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preface
The present volume was partially elaborated on the basis of the work-
shop “citizenship, collective identity and welfare state nationalism“ 
held at the University of southern denmark in odense in november 
2008. This workshop was organized by the nordic centre of excel-
lence nordWel (The nordic Welfare state – historical foundations 
and future challenges). subsequently, in preparing this book, i have 
benefited greatly from the generous support and assistance of the nor-
dic centre of excellence nordWel.
my special thanks are due to the director of the nordWel profes-
sor pauli Kettunen and vice-director of the nordWel professor Klaus 
petersen for their initial feedback on the draft, their comments and 
suggestions and for including this volume into the nordWel publica-
tion series. i also thank Jussi Vauhkonen and heidi haggrén from the 
University of helsinki for their conscientious coordination of the pub-
lishing of this book. 
last, but not least, i owe thanks to daniel Béland, Grete Brochmann, 
romana careja, patrick emmenegger, Bryan fanning, heidi Vad Jøns-
son, ireneusz paweł Karolewski, pauli Kettunen and andré lecours. 
Their chapters in this volume constitute a significant contribution to 
a better understanding of the phenomena of welfare citizenship and 
welfare nationalism. 
Andrzej Marcin Suszycki, June 2011 .

9introduction:  
The aims and the content of this volume 
andrzej marcin suszycki
This volume offers contributions of scholars in the field of welfare state 
studies, comparative politics and political theory that focus on the re-
lationship between citizenship and welfare as well as nationalism and 
welfare. 
This volume has two main aims. first, it should contribute to a more 
systematic conceptualisation of the terms welfare citizenship and wel-
fare nationalism. although we can observe a considerable proliferation 
of research on citizenship, the term welfare citizenship has surpris-
ingly remained unclear in conceptual and theoretical terms. certainly, 
studies on social citizenship have been conducted for several decades, 
at least since Thomas h. marshall’s seminal work on citizenship and 
social class.1 however, defining welfare citizenship as a shared mem-
bership in a community adhering to social rights seems to be too 
parsimonious to outline the substance of welfare citizenship. rather, 
against the background of the results of the research on citizenship 
in the field of political theory and the increasingly advanced research 
on the nature of the welfare state in the field of welfare state studies, 
we expect welfare citizenship to be more than the social citizenship in 
marshall’s understanding. Welfare citizenship would presumably in-
clude a political, juridical, and ideational dimension as well as habitual 
1 marshall, t.h. (1992 [1950]) citizenship and social class, london: pluto press.  
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and discursive practices through which citizens negotiate the content 
of material and symbolic benefits as well as the access to these benefits. 
still, open questions, which this volume attempts to address, include, 
for instance: does welfare citizenship depend more upon a singular or 
rather on a unitary conception of the common good? What is the link 
between different models of citizenship and the development of rights, 
obligations and compliance in the specific framework of the welfare 
state? Under what circumstances can welfare citizenship be extended 
beyond the nation-state? 
a similar problem pertains to nationalism in the context of the 
welfare state. as for scholars of nationalism, they regularly focus on 
ethnicity or civic culture but rarely examine the welfare state. al-
though scholars in the field of welfare state studies have seen the 
causal relationship between national identity and the system of wel-
fare provisions, they have rarely scrutinised the relationship between 
nationalism, understood not only as a political but also a societal and 
discursive phenomenon, and the system of welfare provisions. how-
ever, even scholars who have approached welfare nationalism, have 
regularly done it without answering a number of fundamental con-
ceptual, methodological and theoretical questions. These questions 
are, for instance: What is welfare nationalism? how can we make the 
concept suitable for the purposes of empirical studies? in what systems 
does it occur on a regular basis? should we see it as an acceptable and 
legitimate political phenomenon? can we assume a holistic character 
of welfare state nationalism and regard it as a consistent ideological 
phenomenon? 
The second goal of this volume is to examine both in inter-country 
comparisons and in-depth single country cases how citizenship and 
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nationalism change their meaning and functions in view of the proc-
esses of globalisation, european integration and immigration as well as 
in the context of multi-ethnical statehood. in the conventional under-
standing, citizenship and national belonging were bounded by the bor-
ders of the national welfare community. scholars typically acknowl-
edged that citizens in welfare states were fully committed to ideas and 
interests linked to national welfare and that the emergence and devel-
opment of welfare states involved an intergenerational contract based 
on a firm sense among citizens that they belonged naturally together, 
that they had common interests, a common history of rights and du-
ties with regard to welfare state, and that they could trust one another. 
consequently, citizens were supposed to be continuously willing and 
able to reassure themselves that their welfare systems should exist and 
they had strong reasons to remain the equally entitled members of 
welfare based political community and that they should create a solid 
resistance to the retrenchment of the welfare system. however, the in-
creasingly relevant phenomena of transnational migration, globalisa-
tion and regional integration as well as the multi-ethnicity of several 
welfare states have constituted a serious challenge to this conventional 
perspective. despite the growing interest in the consequences of these 
phenomena for the cohesion and endurance of welfare states, there 
are still important aspects to be explored. They include, for instance, 
the following questions from the field of historical welfare state stud-
ies, comparative politics and political theory: did the nation-build-
ing process which in many states corresponded to the development 
of the welfare state collide with the goal of the so-called multicultural 
integration after the welfare states were confronted with massive im-
migration waves from the early 1960s? has the social citizenship been 
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reconciled with claims for liberality towards new cultural and ethni-
cal minorities? are the structures of old and established welfare states 
more skilled in integrating aliens into the national welfare community 
than the recently developed welfare states? do the integration policies 
in the form of guest-worker-policies follow the general development in 
the expansion of the welfare state? 
 accordingly, the volume has three parts. part i deals with 
conceptual and theoretical normative aspects of the relationship be-
tween citizenship and welfare and nationalism and welfare. in chapter 
1, ireneusz paweł Karolewski explores the conceptual dimension of 
welfare citizenship. Karolewski claims that welfare citizenship is not 
equal with social citizenship, which is constructed mainly through the 
prism of the social policies of the state. in contrast – as argued by Ka-
rolewski –we can speak of welfare citizenship, even in the absence of 
social policies, since welfare citizenship can be found in each citizen-
ship model regardless the social activity of the state. Karolewski dis-
aggregates citizenship into three components: rights, obligations and 
compliance. he regards this disaggregation of citizenship as a point of 
departure for different generic models of citizenship such as republi-
can, liberal and caesarean citizenship, to which he ascribes types of 
welfare citizenship. in the perspective of republican citizenship, wel-
fare is relevant vis-à-vis civic duties of the citizens. since civic obliga-
tions are deemed necessary with regard to collectivity, republican citi-
zenship is not about individual welfare but rather community welfare. 
according to Karolewski, the welfare state is a modern equivalent for 
the republican citizenship model, as its function is to secure citizens’ 
material and social minimal independence, in particular in times of 
economic downturn and citizens’ unemployment. furthermore, Ka-
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rolewski differentiates two versions of liberal welfare citizenship. in the 
libertarian version, citizens live in a society of atomistic individuals. 
here, welfare is subject to individual choice and the state is not allowed 
to enforce collective welfare policies in the name of collectivity. liber-
tarian citizens believe in the workings of the market as an embodiment 
of freedom. in his context, charity plays an important role. in its social 
version, welfare liberal citizenship, social rights, in addition to civil 
and political rights, are viewed as a necessary component of citizen-
ship. among other things, they encompass healthcare services, social 
security, as well as state investment in citizens’ education. interestingly 
enough, this can lead to similar welfare policies as in republican wel-
fare citizenship. Yet in the social version of liberal welfare citizenship, 
citizens are private holders of rights (including rights to welfare) and 
have at the same time minimal responsibilities if any (first and fore-
most taxpaying) vis-à-vis the community. caesarean welfare citizen-
ship stresses security politics as the major welfare concern of the state. 
security politics become the basis for the new definition of welfare, as 
the state increasingly uses technologies of surveillance and shifts the 
focus from a rights-orientated citizenship to neurotic citizenship. a 
neurotic citizen defines welfare politics in terms of its permanent inse-
curity, which can only be guaranteed by the state. his/her preference 
for liberty and freedom becomes surpassed by his/her fears of survival 
in view of, for instance, organised crime and possible terrorist attacks. 
in this sense, welfare becomes securitised. 
 chapter 2 proposes a conceptual, analytical and theoretical 
framework of welfare nationalism. andrzej marcin suszycki regards 
welfare nationalism as a form of nationalism. he defines welfare na-
tionalism at the micro level as individuals’ auto-categorisations and 
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xeno-categorisations in terms of national distinction on the basis of 
national mega-narratives related to welfare, and at the meso level 
and macro level, as a discursive commitment of collective political or 
societal actors to the national narratives related to welfare. Besides, 
suszycki points to the level of supranational effects of welfare national-
ism, that is, the effects on the international system. as far as the ideal 
types of welfare nationalism are concerned, suszycki distinguishes 
between “archaeological” and instrumental welfare nationalism, be-
tween strong, medium and weak levels of welfare nationalism, as well 
as between consistent and contextual welfare nationalism. at the theo-
retical level, suszycki claims that one of the major problems, which 
relates to the contemporary phenomena of globalisation and regional 
integration, is that scholars conventionally regard a mere resistance 
against the transfer of sovereignty in welfare issues to a supranational 
level (european integration is here the most prominent example) as 
welfare nationalism, whereas a mere support for sovereignty transfer 
is automatically seen as non welfare nationalism. suszycki asserts that 
we should speak of welfare nationalism only when political actors refer 
to specific national welfare related interests and ideas (welfare narra-
tives) to legitimise their resistance to or, their support for, sovereignty 
losses in welfare issues. Besides, suszycki maintains that the extent 
to which political or societal actors resort to consistent or contextual 
welfare nationalism mainly depends on the degree of socio-economic 
dependence of a country on its international environment. further-
more, suszycki suggests that scholars use the term welfare nationalism 
to describe phenomena which should not be considered as welfare na-
tionalism, such as (welfare) regionalism or (welfare) localism. in this 
context, suszycki maintains that using approaches which emulate the 
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characteristics of the nation-states to regionalism or other sub-state 
political phenomena leads to an unjustified increase of ‘welfare nation-
alisms’. as to the ethical assessment of welfare nationalism, suszycki 
follows the theses of liberal nationalists. Therefore, he advocates oth-
ers to consider welfare nationalism in democratic states as a legitimate 
method of maintaining the citizens’ willingness to bear the financial 
and social burdens needed for the welfare system to function. 
 chapter 3 combines conceptual and empirical insights regard-
ing the new global framework of citizenship and welfare nationalism. 
pauli Kettunen emphasises that although globalisation and processes 
of regional integration have seriously challenged the foundations of 
national welfare states, the significance of nationalism has not dimin-
ished. Quite the contrary: beside its “traditional” forms such as pro-
tectionist or racist policies and discourses against the global mobility 
of capital, information, ideas, and people, nationalism has become an 
inherent part of the globalised economy where it appears in the con-
cern for “our” competitiveness. Kettunen argues that this new form of 
welfare nationalism associated with and nourished by global economic 
competition led to significant changes in the nationalistic legitimisa-
tion of the nation-state as well as in the shaping of political and social 
identities and in notions of citizenship. Kettunen stresses that even the 
nordic welfare states were profoundly transformed by this new form 
of welfare nationalism. furthermore, Kettunen claims that –in the case 
of eU member states –focusing on globalisation not just as a national 
challenge but as a communitarian european challenge implies euro-
nationalist agenda-settings fulfilling the imperatives of “our europe-
an” competitiveness. as to social citizenship, Kettunen argues that the 
myrdalian post-World-War-ii visions of national and worldwide “cre-
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ated harmony”, with their optimistic confidence in “enlightened citi-
zenry”, have been replaced by the concepts of “corporate citizenship” 
and –in the european context –“social partnership”. While “corporate 
citizenship” emerged as an affirmative response to demands for “social 
responsibility” in enterprises and demands to adopt a “stakeholder” 
instead of a narrow “shareholder” perspective, hence “social partner-
ship”, as a response to the critique of neo-liberalist globalisation, has 
reflected an attempt by the eU to engage business companies in a strat-
egy aimed at european competitiveness, based on knowledge, relative-
ly high social norms, and trade union participation. Kettunen asserts 
that both concepts are characteristic of the recent discourse in which 
the ideas and practices of collective negotiations and agreements are 
discussed from the point of view of their compatibility with the new 
needs of national or european competitiveness. 
part ii deals with welfare citizenship and welfare nationalism in a 
comparative perspective in the context of multi-ethnical or multilin-
gual statehood and against the background of increasing immigration 
flows. it makes clear that, first, there is generally a strong causality be-
tween ethnic heterogeneity and distributional conflicts, and, second, 
that communitarian thinking is becoming stronger the more the wel-
fare system is exposed to internalisation, globalisation and regional in-
tegration. in chapter 4, daniel Béland and andré lecours focus on the 
relationship between sub-state nationalism and welfare-state politics 
in Belgium, canada, and the United Kingdom. Béland and lecours 
claim that sub-state nationalism can affect welfare state development in 
two related ways. first, nationalist actors can reshape the social policy 
agenda while promoting new policy alternatives. second, nationalist 
mobilisation can reinforce the institutional autonomy of their region 
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in the field of social policy governance. Béland and lecours stress that 
sub-state nationalism in flanders, Québec, and scotland involves a so-
cial policy dimension and the nationalist movements strongly affect 
policy agendas at both the state and the sub-state levels, albeit in dif-
ferent ways and to varying degrees. in Belgium, the dominant flemish 
nationalist discourse stresses the belief that wealthy flanders is subsi-
dising poor Wallonia through a country-wide social insurance system. 
as a consequence, flemish nationalism has questioned the legitimacy 
of the federal government to regulate the social insurance system, and 
–increasingly –also the very meaning of solidarity between flanders 
and Wallonia, transforming the call for welfare-state decentralisation 
into an unavoidable political issue across the country. in contrast to 
flemish nationalism, Québécois nationalism in canada has been an 
important agenda setter in social policy as it has contributed to the im-
plementation of many distinctive social programmes –compared with 
the english-speaking canadian provinces –and it has put pressure on 
the canadian federal government to keep up with its progressive fam-
ily policies. also in scotland, policies enacted in the name of ‘national 
distinctiveness’ have had an impact on state-level policy debates on is-
sues like the elimination of up-front tuition fees for university students 
and the establishment of free personal care for the elderly. recently, 
the scottish nationalist discourse has increasingly made the case that 
scottish independence would not only serve to achieve greater social 
justice in scotland but also to generate new wealth. in sum, social 
policy has factored into nationalist mobilisation in all three cases in-
sofar as Québécois, scottish, and flemish nationalism have pushed for 
welfare-state decentralisation. however, whereas the cases of Québec 
and scottish nationalism are similar, as both pushed for equality and 
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redistributive justice in canada and the United Kingdom, flemish na-
tionalism has rejected equality and redistributive justice in Belgium. 
in chapters 5, patrick emmenegger and romana careja claim that 
welfare-state nationalism has been permanently present, directly or 
indirectly, in the justification of social benefits schemes: in some cases 
the policy of defence or promotion of a nation was used as a reason 
for the creation of welfare entitlement schemes, in other cases wel-
fare standards have been used to define a nation and rally the citizens 
in its defence. emmenegger and careja argue that in Western europe 
a certain level of nationalism continues to influence the allocation of 
welfare benefits, and nationalism becomes most visible when the issue 
of welfare benefits is raised with respect to the category of ‘migrants’. 
in this regard, they argue that current reforms in the area of migration 
and social policy in West european states have been inspired by the 
popular belief in these states that individuals from poorer countries 
are induced to migrate to richer countries by the wish and expecta-
tion of social benefits. emmenegger and careja emphasise that, since 
voters in affluent countries do not perceive immigrants as a part of 
the national community, they increasingly reject the idea of provid-
ing immigrants with social benefits even in times of need. as a re-
action to the voters’ anti-immigrant attitude, european governments 
inhibit immigration, reduce the welfare entitlements of asylum seekers 
and retrench social protection schemes that were believed to provide 
a disproportionate amount of benefits to immigrants. emmenegger 
and careja substantiate their arguments by presenting survey data on 
the deservingness of different societal groups and a review of policy 
reforms in the cross-section of migration policy and social policy in 
france, Germany and Great Britain.
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part iii includes three in-depth single country case studies on nor-
way, denmark and ireland both in a historical and more contempo-
rary perspective. in all three cases, the authors suggest that we deal 
with expanding and boundary-making welfare nationalism and with 
the politics of making welfare citizenship more difficult to be achieved 
by immigrants, hence the question of a longer (denmark) or shorter 
(norway and ireland) history of welfare-state development does not 
play any significant role. Besides, the more recent developments in 
denmark and norway also starkly contrast with the earlier ideology 
of multicultural integration. in chapter 6, Grete Brochmann examines 
how the tradition of strong egalitarian social citizenship governance, 
which had been a fundamental element of the nation-building proc-
ess in norway after World War ii, was reconciled from the early 1970s 
onwards with claims for the integration of immigrants into the welfare 
state. Brochamnn emphasises that the political elites of the country 
assumed that against the background of the relatively short history 
of the norwegian nationhood their political legitimacy could only be 
secured through the ethnic norwegian people. Besides, Brochmann 
points to the fact that norway indeed had no experience in handling 
the phenomenon of immigration.  That is why, as Brochmann argues, 
the immigrants with legal residency status were given immediate ac-
cess to welfare rights by and large at par with norwegian nationals, 
hence they were intentionally included into the social component of 
the citizenship, whereas at the same time they were perceived as cultur-
ally too different and alienated to be able to belong to the norwegian 
nationhood and not included into the political component of citizen-
ship. according to Brochamnn, even recent developments such as the 
new citizenship law from 2005 with the reinforcement of the “single 
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citizenship”-policy demonstrate that immigrants are not targets for the 
otherwise ongoing and continuous nationhood formation. 
 in chapter 7, heidi Vad Jønsson deals in a historical perspec-
tive with the danish immigration and integration policies from the 
1960s to the early 1980s. Jønsson points to the fact that –in contrast 
to norway –the foundations for these policies had already been laid in 
the late 19th and early 20th century as the responsibility for foreigners’ 
social situation, especially the protection of foreign workers from ex-
ploitation, was placed within the framework of the danish state. Jøns-
son demonstrates that this responsibility remained with the state and 
the integration policy, in the form of guest-worker policy, to a great 
extent followed the general development in the expansion of the dan-
ish welfare state and immigrants were granted equal social rights to the 
native danes. however, since the middle of the 1970s, as it was recog-
nised that the “temporary” guest-workers intended to stay in denmark 
on a permanent basis and the unemployment rate of immigrants began 
to become higher than that of native danes, the political and societal 
discourse began to consider immigrants as a ‘social problem’. The solu-
tion to this problem was seen in a comprehensive political and social 
inclusion of immigrants into the danish welfare state as well as their 
societal adjustment, especially through their more active participation 
in the labour market. The policy of political and social equalisation 
of immigrants to the native danes was continued in the 1980s with a 
gradual shift towards the enforcement of immigrants’ respect for the 
danish norms, values and standards –a policy which has also charac-
terised the danish policy towards immigrants in the recent decade. 
 in chapter 8, Bryan fanning examines contemporary irish 
immigration and integration policy against the background of the 
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irish membership in the european Union, the interests of the national 
economy defined in neo-liberal terms, and the recent mass immigra-
tion to ireland both from new eU member states and non-eU coun-
tries. drawing on Joppke’s approach, fanning claims that the neo-
liberal irish welfare state coerces its own citizens into releasing their 
self-producing and self-regulating capacities as an alternative to the 
redistribution and public welfare that it does not deliver. towards im-
migrants, the irish welfare state follows the logic of “civic integration”, 
which assumes that migrants and immigrants are responsible for their 
own social integration. in this sense, civic integration is the equiva-
lent on the part of immigrants to the workfare policies that also the 
irish population is subjected to in the context of the shrinking welfare 
state. Besides, fanning argues that the irish government –like the gov-
ernments of many other eU member states –practiced welfare ethnic 
nepotism as a response to the challenge of immigration. for instance, 
in 2004, the birth-right to irish citizenship for immigrant children 
born in ireland, i.e. the Ius Soli principle, was removed. The change 
towards a Ius Sanguine basis of establishing rights to citizenship was 
accompanied by the weakening of social rights of immigrants. in 2004 
the irish government curtailed the welfare entitlements of new immi-
grants, also those arriving from other eU member states. in 2006 how-
ever, the irish government had to acknowledge that eU law imposed 
reciprocal obligations on eU member states to recognise the welfare 
entitlements of citizens from other eU countries resident in ireland. 
consequently, the group most seriously affected by the new welfare 
stratifications remained the non-eU migrants. in this context fanning 
asserts that eU member states extend cosmopolitan reciprocal welfare 
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altruism towards one another and welfare ethnic nepotism towards 
citizens of non-eU member states. 
in conclusion, this volume on the one hand makes clear that we should 
examine the terms welfare citizenship and welfare nationalism as com-
plex and multi-dimensional phenomena. on the other hand we should 
see them as not complete phenomena, hence subject to change. such 
an approach might be a promising basis for a conceptual and theoreti-
cal as well as empirical explanatory framework.
still, this volume leaves a number of important questions to be ap-
proached in further research on the topic. These problems include, 
for instance, the relationship between the variations in the historical 
development of different welfare states and the content and nature of 
their contemporary welfare citizenship and welfare nationalism. Be-
sides, future research might discover surprising insights on the more 
recent discursive change which has been brought about by the demo-
graphical tendencies and labour demand in a number of West europe-
an states where immigrants after having been treated for decades as a 
“burden” on welfare are perceived as the potential saviours of the wel-
fare systems. another problem, which against the focus of the main-
stream research on Western states has occupied marginal attention so 
far, is the phenomenon of welfare citizenship and welfare nationalism 
in non-Western states.
part i  
Welfare citizenship and  
Welfare nationalism:  
conceptual and theoretical  
considerations

chapter 1 
conceptualising Welfare citizenship
ireneusz paweł Karolewski
The goal of this chapter is to elucidate the relationship between citi-
zenship and welfare by introducing the concept of welfare citizenship. 
in the following section i will explore the conceptual dimension of 
citizenship, which comprises the (parsimonious) semantic core of citi-
zenship and disaggregates citizenship into three components of rights, 
obligations and compliance. following this, i will use this disaggrega-
tion of citizenship as a point of departure for the models of citizenship. 
i will use each of these components of citizenship to construct generic 
models of citizenship, to which i will ascribe types of welfare citizen-
ship. These three models of citizenship include the republican, the lib-
eral and the caesarean citizenship.
What is citizenship?
a minimal definition would delineate citizenship as a shared member-
ship in a political community.1 This definition is insensitive regarding, 
for instance, the type of territoriality, since citizenship may be realised 
in smaller territories of the cities or larger territories of nation-states or 
1 cf. stewart, angus (1995) ‘two conceptions of citizenship’, British Journal of sociology 
46, no. 1,  63–78.
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even federations.2 in addition, this parsimonious definition does not 
tell us anything about the substance of citizenship, but relates it to the 
political authority and the relationship among citizens by stressing the 
political nature of the membership. consequently, it leaves the ques-
tion of who belongs to a polity unanswered by treating it as a variable.3 
We can map citizenship along three criteria of rights, obligations 
and compliance. These three criteria are components of citizenship. 
They can assume different forms, different scopes, different ranges as 
well as different degrees. in this sense, they are variables and should be 
viewed neither as constants nor as teleological categories which need 
to be fulfilled in order to claim the ‘genuine’ citizenship. 
The advantage of such a disaggregative and synthetic conception of 
citizenship is that by using rights, obligations and compliance we can 
examine any type of citizenship irrespective of its territorial range, its 
cultural background or its substance. Therefore, this approach is on 
the one hand synthetic, combining different aspects of citizenship as 
its components, and disaggregative on the other as we can examine 
the components of citizenship separately, thus disaggregating it along 
different analytical lines. 
The components of citizenship are seldom equally highlighted in 
the conceptions of citizenship. some stress the relevance of rights, 
whereas others focus on obligations or compliance. Therefore, we can 
speak, for instance, of a rights-orientated model of citizenship or ob-
2 nancy fraser and linda Gordon highlight the original meaning of ‘citizen’, relating it to 
the dwellers of medieval cities which were situated outside the feudal relations of servi-
tude. fraser, nancy and Gordon, linda (1998) ‘contract versus charity: Why is there 
no social citizenship in the United states?’, in Gershon, shafir (ed.), The citizenship 
debates, minneapolis: University of minnesota press, 113–127.
3 cf. Thomas, elaine r. (2002) ‘Who Belongs? competing conceptions of political mem-
bership’, european Journal of social Theory 5, no. 3, 323–349.
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ligation-centred model of citizenship. however, the focus on one of 
the components in various citizenship conceptions does not imply that 
the other two components are analytically irrelevant; they are merely 
secondary regarding a specific model of citizenship. 
citizenship components: rights, obligations, and 
compliance 
rights are an essential component of almost every conception of citi-
zenship. historically derived from the roman concept of citizenship, 
in which citizenship meant mainly a legal status, rights are regarded as 
entitlements or privileges. in the legal sense, rights empower citizens to 
resolve conflicts before courts. Therefore, citizenship protects citizens 
from arbitrary political decisions and renders them free, placing free-
dom at the heart of citizenship. citizens can sue in courts and invoke 
a law that grants them rights. in the modern version of citizenship, t. 
h. marshall’s approach presents an apogee of the rights-accentuated 
citizenship. he argues that citizenship is a unified pool of various types 
of citizenship rights including civil, political and social rights.4 
The rights-orientated conception of citizenship is underpinned by 
two principles. it is the principle of legality, which is associated with 
the judiciability of rights in the case of their violation. The other un-
derlying principle of citizenship is the equality of status, which means 
that citizens cannot be excluded from entitlements enjoyed by other 
citizens. While many social inequalities and differences between indi-
viduals are impossible to annihilate, it is citizenship that equalizes in-
dividuals by bestowing the same entitlements upon them, thus having 
4 marshall, t. h. (1992/1950) citizenship and social class, london: pluto press. 
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the power to politically mitigate class divisions. The equality of status 
in citizenship means that all types of citizenship rights are connected 
or unified. however, it is not the equality of the outcome, but rather 
the equality of status with regard to the rights of citizenship as enti-
tlements. This amounts to legal equality and is closely linked to the 
concept of liberty. 
however, the rights-accentuated approach to citizenship can take 
an alternative turn than the equality of status. The special group rights 
approach points in the opposite direction. it argues in favour of the 
recognition of differences in status for minority groups in diverse so-
cieties in order to achieve the equality of the outcome.5 since in their 
account, the equal treatment of individuals (in the sense of equal sta-
tus) is ‘difference-blind’, it tends to perpetuate oppression or disadvan-
tages.6 in this perspective, the procedural equality of status does not 
result in the substantive equality of the outcome. This position holds 
that a more substantive equality cannot be achieved without recognis-
ing and valuing differences alongside individual rights. consequently, 
the pursuit of equality should involve differential rights on the basis of 
group membership to reduce potential vulnerability and disadvantage 
from majorities.7 
irrespective of the aim of the citizenship rights (equality of status or 
equality of outcome), rights are believed to be the central regulative in-
5 cf. Barry, Brian (2002) culture and equality, cambridge: harvard University press, esp. 
91–103.
6 taylor, charles (1992) ‘The politics of recognition’, in amy Gutmann (ed.), multicul-
turalism and the politics of recognition. princeton: princeton University press, 25–73; 
Kymlicka, Will (1995) multicultural citizenship: a liberal Theory of minority rights. 
oxford: oxford University press.
7 cf. offe, claus (1998) ‘homogeneity and constitutional democracy: coping with iden-
tity conflicts through Group rights’, Journal of political philosophy 6, no. 2, 113–141; 
modood, tariq (1997) ‘introduction‘, in tariq modood and pnina Werbner (eds.), The 
politics of multiculturalism in the new europe. london: zed press, 1–25.
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strument in achieving citizenship. traditionally, in liberal approaches 
to citizenship, rights reflect the ontological priority of the individual, 
and link the individual to a political community. at the same time, 
rights exclude non-members from the community by not ascribing 
these rights to them.8 Therefore, rights integrate members of the com-
munity and ‘close’ the community socially. 
next to rights we identify obligations as a further component of 
citizenship. The main thrust of the obligation-based component of 
citizenship is that civic virtues such as solidarity, loyalty or trust are 
necessary features of being a citizen. There are two basic arguments 
in favour of this component. First, there is an ethical understanding 
of citizenship as moral obligation and virtue. its point of departure is 
frequently a critique of a liberal society and selfhood which are sup-
posed to be remedied, for instance with the aristotelian conception 
of citizenship as civic friendship.9 in this sense, citizens are expected 
to demonstrate altruistic features, since they are concerned with the 
welfare of their friends for their sake, not merely for their own. The 
general bonds of civic friendship are a basis for a political community 
whose goal is to fulfil civic obligations towards each other.10 Second, 
beyond this virtue-accentuated and ethical account of citizenship, we 
can discern an instrumental view of civic obligations. This position 
argues first and foremost that potential threats to citizens’ welfare and 
democracy exist whenever low levels of participation, trust and soli-
8 cf. haltern, Ulrich (2005) ‘das Janusgesicht der Unionsbürgerschaft’, swiss political 
science review 11, no. 1, 87–117, esp. 90.
9 cf. for instance schwarzenbach, sibyl a. (1996) ‘on civic friendship ‘, ethics 107, no. 1, 
97–128; sherman, nancy (1987) ‘aristotle on friendship and the shared life’, philoso-
phy and phenomenological research 47, no. 4, 589–613. 
10 cf. Bean, clive (2001) ‘testing the precepts of republican political theory against citizen 
attitudes, beliefs and practices ‘, Journal of sociology 37, no. 2, 141–155.
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darity occur, thus endangering the existence of the republic.11 in this 
sense, civic fulfilment is not the ultimate goal but rather the survival of 
the republic. of course, these two republican positions cannot be eas-
ily disconnected, since the existence of a republic is a prerequisite for 
the civic fulfilment through obligations in the citizenship. 
in contemporary obligations-centred approaches to citizenship, de-
liberative norms assume a particularly outstanding position.12 most 
of the contemporary versions of obligation-based citizenship put an 
emphasis on deliberation processes and communicative norms, rather 
than demanding civic obligations in the form of the communal ethic 
of care or the obligation to participate fully in public life. meanwhile, 
these communicative norms are regarded equally (or even more) 
relevant than many other conceptions of civic obligation, above all 
in their function as potential solutions to some of our most urgent 
contemporary political problems.13 in this perspective, activating the 
deliberative capabilities of citizens becomes a political priority. citi-
zens must learn to give their fellow citizens (and expect to receive from 
them) reasonable accounts of their political preferences and be ready 
to accept the power of better argument relating to common goods.14 
communicative norms are therefore norms of truth- and consensus-
seeking, transferable to any of the deliberative settings such as legisla-
11 cf. pettit, philip (1997) republicanism: a Theory of freedom and Government. oxford: 
oxford University press; skinner, Quentin, (1990) ‘republican ideal of political liberty’, 
in Gisela Bock, Quentin skinner and maurizio Viroli (eds.), machiavelli and republi-
canism. cambridge: cambridge University press, 293–309.
12 mansbridge, Jane et al. (2006), ‘norms of deliberation: an inductive study’, Journal of 
public deliberation 2, no. 1, 1–47.
13 Vetlesen, arne Johan (1995) ‘hannah arendt, habermas and the republican tradition’, 
philosophy & social criticism 21, no. 1, 1–16; honneth, axel (1991) ‘The limits of 
liberalism: on the political-ethical discussion on communitarianism’, Thesis eleven 
28, no. 1, 18–34.
14 habermas, Jürgen (1995) ‘reconciliation through the public use of reason: remarks on 
John rawls’s political liberalism’, Journal of philosophy 92, no. 3, 109–131. 
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tive sessions, court proceedings, and administrative hearings, as well 
as non-governmental associations.15 These deliberative settings are 
rule-free, since the citizens’ goal is not to exercise power over each 
other, but rather to exercise power with each other. This discourse on 
ethics, grounded in communicative norms, can be derived from the 
aristotelian concept of civic friendship, even though such ethics can 
be practiced for instrumental reasons as well as ethical ones.16 
Beyond the matrix of rights and obligations we identify a third com-
ponent of citizenship, which is compliance. in this perspective, citizens 
are also defined as the subjects of political authority. This perspective 
merges the concept of the citizen as a free person and as the subject 
of political authority with an accentuation of the latter. in this sense, 
the condition of liberty can only be reached when citizens are subject 
to political rule, which guarantees their survival in view of antagonis-
tic political conflicts.17 Yet it does not necessarily mean an arbitrary 
power or domination. central to this understanding of citizenship is 
the relationship between the citizenship and the political authority, 
where the interventions of the political authority can be legitimate and 
reasonable. This legitimacy generates political rule according to the 
collective interests of citizens, which is not simply domination. in this 
perspective, citizens possess enough rationality to understand the ne-
15 carson, lyn (2006), ‘improving public deliberative practice: a comparative analysis of 
two italian citizens: Jury projects in 2006’, Journal of public deliberation 2, no. 1, 1–18; 
levine, peter et al. (2005) ‘future directions for public deliberation’, Journal of public 
deliberation 1, no. 1, 1–13.
16 cf. habermas, Jürgen (1992) faktizität und Geltung: Beträge zur diskurstheorie des 
rechts und des demokratischen rechtsstaats, frankfurt: suhrkamp; flynn, Jeffrey 
(2004) ’communicative power in habermas ‘s Theory of democracy’, european Journal 
of political Theory 3, no. 4, 433–454.
17 schmitt, carl (1996/1932) The concept of the political, translated and with an introduc-
tion by George schwab, chicago: University of chicago press; rasch, William (2000) 
‘conflict as a Vocation: carl schmitt and the possibility of politics’, Theory, culture & 
society 17, no. 6, 1–32. 
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cessity of compliance to political authority, without which there would 
be no civilized existence and therefore no citizenship. citizens have 
the power to choose their leaders, and the leaders in turn are obli-
gated to consider citizens’ welfare. Therefore, the goal of citizenship 
for the citizens is to be ruled, otherwise societies will end up in chaos 
and anarchy, which would endanger the survival of the very citizens. 
The focus of this component of citizenship shifts towards the notion 
of power sovereignty and away from the individual rights and obliga-
tions of citizens. however, it does not necessitate that citizens degen-
erate into slaves, serfs or subjects of authoritarian power. The political 
ruler can possess legitimacy, since he is either elected by the citizens 
or the political decisions are accepted by them. discussing citizenship 
as compliance relates rather to a question of final political authority, 
which does not reside with individual citizens.18
citizenship as compliance becomes particularly relevant in the con-
text of security-focused policies of the contemporary state. inspired 
by the writings of michel foucault, surveillance practices of record-
keeping and monitoring behaviour can be seen as defining features of 
modernity and citizenship.19 considering the emergence of ‘discipli-
nary technologies’ the notion of panopticism assumes that citizens are 
never certain if they are being observed at any one particular moment 
by the state. Therefore, the rational citizen seeking to avoid punish-
ment will act as if s/he were the object of constant surveillance.20 This 
18 cf. pranger, robert J. (1966) ‘an explanation for Why final political authority is neces-
sary’, american political science review 60, no. 4, 994–997.
19 foucault, michel (1977) discipline and punish: the birth of the prison, london: allen 
lane.
20 cf. scholz, John t. and pinney, neil (1995) ‘duty, fear, and tax compliance: The 
heuristic Basis of citizenship Behaviour’, american Journal of political science 39, no. 
2, 490–512.
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theoretical perspective has recently been reinvigorated as a result of 
the growth in new communications technology and data-processing 
systems.21 it stresses that the state treats security measures encroaching 
on civil rights as largely negligible in the face of indeterminable danger 
for citizens’ lives.22 it results in a shift from the category of civil, politi-
cal and social citizenship with its emphasis on rights and participation, 
to the citizenship of the risk society. in this sense, citizenship is regard-
ed as a function of ‘risk society’, which is associated with the dangers 
of nuclear catastrophes, global warming, regional financial crises and 
terrorist attacks.23 as a consequence, compliance and obedience to au-
thority are viewed as grounded in an enlightened and informed choice 
of citizens, rather than from state propaganda and manipulation.
Three models of citizenship
The three models of citizenship are ideal types in the Weberian sense. 
They do not exist in pure form, exactly as other typological categories. 
even though our conception of citizenship includes all three compo-
nents (rights, obligations, compliance), we can identify generic mod-
els of citizenship based on the emphasis of each of the components. 
our three generic models of citizenship therefore correspond to the 
components of citizenship of obligations, rights, and compliance, pro-
ducing the republican, the liberal and the caesarean model of citizen-
21 coleman, roy (2003) ‘images from a neoliberal city: The state, surveillance and social 
control’, critical criminology 12, no. 1, 21–42.
22 Bell, colleen (2006) ‘surveillance strategies and populations at risk: Biopolitical 
Governance in canada’s national security policy’, security dialogue 37, no. 2, 147–165; 
henman, paul (2004) „targeted!: population segmentation, electronic surveillance and 
Governing the Unemployed in australia’, international sociology 19, no. 2, 173–191.
23 cf. Beck, Ulrich (2002) ‘The terrorist Threat: World risk society revisited‘, Theory, 
culture & society 19, no. 4, 39–55; Beck, Ulrich (2003) ‘The silence of Words: on ter-
ror and War’, security dialogue 34, no. 3, 255–267.
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ship. each model stresses a different component while maintaining the 
other components, even though these assume weak values. 
The republican model of citizenship is based on the aristotelian ide-
al of the citizen as a zoon politikon, the political man for whom politics 
is a means of leading a good life in the republic.24 in contrast, the lib-
eral tradition of citizenship draws strongly from the writings of John 
locke and david hume25, according to whom citizens are individuals 
whose primary concern is not realising any human ideal of good but, 
on the contrary, lies in the realising of their interests and passions.26 in 
this conception of citizenship, politics is only an instrument for guar-
anteeing the realisation of citizens’ individual interests.27 The third 
model is caesarean citizenship, the roots of which can be found in the 
writings of Thomas hobbes and, in its modern version, in the works 
of carl schmitt.28 Being a citizen means to think of politics in catego-
ries of friend and enemy. The caesarean citizen delineates politics as a 
perpetual struggle against enemies, be it internal (hobbes) or external 
24 aristotle, politics 1253 a i; logs, isaac (1897) ‘The political philosophy of aristotle’, The 
annals of the american academy of political and social science 10, 313–333; coby, 
patrick (1986) ‘aristotle’s four conceptions of politics’, political research Quarterly 39, 
480–503.
25 some authors regard also Baruch spinoza as a co-founder of liberalism, while others 
disagree. cooper, Julie (2006) ‘freedom of speech and philosophical citizenship in spi-
noza’s Theologico-political treatise’, law, culture and the humanities 2, 91–114. That 
the works of John stuart mill were essential for the development of the liberal doctrine 
appears, however, to be consensual. see  stimson, shannon c and milgate, murray 
(2001) ‘mill, liberty and the facts of life’, political studies 49, 231–248.
26 locke, John (1988/1739) two treatises of government. cambridge: cambridge Univer-
sity press; hume, david (1992/1739), treatise of human nature, new York: prometheus 
Books; Kohn, margaret (2006) ‘The passion of liberalism’, political Theory 34, no. 4, 
499–505.
27 hume, david, treatise of human nature, 534ff; finlay, christopher J. (2004), ‘hume’s 
Theory of civil society’, european Journal of political Theory 3, no. 4, 369–391.
28 hobbes, Thomas (1996/1651) leviathan, or the matter, form and power of a com-
monwealth, ecclesiastical and civil, edited with an introduction by J.c. a. Gashin. 
oxford: oxford University press; schmitt, carl (1996/1932) The concept of the political, 
translated and with an introduction by George schwab. chicago: University of chicago 
press).
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enemies (schmitt). citizenship is thus about survival, security and the 
effectiveness of political decisions. politics is therefore ubiquitous, al-
though in a different manner than in the republican model. The citizen 
does not realise any human good, nor does s/he pursue her/his purely 
private interests. rather, the citizen authorises the caesar, a political 
leader with power, who guarantees the survival of the individual and 
the nation in a hostile environment with foes. Therefore, the citizen 
must not only be aware of enemies but also be organised within a ho-
mogenous nation aware of the danger, thus allowing for unanimous 
decisions. 
republican citizenship
The republican approach to citizenship focuses on the duties of the cit-
izens in a democratic community. on the one hand, it follows the idea 
that political participation is the way of realisation of human good, 
since only political participation allows for an active liberty – that is, 
freedom to make laws that one can live by.29 on the other hand, there 
is a clear moral prescription for the citizen to politically participate in 
the affairs of the community. The citizen is primarily a ‘holder of du-
ties’ vis-à-vis the polity, as the holding of political office is regarded as 
a necessary burden resulting from the republican aversion to a perma-
nent political class. Therefore, republican citizenship stresses the obli-
29 rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1999/1762) du contrat social ou principes du droit politique.
paris: Gf flammarion; sandel, michael J. (1999) ‘liberalism and republicanism: 
friends or foes? a reply to richard dagger’, The review of politics 61, no. 2, 209–214; 
colish, marcia l. (1971) ‘The idea of liberty in machiavelli’, Journal of the history of 
ideas 32, no. 3, 323–350; shaw, carl K.Y. (2003) ‘Quentin skinner on the proper mean-
ing of republican liberty’, politics 23, no. 1, 46–56. 
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gation component of all citizenship components (rights, obligations, 
compliance) the most.30 
The deliberative theory of democracy offers a post-modern, al-
though curtailed, version of republicanism, based on the obligation 
component of citizenship. The essential element of the deliberative de-
mocracy theory is the argumentative exchange between equal citizens 
who engage in consensus building.31 deliberation rests on the princi-
ple of a continuous debate between citizens in which only the power 
of argument is expected to count. The debate should be free, open and 
fair, and it ought to guarantee equal access for every interested citizen. 
deliberative theory excludes voting procedures, since citizens should 
debate until they reach a consensus.32 The only way to influence the 
political outcome is through the debate in which only better argu-
ments succeed. Those arguments must not, however, be based on self-
ish preferences, since the goal of deliberation is not only to solve com-
mon problems but also, often primarily, to find what the public good 
is. correspondingly, the arguments ought to relate to the common 
good and public interest.33 in this deliberative perspective, the model 
of citizenship is active, participatory and citizens should be committed 
to the res publica.34 in this sense, citizens are obliged to share discursive 
30 dagger, richard K. (1977) ‘What is political obligation?’, american political science 
review 71, no. 1, 86–94; cf. also segall, shlomi (2005), ‘political participation as an 
engine of social solidarity: a sceptical View’, political studies 53, 362–378.
31 cohen, Joshua (1989) ‘deliberation and democratic legitimacy’, in alan hamlin and 
philip pettit (eds.), The good polity: normative analysis of the state. cambridge: Black-
well, 17–34, esp. 74.
32 fabre, cécile (2003) ‘to deliberate or to discourse: is that the Question?’, european 
Journal of political Theory 2, no. 1, 107–115; scholz, sally J. (2002) ‘dyadic deliberation 
versus discursive democracy’, political Theory 30, no. 5, 746–750.
33 cf. manin, Bernard (1987) ‘on legitimacy and political deliberation’, political Theory 
15, no. 3, 338–368.
34 Vitale, denise (2006) ‘Between deliberative and participatory democracy: a contribu-
tion on habermas’, philosophy and social criticism 32, no. 6, 739–766.
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ethics, rather than sacrifice their lives.35 in addition, the deliberative 
conception of citizenship hopes for the integrative effects of delibera-
tion, particularly in divided societies.36 although unmistakably repub-
lican, deliberative theory cuts down the role of the citizen to a com-
municative process, whilst putting aside issues of voting, the holding 
of political office and obligations to the polity.37 nevertheless, it is, as 
is the entire republican tradition of citizenship, driven by the logic of 
shared obligations, from which moral resources, societal integration 
and collective identity are drawn.38 
35 cf. flynn, Jeffrey (2004) ‘communicative power in habermas’s Theory of democracy’, 
european Journal of political Theory 3, no. 4, 433–454; Yack, Bernard (2006) ‘rheto-
ric and public reasoning: an aristotelian Understanding of political deliberation’’, 
political Theory 34, no. 4, 417–438; shockley, Kenneth (2006) ‘on participation and 
membership in discursive practices’, philosophy of the social sciences 36, no. 1, 67–85; 
cf. also Buchstein, hubertus (1995) ‘die zumutungen der demokratie. Von der norma-
tiven Theorie des Bürgers zur institutionell vermittelten präferenzkompetenz’, in Klaus 
von Beyme and claus offe (eds.), politische Theorien in der Ära der transformation, 
opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 295–324. 
36 dryzek, John s. (2005) ‘deliberative democracy in divided societies: alternatives to 
agonism and analgesia’, political Theory 33, no. 2, 218–242; Bohman, James (2003) 
‘reflexive public deliberation: democracy and the limits of pluralism’, philosophy and 
social criticism 29, no. 1, 85–105.
37 epstein, richard a. (1988) ‘modern republicanism: or the flight from substance’, Yale 
law Journal 97, no. 8, 1633–1650.
38 cf. habermas, Jürgen (1995) ‘reconciliation through the public use of reason: remarks 
on John rawls’s political liberalism’, Journal of philosophy 92, no. 3, 109–131. however, 
some republican authors see limitations of public deliberation in respect of cultural 
conflicts. cf. Bohman, James (2003) ‘reflexive public deliberation: democracy and the 
limits of pluralism’, philosophy & social criticism 29, no. 1, 85–105. in this sense, public 
deliberation would require a substantive dimension apart from the purely procedural 
propagated by Jürgen habermas. however, giving public deliberation more substance 
shifts it again from procedural universalism towards republicanism. cf. Gilabert, pablo 
(2005) ‘The substantive dimension of deliberative practical rationality’, philosophy & 
social criticism 31, no. 2, 185–210.
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liberal citizenship
The liberal model of citizenship is rights-based, in contrast to the ob-
ligations-orientated republican citizenship.39 This results from a para-
digm in which individuals are guided in their actions by private inter-
ests and passions, with politics being just one area besides economy, 
religion, culture, science etc. public space does not possess any moral 
supremacy since political power comes into being by the voluntary de-
cision of rational creatures.40 The government function is neither to 
fulfil a supreme human good nor are citizens’ actions subordinated to 
the shared public interest. The elected government’s main role is to de-
ter citizens’ transgressions of other citizens’ rights. The gravest of these 
are offences against individual freedom and property.41 any number 
of individuals can exercise political power collectively by electing a 
government and replacing it any time they please. The political com-
munity entrusts political power to a government consisting of deputies 
for the people – trustees who can be discarded if they fail their elec-
tors.42 The government can therefore be dissolved when the governors 
neglect their tasks or act contrary to the will of the citizens.43 The po-
39 cf. patrick, morag (2000) ‘liberalism, rights and recognition’, philosophy and social 
criticism 26, no. 5, 28–46; scorza, Jason a. (2004) ‘liberal citizenship and civic 
friendship’, political Theory 32, no. 1, 85–108.
40 cf. riley, patrick (1976) ‘locke on Voluntary agreement and political power’, political 
research Quarterly 29, 136–145; Van leeuwen, Bart (2006) ‘social attachments as con-
ditions for the condition of the good life?: a critique of Will Kymlicka’s moral monism’, 
philosophy and social criticism 32, no. 3, 401–428.
41 locke, John (1988/1690) two treatises of government. cambridge: cambridge Uni-
versity press, esp. chapter V; larmore, charles (1990) ‘political liberalism’, political 
Theory 18, no. 3, 339–360; Waldron, Jeremy (1987) ‘Theoretical foundations of liberal-
ism’, philosophical Quarterly 37, no. 147, 127–150.
42 cf. mcswain, cynthia J. (1985) ‘administrators and citizenship: The liberalist legacy 
of the constitution’, administration and society 17, no. 2, 131–148.
43 locke, John (1988/1690), two treatises of government, esp. chapter XiX; seliger, 
martin (1963) ‘locke’s Theory of revolutionary action’, political research Quarterly 16, 
548–568; langston, Thomas s. and lind, michael e. (1991) ‘John locke and the limits 
of presidential prerogative’, polity 24, no. 1, 49–68.
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litical community comes into being by the consent of every individual 
by way of the social contract, which has to be constructed in a manner 
fair to everybody. against this background, citizens by and large enjoy 
passive liberty, which is expressed in terms of the rule of law. in other 
words, citizens are not necessarily interested in participation but rath-
er in an undisturbed accumulation of wealth. to put it provocatively, 
a liberal citizen is likely to be more interested in property than in de-
mocracy, as opposed to his republican counterparts. a liberal citizen 
could even choose to live under a despotic regime but under the rule 
of law – one which allows him the freedom to advance his affairs in 
private and guarantees the security of his property – rather than to live 
in a democracy accompanied by insecurity and disorder.44 
The role of the citizen as an individual is merely one among many.45 
s/he is an economic creature living in a market-based society, the logic 
of which is competition.46 The government seems to be merely a tool to 
enable citizens’ cooperation. This guarantees the security of contracts, 
reduces transaction costs and offers information to the participants in 
the market who suffer from the dilemmas of collective action.47 still, 
liberal citizens are not equal in the market. on the one hand, some in-
dividuals lose due to competition, and therefore lean towards the social 
taming of the market by the state. on the other hand, there are winners 
in the market competition who in turn view themselves primarily as 
44 ignatieff, michael, ‘The myth of citizenship’, 61; Barry, Brian (1973) ‘liberalism and 
Want-satisfaction: a critique of John rawls’, political Theory 1, no. 2, 134–153.
45 moon, J. donald (2003) ‘liberalism, autonomy, and moral pluralism’, political Theory 
31, no. 1, 125–135.
46 cf. pettit, philip (2006) ‘freedom in the market’, politics, philosophy and economics 5, 
no. 2, 131–149.
47 cf. north, douglass c. (1993) ‘What do we mean by rationality?’, public choice 77, 
159–162; Kato, Junko (1996) ‘institutions and rationality in politics – Three Varieties of 
neo-institutionalists’, British Journal of political science 26, no. 4, 553–582.
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taxpayers. These two major roles are decisive for the self-definition of 
individuals as citizens in the liberal model of citizenship. in the liber-
tarian version of this model, individuals are interested in a small gov-
ernment that acts effectively with regard to the tasks entrusted to it. 
This is because an expanding government functions beyond the nec-
essary minimum, potentially endangering the freedom of citizens. in 
his radical theory of justice, robert nozick points out that the redis-
tribution of resources by the state in a free society without the consent 
of everybody inevitably leads to enslavement, as taxpayers are forced 
against their will to contribute to the welfare of strangers.48 There is, 
therefore, an imminent threat from government to citizens’ freedom, 
meaning that it is in citizens’ best interests to keep the government at 
bay. for this reason, the government is only allowed to execute actions 
necessary for the production of common goods, which cannot be pro-
duced individually. since the expansion of government tasks means 
higher taxes, citizens tend towards reducing the costs of state activity, 
particularly since the government is not indispensable for the func-
tioning of the society. as david hume put it “though government be 
an invention very advantageous, and even in some circumstances ab-
solutely necessary to mankind; it is not necessary in all circumstances, 
nor is it impossible for men to preserve society for some time, without 
having recourse to such an invention”.49 
48 nozick, robert (1974) anarchy, state, and Utopia. oxford: oxford University press; no-
zick, robert (1973) ‘distributive Justice’, philosophy and public affairs 3, no. 1, 45–126; 
cf. also nock, christopher John (1992), ‘equal freedom and Unequal property: a 
critique of nozick’s libertarian case’, canadian Journal of political science 25, no. 4, 
677–695.
49 hume, david, treatise of human nature, 539.
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caesarean citizenship
Whereas republican citizenship aims for the common good, and the 
liberal citizenship highlights the individual’s rights and interests, the 
caesarean model of citizenship is regarded by its protagonists as a 
remedy against the decline of political order. caesarean citizenship is 
based on the idea of the self-preservation of individuals who construct 
the state or/and acknowledge its total authority for the sake of protec-
tion against enemies. in the writings of Thomas hobbes, the peace-
keeping state is the result of consent between individuals who decide 
to permanently surrender political authority over themselves to Le-
viathan, the omnipotent ruler.50 individuals are unfit to live peacefully 
by themselves, as they cannot trust each other.51 The ruler, symboli-
cally represented by a biblical monster, is to subdue another monster, 
the multi-headed Behemoth – a symbol of rebellion and civil war.52 
a strong ruler is thus regarded as the only solution to political chaos 
50 hobbes, Thomas (1990/1682) Behemoth or the long parliament, edited by ferdinand 
tönnies, with an introduction by stephen holmes. chicago: University of chicago 
press; hobbes, Thomas (1991/1642), The citizen (de cive), edited by Bernard Gert. 
indianapolis: hackett publishing company; hobbes, Thomas (1996/1651) leviathan, or 
the matter, form and power of a commonwealth, ecclesiastical and civil, edited with an 
introduction by J. c. a. Gashin. oxford: oxford University press.
51 hobbes, Thomas (1991/1642) The citizen, 100ff. some authors discover liberal elements 
in hobbes’ state theory. however, the main stream liberalism rejects hobbes as a liberal 
author and regards the hobbes-orientated school of thought not more than ‘vulgar lib-
eralism’. see neal, patrick (1993) ‘Vulgar liberalism’, political Theory 21, no. 4, 623–642.
52 springborg, patricia (1995) ‘hobbes’s Biblical Beasts: leviathan and Behemoth’, political 
Theory 23, no. 2, 353–375; petit, philip (2005) ‘liberty and leviathan’, politics, philoso-
phy and economics 4, no. 1, 131–151; Boyd, richard (2001) ‘Thomas hobbes and the 
perils of pluralism’, The Journal of politics 63, no. 2, 392–413.
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which would otherwise tear society apart and claim the lives of its citi-
zens.53 
Yet with the conclusion of the contract of rule, citizens willingly sur-
render their political rights and pledge their obedience to the Levia-
than. consequently, the ruler, like the roman emperor caesar, is free 
to make laws according to his will, even if capricious and despotic, for 
he guarantees the survival and security of his citizens. moreover, le-
viathan, or caesar, possesses the ultimate authority of interpretation, 
since society suffers potentially from the chaos of different meanings, 
which begin, for example, with diverging interpretations of religious 
doctrines. Thus, in the case of the caesarean citizenship, we deal with 
the political and interpretational decisionism. although citizens of the 
caesarean model are fully allowed to pursue their economic interests, 
politics is reduced to the arbitrary decisions of the ruler. as a conse-
quence, the caesarean model of citizenship is not about the rights and 
obligations of citizens but about the effectiveness of political decisions 
and the compliance of the citizens who submit to an authority in the 
face of potential danger. 
This train of thought had been further developed by carl schmitt in 
the first half of the 20th century. according to schmitt, the very essence 
of politics is the ability of citizens to think of the others in terms of 
‘enemies’, to let themselves become politically mobilised and to make 
unanimous decisions. in his view, the democratic claim of equality 
53 cf. frost, samantha (2004) ‘hobbes out of Bounds’, political Theory 32, no. 2, 257–273. 
as a further caesarean author we could identify Jean Bodin due to his focus on state 
sovereignty regarding internal conflicts. Bodin, Jean (1961/1583) les six livres de la 
république. paris: aalen; dunning, Wm. a. (1896) ‘Jean Bodin on sovereignty’, political 
science Quarterly 11, no. 1, pp. 82–104; shepard, max adams (1930) ‘sovereignty at the 
crossroads: a study of Bodin’, political science Quarterly 45, no. 4, 580–603, maritain, 
Jacques (1950) ‘The concept of sovereignty’, american political science review 44, no. 
2, 343–357.
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cannot be resolved on the basis of liberal democracy, which offers 
only temporary and occasional solutions to the existing problem of 
inequality. Whereas shifting majorities are sufficient for liberal citizens 
to cooperate with each other by entrusting the governors with political 
tasks, schmitt regards it as mere legality as opposed to real legitimacy.
in the caesarean model the dichotomy does not run along the lines 
of a citizen/non-citizen difference, as is the case in the cognitive per-
spective on collective identity. instead, it highlights the difference be-
tween the citizen and the suspect. Therefore, the caesarean identity 
technology does not exhaust itself in the process of categorisation, but 
uses the very identifying process to strengthen collective responses 
and compliance. as biometric technologies, detention facilities and 
new methods of surveillance are employed to conceal and advance the 
exclusionary and restrictive practices of the caesarean citizenship, the 
goal of citizens and government agencies had become to secure iden-
tity.54 
What kind of welfare citizenship?
i argue that besides the diverging perspectives on what constitutes 
citizenship, the three outlined models of citizenship indicate quite 
different welfare concepts. in each citizenship model we can differ-
entiate diverging types of welfare citizenship. The concept of welfare 
54 cf. muller, Benjamin J. (2004) ‘(dis)Qualified Bodies: securitization, citizenship and 
identity management’, citizenship studies 8, no. 3, 279–294; scheuerman, William e. 
(2006) ‘carl schmitt and the road to abu Ghraib’, constellations 13, no. 1, 108–124; 
dee, mike (2002) The new citizenship of the risk and surveillance society: from 
a citizenship of hope to a citizenship of fear?, centre for social change research, 
school of humanities and human services, Queensland University of technology; 
zedner, lucia (2005) ‘securing liberty in the face of terror: reflections from criminal 
Justice’, Journal of law and society 32, no. 4, 507–533.
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citizenship deals with a specific issue of citizenship, which is linked to 
the relationship between the individual citizen and the state activity. 
however, welfare citizenship is not equal with social citizenship, which 
constructs citizenship mainly through the prism of social policies of 
the state. in contrast, i argue that we can speak of welfare citizenship, 
even in the absence of social policies, since welfare citizenship can be 
found in each citizenship model regardless the social activity of the 
state. against this backdrop, we can differentiate republican, liberal 
and caesarean welfare citizenship. 
republican Welfare citizenship
in the perspective of the republican citizenship, welfare is relevant vis-
à-vis civic duties of the citizens. since civic obligations are deemed 
necessary with regard to the collectivity, republican citizenship is not 
about the individual welfare but rather the community welfare. The 
republican welfare state becomes crucial when it comes, for instance, 
to the participation in the political process in which citizens become 
socialised in their acceptance of political obligations. in order to guar-
antee civic participation, the modern welfare state replaces in a certain 
sense the society based on slavery, in which the citizen possessed the 
time and the material resources to actively participate in the politi-
cal process for the sake of the public interest. in ancient Greece, civic 
engagement was mainly possible, given that the every-day production 
and distribution of goods was carried out by slaves. The modern wel-
fare state fulfils the same functions through policies of social security 
(by regulating labour time, allocating resources to the old and poor, 
funding the citizenship-orientated education system etc.). Thus, the 
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welfare state is a modern equivalent for the republican citizenship 
model, as its function is to secure citizens’ material and social mini-
mal independence, in particular in times of economic downturn and 
citizens’ unemployment. as the market processes constantly produces 
‘losers’ and cannot rule out impoverishment, the modern state needs 
to guarantee the minimal social net, which would allow the impover-
ished or sick citizens to make political decisions dedicated to the com-
mon good, rather than decisions aimed at improving their own lives.
in addition, the modern welfare state has to undergird the de-
liberative institutions of republicanism. in this perspective, at least 
some form of labour time regulation and/or material redistribution 
is needed to make deliberation days or citizens’ participation in deci-
sions on the municipal budget possible. for instance, citizens working 
every day of the week have very limited chances of participation. By 
the same token, citizens living from the minimum wage need to be 
compensated for their participation, as they are confronted with less 
income due to their civic activity. in this sense, the republican welfare 
state is supposed to correct the inequalities of the market, which can 
encroach on civic engagement. in other words, rule-free deliberation 
among citizens does not come for free, as both the deliberative institu-
tions have to be ‘produced’ and the participation of the citizens has to 
be financially supported.
a further field of political activity by the republican welfare state, is 
the investment in mass education, which should guarantee the discur-
sive equality of citizens through a high level of citizens’ enlightenment. 
This is not trivial, as it might sound, since in the deliberative version of 
the republican citizenship arguments mean political power. however, 
civic communication has to be learnt, otherwise citizens with a bet-
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ter education would be systematically privileged, which would in turn 
establish structural asymmetries in the citizenship, thus undermining 
the very concept of citizens’ equality.
liberal Welfare citizenship
We can differentiate two versions of liberal welfare citizenship. in the 
libertarian version, citizens live in a society of atomistic individuals. 
here, participation in the political process is not constitutive for being 
a citizen and welfare is subject to individual choice. politics is merely 
one of a plethora of various areas in which citizens construct their 
broad spectrum of preferences, although there is a meta-preference 
for individual-cost sensitivity that plays an important role in deciding 
on the hierarchy of preferences. Therefore, the state is not allowed to 
enforce collective welfare policies in the name of collectivity. every in-
dividual enjoys natural rights, which may be infringed either by others 
or by the state. The main function of the government is thus to hinder 
the infringement of natural rights and punish legal transgressions by 
individuals. however, the state has to restrain itself from activism in 
other policy fields. libertarian citizens are therefore suspicious of col-
lective welfare policies, since these present potential threats to indi-
vidual freedoms. in most cases, individuals believe in the workings of 
the market as an embodiment of freedom. in this context, welfare can 
be realised mainly in the form of charity. 
in its social version, liberal citizenship, unlike its republican counter-
part, also excludes political hyperactivity, since the primary concern of 
citizens is more with their material existence than with self-fulfilment 
in the polity. in this welfare perspective, political rights guarantee only 
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a formal equality without addressing real inequalities induced by the 
market. Therefore, social rights in addition to civil and political rights 
are viewed as a necessary component of citizenship. among other 
things, they encompass healthcare services, social security, as well as 
state investment in citizens’ education. interestingly enough, this can 
lead to similar welfare policies as in the republican welfare citizenship. 
Yet in the social version of liberal welfare citizenship, citizens are pri-
vate holders of rights (including rights to welfare) and have at the same 
time minimal responsibilities if any (first and foremost taxpaying) vis-
à-vis the government. public space is thus not essential in this model 
of citizenship, since the individual, as a citizen, remains a private per-
son, faithful mainly to himself. s/he balances her/his different roles 
in society to realise her/his utility. certainly, it does not exclude civic 
virtues such as individualism and pluralism, which are tenets of liberal 
citizenship. however, these virtues differ visibly from republican civic 
virtues. as a liberal citizen is a member of a pluralist society, govern-
ment represents the interests of the majority, since it cannot reconcile 
the preferences of all its citizens. however, this is acceptable for the lib-
eral citizen of the political minority, since the minority can potentially 
become a political majority after the next election. 
caesarean Welfare citizenship
in the modern post-9/11 version, caesarean welfare citizenship stress-
es security politics as the major welfare concern of the state. security 
politics become the basis for the new definition of welfare, as the state 
increasingly uses technologies of surveillance and shifts the focus from 
a rights-orientated citizenship to neurotic citizenship. a neurotic citi-
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zen defines welfare politics in terms of its permanent insecurity, which 
can only be guaranteed by the state. his preference for liberty and free-
dom becomes surpassed by his fears of survival in view of organised 
crime and possible terrorist attacks. in this sense, welfare becomes se-
curitised. 
in addition, the activity of the citizen focuses more strongly on re-
porting potentially dangerous situations and spying on his/her com-
patriots, rather than on elections, public space and ensuring the ac-
countability of the government. consequently, the state highlighting 
welfare as security is inclined to perpetuate the feeling of insecurity, 
thus transforming security politics into politics of insecurity. as a re-
sult, the state demonstrates its indispensability (and thus legitimacy), 
whereas the fear-inclined citizens support the state almost uncondi-
tionally. in this way, a shared perception of danger and threat generates 
the feeling of collective vulnerability. however, it is not only a diffuse 
feeling of insecurity which is instigated as a result of identity technolo-
gies; governments are instead likely to give the enemy a face and a 
name. 
Beyond terrorists and criminals, migrants and minorities can be 
used as a negative point of reference for caesarean citizenship and its 
security policies. The caesarean welfare citizenship establishes a se-
curity discourse that defines migration in terms of identification of 
existential threats. images of societal danger from a criminal and in-
vading enemy are reified in the discourse. in the process, the security 
concerns are defined against the background of dangers to societal in-
tegration, threats to the community’s conception of a good life and the 
welfare of the community. migration is thus increasingly depicted as 
a threat to the community’s survival in its current social and cultural 
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form.55 as a result, the caesarean welfare citizenship highlights border 
control and asylum policies, which became the cornerstone of a defen-
sive collective identity. 
conclusions
i argued that we can use the term ‘welfare citizenship’ in each model of 
citizenship. even though these different types of welfare citizenship are 
still sketchy, as i presented only a preliminary attempt to systematise 
the notion of welfare citizenship, it can be fruitful to pursue further 
research on this subject. one of the advantages is that we could tran-
scend the notion of social citizenship and compare different concepts 
of welfare citizenship. 
Within the republican model of citizenship we can observe a shift 
towards deliberation, which emphasises the welfare obligations of the 
community as an underpinning for the deliberative ethics of the citi-
zens. conversely, the citizens are obliged to take the welfare of the col-
lective into account, rather than their individual welfare. in this sense, 
the republican welfare citizenship can exist only against the back-
ground of a strong community. in contrast, the liberal model of citi-
zenship spawns a rights-orientated welfare citizenship, in which there 
is a focus on the liberal rights equality among citizens. in the social 
version of the liberal welfare citizenship, individual social rights are 
viewed as a necessary component of citizenship in addition to civil and 
political rights, whereas the libertarian version wants to defend the in-
dividual citizens against welfare collectivism, which is associated with 
transgressions of the individual freedoms. Thus, libertarian welfare is 
55 ibid., 758.
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mainly based on charity. The caesarean welfare citizenship is associ-
ated with the securitisation of welfare, where, for instance, migration 
is regarded as a threat to the welfare of a community. here, the liberal 
preference for liberty and freedom becomes surpassed by the citizen’s 
fears of survival in view of organised crime and possible terrorist at-
tacks. 
chapter 2 
Welfare nationalism: 
conceptual and theoretical 
considerations 
andrzej marcin suszycki 
introduction
The concept of welfare nationalism has enjoyed a rising popularity 
among scholars of sociology, political science and history. despite a 
growing body of literature on the topic there is little agreement on 
what welfare nationalism is, or how to make the concept suitable for 
the purposes of empirical studies. 
The major conceptual problem seems to be the practice of describ-
ing a number of policies or discourses, which refer to an exclusive 
character of a welfare system, as welfare nationalism, without first 
thoroughly defining the term nationalism. Therefore, this chapter 
claims that conceptualising welfare nationalism requires first a defini-
tion of the term nationalism. 
The conceptual vagueness of the term nationalism leads to confu-
sion at the theoretical level. one of the major theoretical problems, 
which relates to the contemporary phenomena of globalisation and 
regional integration, is that scholars conventionally regard a mere re-
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sistance against the transfer of sovereignty in welfare issues to a supra-
national level (european integration is here the most prominent ex-
ample) as welfare nationalism, whereas a mere support for sovereignty 
transfer is automatically seen as non-welfare nationalism. This chapter 
claims that we can speak of welfare nationalism only when political 
actors refer to specific national welfare interests and ideas (welfare nar-
ratives) to legitimise their resistance against or support for sovereignty 
losses in welfare issues. 
another theoretical problem is that scholars use the term welfare 
nationalism to describe phenomena which should not be considered 
as welfare nationalism, such as (welfare) regionalism or (welfare) lo-
calism. This chapter argues that using approaches which emulate the 
characteristics of the nation-states to regionalism or other sub-state 
political phenomena lead to an unjustified increase of ‘welfare nation-
alisms’. 
a third theoretical aspect to be discussed in this chapter considers 
the reasons for the phenomena of consistent welfare nationalism, i.e. 
regular adherence of political actors towards welfare nationalism, and 
contextual welfare nationalism, i.e. the selective adoption of welfare 
nationalism by political actors. This chapter suggests that the extent 
to which political or societal actors resort to both forms of welfare na-
tionalism mainly depends on the socio-economic degree of depend-
ence the country has on its international environment. 
The major normative fallacy is that scholars have not clearly defined 
the conditions which would make a normative ‘reconciliation’ between 
(welfare) nationalism and liberal political systems. Generally, welfare 
nationalism –like nationalism in general –has mostly been regarded as 
a morally pejorative force leading to conflict, separatism and chauvin-
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ism. The point of departure for this chapter is the notion of liberal na-
tionalism which regards nationalism as an inherent part of democracy 
and believes that liberal values can be easier realised by people with a 
strong national identity. in this sense this chapter claims that national-
ist welfare policies and discourses can be consistently pursued with 
liberal principles. 
conceptual considerations
drawing on the approaches of two prominent scholars of nationalism, 
david miller and liah Greenfeld, we can characterise nationalism in 
discursive terms as an individual or collective commitment to national 
ideas or interests included in four general narratives. These narratives 
are, first, the idea that nations are real, which means that there exists 
a specific factor differentiating people belonging to one nation from 
those belonging to other nations, even though – as emphasised by 
miller –there are different views about what that this specific factor 
is. second, it is the belief that membership in a nation confers rights 
and imposes obligations. nations are communities in which members 
recognise special ties to their compatriots, and they feel that they owe 
them more than they owe non-members.1 Third, this idea is reinforced 
by the principle of fundamental equality of membership, which al-
lows for the open class system of stratification. The open class system 
is based on achievement, rather than ascription, and has transferable 
properties, such as wealth and education, rather than birth, as the ba-
sis of status distinctions. hence, nationalism accepts social mobility as 
1 miller, david (2008) ‘nationalism’, in dryzek, John/honig, Bonnie/phillips, anne (eds.) 
The oxford handbook of political Theory, oxford University press, 529–530. 
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legitimate in principle.2 The fourth narrative is the idea that nations are 
valuable communities and nationhood is the very core of political and 
social life. Therefore, nationalism wants to maintain political institu-
tions that allow national decision-making free from external coercion, 
and, in more extreme cases, they expect the members to maintain their 
nation even at the price of significant sacrifices.3 
along the lines of the above description of nationalism we can char-
acterise welfare nationalism as an individual or collective commitment 
to narratives related to welfare, which we can find in nearly all na-
tional referential frameworks. These narratives include, first, the idea 
that differences between nations result from the different state of their 
socio-economic development, hence welfare is one of the main criteria 
used to identify that specific factor from miller’s definition that dif-
ferentiates people of one nation from those belonging to other nations, 
i.e. the notion of a particular welfare-based identity of the nation. in 
this sense welfare nationalism is also a form of “methodological” wel-
fare nationalism, as the possibility that the unity of welfare and nation 
might dissolve, disintegrate or undergo a total transformation remains 
beyond the cognitive perspective of welfare nationalists.4 closely linked 
to this aspect, is, second, the welfare nationalist belief that the national 
welfare system is superior to other welfare and non-welfare systems, 
i.e. the notion of a social-economic “grandness” of the nation or it be-
ing a “model of welfare” to be followed by other states. Third, welfare 
2 Greenfeld, liah (1999) ‘is nation Unavoidable? is nation Unavoidable today?’, in 
Kriesi, hanspeter/armingeon, Klaus/siegrist, hannes/Wimmer, andreas (eds.) nation 
and national identity. The european experience in perspective, zürich: Verlag rüegger, 
40. 
3 miller, david (2008) ‘nationalism’, 529–530. 
4 for the critique of the methodological nationalism see Beck, Ulrich (2006) cosmopoli-
tan Vision, cambridge: polity press, 29. 
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nationalism includes the belief that members of a national community 
are obliged to make sacrifices for their compatriots in order to preserve 
the national welfare, and that these obligations belong to the most de-
manding moral commitments that the members of the community 
have. The republican appeal for a collective action for the common 
wealth constitutes a spectacular example of this idea. at the same time, 
these obligations are not owed equally to non-members, whereas it has 
to be added that ‘not equally’ does not mean that no obligations are 
owed to non-members; respect for others’ human rights and solidar-
ity (also financial aid) with non-members in need remains a general 
obligation. fourth, welfare nationalism assumes that the fundamental 
equality of membership and considerable rates of social mobility can 
be achieved only within the national welfare system, i.e. the notion of 
causality between social justice and national belonging. fifth, welfare 
nationalism includes the idea that national welfare is politically signifi-
cant and the belief that since welfare systems are not equal, national 
welfare cannot be fully realised unless given the political independ-
ence to maintain its own model of development. hence, national wel-
fare should not be subject to laws passed for other national (welfare) 
communities. consequently, welfare nationalism contains the support 
for preserving political, economic and social institutions that make it 
possible for the national community to decide on the main rules of its 
welfare system free from external pressures, allowing a transfer of the 
main nation-state functions beyond the national boundaries where, 
on balance, the welfare benefits outweigh the welfare losses. all these 
aspects are linked to one another: the belief that members of a national 
community are obliged to make sacrifices for their compatriots to pre-
serve their national welfare through fighting for independent political, 
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economic and social institutions is linked to the belief that the national 
welfare system constitutes a specific national good and is superior to 
other welfare systems. 
levels of analysis
against the multiplicity of aspects to be considered at the conceptual 
level, it is clear that welfare nationalism is not a one-dimensional or 
one-level phenomenon. rather, welfare nationalism often occurs in 
complex situations with several regional, national or supranational ac-
tors acting at different levels and in different political and social struc-
tures. This section suggests that, departing from the above definition 
of welfare nationalism as an individual or collective commitment to 
the welfare-related national interests and ideas, we should examine the 
empiric dimension of welfare nationalism at four levels.5 
The micro level of analysis refers to the welfare nationalism of in-
dividuals and focuses mainly on its psychological aspects. it is mainly 
a domain of quantitative research which provides us with insights on 
auto-categorisations and xeno-categorisations in terms of national 
distinction on the basis of welfare narratives, as well as individuals’ 
expressions of interests and emotions related to national attachment 
resulting from national mega-narratives related to welfare. in other 
words, the micro level of welfare nationalism refers to the individu-
als’ self-categorisation as members of a welfare nation with the term 
welfare being the most important “membership category”.6 such a 
5 for the four levels of nationalism see suszycki, andrzej marcin and ireneusz paweł 
Karolewski (2011) The nation and nationalism in europe. an introduction, edinburgh: 
edinburgh University press, 104–114. 
6 see sacks, harvey (1992) lectures on conversation, edited by Gail Jefferson; with an 
introduction by emanuel a. schegloff, oxford: Blackwell. 
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self-categorisation leads –according to tajfel –to individuals favouring 
their own national ingroup and discriminating against members of the 
outgroup: The “we” of the welfare ingroup identity implies a contras-
tive “them” who do not constitute a part of the ingroup.7  
The second level of analysis is –in reference to robert merton –the 
meso level.8 it functions as a ‘theoretical field in which the structural 
mechanisms and the interactions between macro and micro levels 
might be observed’9 but might also be absent. accordingly, the meso 
level of welfare nationalism is an intermediary level between the wel-
fare nationalism of individuals and that of central government or, in 
other words, between the individual and the state. it can be consid-
ered as a part of society or of politics, or, more likely, a mixture of 
the two. relevant actors at this level are political and societal groups, 
for instance representatives of political life (political parties and other 
political organisations), economic and social interest groups and trade 
unions. Welfare nationalism at the meso level can be defined as a dis-
cursive commitment of non-governmental actors to national welfare 
interests or to national ideas related to welfare. The meso level of wel-
fare nationalism includes various meanings of narratives referring to 
national interests and ideas, their construction and reconstruction, 
and conflicts between contending visions of these narratives, as they 
are identified and sustained by different political and societal groups.10 
7 tajfel, henri (1981) human groups and social categories, cambridge: cambridge Uni-
versity press. 
8 see merton, robert (1968) social Theory and social structure, new York: free press.
9 see haanpaa, leena (2007) ‘structures and mechanisms in sustainable consumption 
research’, international Journal of environment and sustainable development 6, 1, pp. 
53–66. 
10 see also finlayson, alain (1998) ‘ideology, discourse and nationalism’, Journal of politi-
cal ideologies 3, 1, 99–118. 
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Welfare nationalism at the meso level might be an instrument to 
gain control of central power in a state, as is often the case with politi-
cal parties. alternatively, it might remain merely an expression of par-
ticular ideas without (directly) claiming control of central government, 
this case frequently occurring with discourses made by representatives 
of economic or social interest groups. The two most common forms 
of welfare nationalist discourse at the meso level are instrumental and 
ideological discourse.11 instrumental welfare nationalist discourse is 
associated with a general instrumentalist understanding of politics 
as dominated by the pragmatic, self-interested pursuit of material re-
sources and political advantage. it mostly addresses and tries to re-
move the relative socioeconomic deprivation. The ideological welfare 
nationalist discourse tries to mitigate social heterogeneity by con-
structing a simplistic confrontation between the virtuous ‘Us’ and the 
significant –but at the same time demonised –‘other’.12 By doing so, 
this discourse often promotes feelings of fear and distrust and engen-
ders collectivist prejudicial stereotyping of the ‘other’. in other words, 
whereas instrumental welfare nationalist discourse can be defined as 
a reflection of interest, ideological welfare nationalist discourse finds 
its fulfilment in the pursuit of moral certainty or socioeconomic su-
periority of the nation. frequently, welfare nationalist discourses are 
subject to fragmentation, as competing groups attempt to realise their 
vision of national welfare interests and ideas.
The macro level of welfare nationalism refers to the political action 
of national governments, which usually has two main goals. This level 
11 see also Brown, david (2004), ‘Why independence? The instrumental and ideological 
dimensions of nationalism’, international Journal of comparative sociology 45, 3/4, 
277–96. 
12 ibid. 284.
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includes, first, governmental strategies for maintaining and strength-
ening the state, as the most important goal of all national governments 
is, in nearly all cases, the survival of their states. This goal results 
from the immanent interest of the state as an autonomous structure 
in self-maintenance13 and the elimination of functional differentiation 
between the state units in international politics, or, in other words, 
their original need to survive.14 hence, every national government is 
expected to protect and strengthen the institution of the ‘state’ it rep-
resents and administrates. This goal becomes particularly important 
in states with ethnic minorities, in federal multi-ethnic states and 
in states with severe socioeconomic cleavages between regions with 
different ethnic settings, hence in states whose political existence or 
territorial integrity may possibly be endangered by separatist tenden-
cies. many actions by which central governments usually respond to 
these challenges can be regarded as expressions of welfare nationalism, 
e.g. practices of enforcing socio-economic homogeneity through the 
introduction of uniform health and labour market insurances, or oc-
cupational pension schemes across the whole country,15 and also the 
13 for this argument see poulantzas, nicos (1975) political power and social classes, 
london: Verso, and miliband, ralph (1969) The state in capitalist society, london: 
Weidenfeld & nicolson. 
14 Waltz, Kenneth n. (1979) Theory of international politics, reading, ma: addison-
Wesley. 
15 prominent examples include Belgium, Great Britain and canada.  
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practices of enforcing interregional financial adjustment16, and the 
politics of identity-building through an extensive use of national sym-
bols related to welfare, or even the emphasis on ‘significant others’ 
menacing the national economy or social system. 
second, the macro level of welfare nationalism might refer to the 
strategies of the legitimisation of political action related to the ‘pure’ 
governmental dimension of politics, hence the interest of governments 
in the maintenance of their domestic power position. The maintenance 
of domestic power in modern democratic states depends primar-
ily on the satisfaction of the socioeconomic interests of society. The 
central concern of the government of democratic states is therefore 
to guarantee the continuous supply of the collective socioeconomic 
goods for which the state is responsible in a national system. These 
goods include, for instance, macroeconomic stability, social security 
and socioeconomic equality. for this purpose governments attempt to 
promote economic growth, the maintenance of or an increase in the 
employment rate, new tax sources and a balance between conflicting 
social interests. in democratic systems, these policies must be legiti-
mised before the voters and we can speak of macro welfare nationalism 
if governmental actors legitimise their policies through a discursive 
commitment to the welfare-related national interests or ideas. 
16 one example of such policy is the system of revenue redistribution among the German 
länder (the so-called financial equalisation mechanism), especially the enormous 
support for east German regions). another prominent example of this form of welfare 
nationalism are the vast financial transfers of the italian central government to the 
southern regions of the country aimed at reducing gaps in socioeconomic development 
between the northern and southern parts of italy. The reduction of the huge socioeco-
nomic differences between the north and the south has been considered as essential for 
the unity of the italian state. a spectacular example of such policy towards regions with 
ethnic minorities is the financial aid of the central italian government for the region of 
south tyrol in northern italy inhabited by a German-speaking majority, which demon-
strated separatist tendencies for decades after it had been incorporated into the italian 
state in 1918. 
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The level of supranational effects of welfare nationalism is the 
fourth level at which we can examine welfare nationalism. however, it 
is not a level of welfare nationalism, as, because of the theoretical and 
methodological assumptions, there cannot be any welfare nationalism 
beyond the level of the nation-state. at this level, we scrutinise how 
domestic politics (welfare nationalism at the micro, meso and macro 
level) influence international politics (the so-called second image in 
international relations theory). The impact of international politics on 
the domestic level of nationalism (second image reversed in the sense 
of Gourevitch)17 is examined at the micro, meso and macro levels (as 
factors coming from outside the nation-state). There are two main su-
pranational effects of welfare nationalism. first, there might be conse-
quences for the structure of the international system. The structure of 
the international system is defined in terms of its polarity and anarchy. 
polarity is the number of poles of power, that is, the number of great 
powers in the system. it determines the possibility of the use of rela-
tive power resources by single actors.18 anarchy means that there is 
no authority above states capable of regulating their interactions and 
potential conflicts. in most cases, states must interact with other states 
on their own, rather than being determined by a ‘world government’ 
– a higher-control entity. in realist understanding, because states exist 
in anarchy, self-help is necessarily the principle of their action. states 
must rely on their own means to realise their interests.19 as to the 
consequences of welfare nationalism for polarity, we can argue that, 
especially in the case of bigger states, the demands of influential ac-
17 Gourevitch, peter (1978) ‘The second image reversed: The international sources of 
domestic politics’, international organization 32, 4, 881–912.
18 Waltz, Kenneth n. Theory of international politics, 134–7. 
19 ibid. 125.
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tors at the meso level for the protection of their economic interests 
or the national social system (meso welfare nationalism) and the re-
spective governmental policies (macro welfare nationalism) towards 
other international actors might lead to interstate conflicts and even 
wars.20 Welfare nationalism can also lead to an implosion of multina-
tional states with severe socioeconomic differences between the ethnic 
groups, and the more relevant such states were in the international 
system, the more significant the changes in polarity are.21 as far as the 
consequences of welfare nationalism for anarchy are concerned, wel-
fare nationalism might belong to factors leading to a stabilisation of or 
an increase in anarchy. for instance, in the unipolar scenario in which 
a single great power with nationalist motives in the field of welfare 
chooses a policy of isolationism and ceases to exercise control of the 
systemic interactions, the result could be a more anarchic character 
of international politics. Under conditions of multipolarity, in which 
several more or less equal powers will try to safeguard their national 
sovereignty and freedom of action in the realm of welfare against ex-
ternal control mechanisms, anarchy will increase. Under conditions of 
bipolarity, welfare nationalism is of limited importance for the level of 
20 here, we might think, for example, of the military interventions of Great Britain and 
france in the middle east, of military actions of the United states in central america 
and in the middle east, and of russia in the caucasus, especially in Georgia. The major 
part of these actions was aimed at securing the supply of the national economy with 
strategic resources such as oil and gas and advantaging their own national business 
companies.   
21 We might think, for instance, of the collapse of the former Yugoslavia, where the 
original calls for the dissolution of the state were partially caused by the slovenian and 
croatian unwillingness to share their more advanced socioeconomic resources with less 
developed regions like Kosovo, Bosnia and herzegovina or macedonia. We might also 
draw on the case of the former czechoslovakia, where the dominant czech discourse at 
the meso level, against the background of having a more advanced economy and better 
social situation in the czech part of the state than in the slovakian part, advocated the 
dissolution of the state. 
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anarchy because of the structurally determined check between the two 
great powers as it persisted during the period of the cold War.
The supranational level of the effects of welfare nationalism might 
also include consequences for the processes of regional integration, 
which often lead to the emergence of regional subsystems such as the 
european Union. Welfare nationalism might be a catalyst for integra-
tion when relevant actors at the meso level and macro level consider 
it to be advantageous for their states. Welfare nationalism might also 
function as a barrier to european integration if ordinary citizens at the 
micro level and relevant actors at the two other levels expect, in the 
economic and social realm, more losses than gains from this process.22 
Whereas structural changes in the international system may be mainly 
caused by the welfare nationalism of big powers, in regional subsys-
tems even welfare nationalism in smaller states can have significant 
effects on the political and economic processes.23
in sum, examining welfare nationalism as a complex, multi-level 
phenomenon does not imply regarding it as a ‘complete’ phenomenon. 
The notion of completeness denotes a methodological finality. com-
plete phenomena are not subject to change and thus remain methodo-
logically self-sufficient –just the contrary to what welfare nationalism 
is expected to be. 
22 for this aspect see for instance Karolewski, ireneusz paweł and suszycki, andrzej mar-
cin (eds.) (2007) nationalism and european integration. The need for new Theoretical 
and empirical insights, new York and london: continuum. 
23 for instance, welfare nationalist attitudes at the micro level and meso level in denmark 
and ireland had important effects on the whole process of european integration. after 
the rejection of the maastricht treaty in a referendum in denmark in 1992 the treaty 
had to be renegotiated, and the rejection of the lisbon treaty in a referendum in ireland 
in 2008 delayed the commencement of this treaty.   
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ideal types of welfare nationalism 
as far as ideal types of welfare nationalism are concerned, we can dis-
tinguish them by the status of national welfare narratives in the refer-
ential discursive frameworks and by the strength of commitment by 
political actors to narratives of national welfare in relation to other 
narratives, as well as by the consistency of the commitment to the na-
tional welfare narratives by political actors. 
if we look closer at the status which the narratives related to welfare 
have within different national referential frameworks, we can distin-
guish at least two ideal types of welfare nationalism to be found at both 
the meso level and the macro level. The first type is “archaeological” 
welfare nationalism. in this case, the narrative of welfare has merged 
with the dominant discursive comprehension and connotations of 
the term nation and the term state (and the term nation has usually 
merged with the term state) and it has become the very core of na-
tional identity. it appeals to tribal instincts and prejudices and makes 
reflection, internal criticism and choice exceptional. This “archaeologi-
cal” source of welfare makes it difficult (even if not impossible) for po-
litical actors to justify their decisions by a commitment to narratives 
going beyond an attempt to re-create the particularity of the (welfare) 
nation. Generally, actors resorting to this national “archaeological” 
welfare narrative perpetuate and freeze the “order of discourse” in the 
sense of foucault.24 not all nation-states have this archaeological type 
of welfare nationalism. We can observe this phenomenon especially in 
scandinavian states, where the dominant discourse uses the terms state 
and nation almost synonymously and links them to the term welfare. 
24 foucault, michel (1969) l’archéologie du savoir, paris: Éditions Gallimard, in particular 
259–275. 
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a decoupling of nation and state or a decoupling of state and welfare, 
and consequently a decoupling of nation and welfare is unusual to the 
political tradition of these states.25 most continental states in europe 
do not have such strong and deep welfare narratives and they repre-
sent the second type of welfare nationalism which can be described 
as instrumental. in this case, the narrative of welfare has not merged 
with the dominant discursive understanding of the term nation and 
the nation-state, and political and national identities are more multi-
faceted, multilayered, and multistranded. appeals to national welfare 
to legitimise political choices are not primarily determined by the ac-
tors’ original socialisation and national identity. rather, instrumental 
welfare nationalism has been affected by the logic of regular domestic 
power politics with actors attempting to gain, maintain and enlarge 
electoral support through politics and discourses which satisfy the 
socio-economic needs of the society. 
furthermore, we can distinguish at least two ideal types of political 
actors’ welfare nationalism by observing the levels of political actors’ 
discursive commitment to narratives of national welfare in relation to 
their commitment to non-national narratives (such as international, 
transnational, supranational, regional or local narratives). it is suggest-
ed here that actors with a strong welfare nationalism resort exclusively 
to the narratives of national welfare to legitimise their political action. 
political actors with a moderate level of welfare nationalism refer both 
to the narratives of national welfare and to non-national welfare nar-
25 for this aspect see for example stråth, Bo (2000) ‘poverty, neutrality and welfare: three 
key concepts in the modern foundation myth of sweden’, in stråth, Bo (ed.), myth and 
memory in the construction of community: historical patterns in europe and beyond, 
Brussels: peter lang, 375–401, see also stråth, Bo (1995) ‘scandinavian identity: a 
mythical reality’, in sørensen, nils arne (ed.) european identities. cultural diversity and 
integration in europe since 1700, odense: odense University press, 37–57.
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ratives. political actors with a weak form of welfare nationalism refer 
to narratives coming from outside the national referential framework 
stronger than to narratives of national welfare. 
as far as the consistency and coherence of welfare nationalism is 
concerned, we can speak of consistent welfare nationalism when po-
litical actors refer on a regular basis to the narrative of national welfare 
to legitimise their decisions. however, political actors may also “jump” 
between different referential frameworks, leaving the ground of the 
national in one issue, and again appealing to national welfare narra-
tives to legitimise their choices in other issues. in this case, we can 
speak of contextual welfare nationalism.26 
Theoretical considerations 
The conventional conceptual vagueness of welfare nationalism often 
produces questionable instruments of analysis with controversial ex-
planatory power. one of the recent major theoretical problems with 
regard to the phenomena of globalisation and regional integration 
is what can be defined as a “discursive trap”. it means that scholars 
conventionally regard a mere resistance against the transfer of sover-
eignty in welfare issues to a supranational level (european integration 
is here the most prominent example) or to international institutions as 
welfare nationalism, whereas a mere support for sovereignty transfer 
is automatically seen as not welfare nationalism.27 consequently, po-
26 most conventional studies suffer from picturing welfare nationalism in terms of ideo-
logical consistency and strategic rigidity. They distinguish between welfare nationalist 
and non-nationalist actors and assume that actors which are labelled “nationalist” in 
one policy issue are necessarily “nationalist” in other policy fields, too. 
27 see for instance schmidt, Vivien a. (2007) ‘trapped by their ideas: french élites’ dis-
courses of european integration and globalization,’ Journal of european public policy, 
14:7, 992–1009. 
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litical actors (especially those at the meso and macro level of analysis) 
opposed to the losses of national sovereignty in welfare issues are de-
scribed as welfare nationalists, even if they do not refer to narratives 
of national welfare to legitimise their resistance towards sovereignty 
losses, while political actors supporting the transfer of sovereignty to 
supranational or international institutions are not regarded as welfare 
nationalists even if they refer exclusively to national welfare narratives 
to legitimise their support for sovereignty transfers.28 
By contrast, this chapter suggests that discursive resistance against 
the sovereignty losses and the affirmation of welfare nationalism 
should be decoupled. defining welfare nationalism as an individual or 
collective discursive commitment to the welfare-related national in-
terests and ideas allows us to assume that discourses that argue against 
sovereignty transfers to the international or supranational level, but 
are not based on a commitment to the narratives of national welfare, 
do not foster welfare nationalism. Vice versa, those political actors 
who are in favour of sovereignty transfers, but argue exclusively on 
the basis of the national welfare narratives to legitimise their support 
for these sovereignty transfers, should be regarded as welfare nation-
28 see also suszycki, andrzej marcin (2006) ‘european identity in sweden’, in Kaina, Vic-
toria/Karolewski, ireneusz paweł (eds.) european identity. Theoretical perspectives and 
empirical insights, Berlin: lit Verlag, 179–207.
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alists.29 This perspective significantly reduces what can be regarded as 
welfare nationalism in view of european integration or globalisation. 
furthermore, defining welfare nationalism as a (discursive) com-
mitment to national welfare ideas and interests helps to avoid a meth-
odological mimicry in the analysis of regionalism or other sub-state 
phenomena. in several studies scholars have applied the characteristics 
of nations (such as territory, integrated economy, and political power) 
to regions or other sub-state entities, as regions have been treated as 
partial nation-states, or nation-states on a smaller scale.30 This has 
led to an increase in the number of “welfare nationalisms”, since dis-
courses in favour of a strengthening of regional welfare systems (to 
the detriment of the centre or international and supranational institu-
tions) have been seen as a form of welfare nationalism.31 however, for 
at least three reasons the characteristics of nations should not be ap-
plied to regions. first, from the historical and macrosociological point 
of view, regional identities are significantly less institutionalised and 
29 of course, a weakness of this approach might be seen in the fact that it does not explain 
the “real” thoughts and perceptions of political actors. it is true that –as argued by 
Wæver – discourse analysis does not attempt to detect the thoughts, motives, hid-
den intentions or secret plans of the political actors. for this see Wæver, ole (2000) 
‘europæisk sikkerhed og integration: en analyse af franske og tyske diskurser om stat, 
nation og europa’, in dyrberg, torben Bech/hansen, allan dreyer/torfing, Jacob (eds.) 
diskursteorien på arbejde, roskilde: roskilde Universitetsforlag, 279–318. however, 
it is not contested that structures within discourses condition possible actions. in the 
democratic systems, policies must hold a definite relationship to discursive structures, 
because political actors must always be able to explain to the voters the consequences of 
their demands. 
30 for examples see Guibernau, montserrat (1999) nations Without states: political com-
munities in a Global age, cambridge: polity press; tambini, damian (2001) national-
ism in italian politics: The stories of the northern league, 1980–2000. london: rout-
ledge; hamilton, paul (2004) ‘converging nationalisms: Quebec, scotland, and Wales in 
comparative perspective’, nationalism and ethnic politics, 10, 657–685; haesly, richard 
(2005) ‘identifying scotland and Wales: types of scottish and Welsh national identities’, 
nations and nationalism 11 (2), 243–263. 
31 studies on the emergence and growth of regional parties in northern italy, Belgium, 
canada, spain and the United Kingdom usually speak of welfare nationalism in the 
context of the distributional issues raised by these parties.
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have a less statist character, even in federal states, compared with na-
tional identities.32 it follows that the referential narrative frameworks 
of regional identities, to which regional actors might refer while legiti-
mising their political choices, are less established and recognised than 
the national ones. second, specific political rights and obligations do 
not exist at the regional level as citizenship status is established in the 
national range and does not vary regionally.33 hence, the effectiveness 
of social citizenship can only be assured and measured in the frame-
work of the nation-state. a third argument is linked to the first one. it 
states that nations play a crucial role in legitimising political systems.34 
legitimacy results primarily from the quality of the political process 
(output). here, it is the nation and not the region that fulfils relevant 
tasks: the output of the political system can only be guaranteed if the 
nation provides for the stability of the entire political order,35 therefore, 
the socioeconomic claims of the inhabitants of regions depend on the 
effectiveness of the national level of law making and production of col-
lective goods. This task cannot be replaced at the regional level.
against the background of these arguments, we should regard 
policies and discourses which exhibit welfare boundary mechanisms 
through appeals to the national narratives of social cohesion and 
solidarity as welfare nationalism. for instance, the anti-Walloon dis-
courses of the flemish movement Vlaams Belang in Belgium are an 
example of welfare nationalism since they refer to the flemish national 
32 Karolewski, ireneusz paweł (2007) ‘regionalism, nationalism, and european integra-
tion’, in Karolewski, ireneusz paweł and suszycki, andrzej marcin (eds.) nationalism 
and european integration. The need for new Theoretical and empirical insights. new 
York, london: continuum, 9–32 (18). 
33 ibid. 18. 
34 ibid. 19. 
35 ibid. 19.
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narratives.36 Vice versa, we should not regard policies and discourses 
which exhibit welfare boundary mechanisms through appeals to the 
narratives of social cohesion and solidarity at the regional or commu-
nal level as welfare nationalism. for example, the contemporary dis-
courses of the lega nord in northern italy against immigration, eu-
ropean integration and the centralised system of welfare redistribution 
in italy should be seen as examples of welfare regionalism or welfare 
localism, because they do not appeal to the italian welfare-related na-
tional narratives but to regional and local ones: even though the lega 
nord tries to stress the high level of welfare in northern italy in order 
to construct a north italian national mythology, its discourse can still 
be seen as a modification of italian nationalism since it amends and 
usurps the main narratives of the italian national identity in order to 
justify the separatist claims.37  
a third significant theoretical issue at the meso and macro level of 
welfare nationalism is to explain the reasons for the phenomena of 
consistent welfare nationalism, i.e. actors’ regular discursive commit-
ment to the welfare-related national interests and ideas, and contextual 
welfare nationalism, i.e. actors’ selective use of welfare nationalism.38 
This chapter suggests that the extent to which actors resort to both 
36 see also de cleen, Benjamin and carpentier, nico (2010) ‘contesting the populist claim 
on “the people” through popular culture: the 0110 concerts versus the Vlaams Belang’, 
social semiotics 20, 2, 175–96. 
37 for this argument see suszycki, andrzej marcin (2010) ‘nationalism in italy’, in Ka-
rolewski, ireneusz paweł and suszycki, andrzej marcin (eds.) multiplicity of national-
ism in contemporary europe, lanham, maryland: rowman & littlefield publishers, 
175–191. 
38 for this phenomenom see for example rohrschneider, robert/Whitefield stephen 
(2010) ‘consistent choice sets? The stances of political parties towards european 
integration in ten central east european democracies, 2003–2007’, Journal of european 
public policy 17:1, 55–75; see also marks, Gary/Wilson, carole/ray, leonard (2002) 
‘national political parties and european integration’, american Journal of political sci-
ence 36(3), 585–94.
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forms of welfare nationalism mainly depends on the degree of socio-
economic dependence of a country on its international environment. 
The higher the level of participation a country has in the processes 
of regional integration and globalisation, the weaker political actors 
attach themselves to consistent welfare nationalism and the stronger 
they resort to contextual welfare nationalism. There are two main fac-
tors explaining this relationship. The first aspect refers to the fact that 
regional integration and globalisation cause the “horizontal” and “ver-
tical” disorientation of the voters, and thus reduce the electoral vulner-
ability of political actors in front of their voter base. horizontal diso-
rientation means that processes of regional integration (in particular 
european integration) and globalisation have significantly increased 
the number of political, economic and social issues to be approached 
by the domestic politics. Vertical disorientation means that the field of 
vision of voters has been strongly limited by the multi-layer decisional 
systems of regional integration (here the eU is again the most promi-
nent example)39 and by the complex structures patterns of global eco-
nomic interdependence. Both forms of disorientation make the clear 
allocation of political responsibilities at the national level more diffi-
cult and consequently limit the ability of the voters to sanction politi-
cal actors’ eventual programmatic or ideological fluctuations. hence, 
this disorientation leaves the door open for a selective use of national 
welfare narratives. such an abandonment of consistent welfare nation-
alism becomes a valuable option, for instance, in situations in which 
changes in the policy or discourses cannot be legitimised (exclusively) 
39 for the multi-layer system of the eU see for instance marks, Gary/hooghe liesbet/
Blank Kermit (1996) ‘european integration from the 1980s: state-centric v. multi-level 
Governance’, Journal of common market studies, Vol. 34, no. 3, 341–378. 
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by a commitment to national welfare narratives, or in situations in 
which political actors adopt policy and discourses platforms which al-
low them to capture segments of voters with affective and ideological 
preferences to be satisfied by a commitment to narratives going be-
yond the national referential framework. 
The second aspect is linked to the first one and refers to the fact that 
the use of national welfare narratives to legitimise political action has 
become increasingly discernible and vulnerable beyond the bounda-
ries of the nation-state. foreign political actors might see their own 
welfare interests disadvantaged by these welfare nationalist policies or 
discourses and also resort to welfare nationalism. hence, national ac-
tors demonstrating welfare nationalism on a regular basis might face 
retaliatory actions at the international level. Given the strong political 
and economic interdependence, these sanctions might jeopardise the 
just domestic distribution of economic benefits and burdens and, con-
sequently, weaken their own domestic power position. consequently, 
international sanction mechanisms reduce the incentives for persis-
tent welfare nationalism (in the form of a permanent use of national 
welfare narratives) and make contextual welfare nationalism more at-
tractive.40
normative assessment of welfare nationalism
as far as the normative dimension of welfare nationalism is concerned, 
this chapter claims that nationalist welfare policies and discourses can 
be reconciled with liberalism. supportive for such a normative rec-
onciliation between welfare nationalism and liberal principles are the 
40 suszycki, andrzej marcin (2010) ‘nationalism in italy’, 185–186.
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core statements of the liberal notion of nationalism. here, we can bring 
forward three main arguments. 
first, liberal nationalists focus on the conditions for personal au-
tonomy and claim that individuals must be free to choose their way of 
life after reflecting on alternative choices. however, the choices always 
take place in specific contexts. The alternatives come from the culture 
that individuals belong to, and only national cultural systems are un-
derstandable enough to provide a large number of choices.41 to be free 
in their choice, individuals must be given the possibility to live in a 
community whose culture they share and whose other members deem 
their choices valuable. against this background, the maintenance of 
the national culture is essential for the personal autonomy. The condi-
tion for this maintenance is, however, that the national community 
retains its political independence.42 adopting this argument to welfare 
nationalism, we can argue that, in many states, welfare is an indispen-
sable part of national culture and one of the central points of reference 
in the lives of individuals. as such, it provides a defined symbolic and 
organisational site for individuals and elites to mobilise resources in 
the pursuit of individual and common goals. hence, policies or dis-
courses aimed at the maintenance of the political independence of 
the national community in the realm of welfare constitute a necessary 
condition for the protection of the personal autonomy of individuals, 
which is a central liberal claim. 
second, liberal nationalism claims that a well-functioning of demo-
cratic institutions requires citizens to trust one another to follow dem-
ocratic norms and not to consider politics as a zero-sum game. ac-
41 miller, david (2008) ‘nationalism’, 535.
42 ibid. 535. 
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cording to liberal nationalism, trust is primarily created by the shared 
nationality of citizens and it is difficult to establish trust in multina-
tional states where members of different ethnic groups distrust the 
other groups.43 in political systems with no trust or with a low level of 
trust, it is difficult to preserve democratic institutions.44 against this 
background, we can assume that policies and discourses, which aim to 
establish or maintain trust through favouring the welfare interests of 
members of the national community over those of non-members, can 
still be regarded as being in accordance with liberalism as long as the 
rules of democracy and law are maintained.  
The third main argument of liberal nationalism can directly be 
brought forward in defence of welfare nationalism. it states that na-
tionhood is a precondition for social justice.45 The welfare state rep-
resents an agreement to use resources to provide all the citizens with 
a lower or higher level of protection against the risks of life.46 Built 
into the system is the redistribution of resources from the richer, tal-
ented and strong members to the more vulnerable or weaker mem-
bers of the community.47 liberal nationalism argues that individuals 
agree to redistribute the resources because of a sense of solidarity with 
fellow-citizens and a sympathetic commitment to their interests.48 This 
sense of solidarity results from a common national identity which in-
creases confidence in the compatriots that they will reciprocate one’s 
43 miller, david (1995) on nationality, oxford: oxford University press, 91–92.
44 miller, david (2008) ‘nationalism’, 536. 
45 canovan, margaret (1996) nationhood and political Theory, cheltenham, Brookfield: 
edward elgar, 27–36. 
46 miller, david (2008) ‘nationalism’, 536. 
47 ibid. 536. 
48 see Barry, Brian (1991) democracy and power: essays in political Theory. oxford: 
oxford University press. 
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own sacrifices.49 These arguments again render justifiable policies and 
discourses which establish or strengthen the exclusiveness of welfare. 
against the background of these three arguments, liberal national-
ism seems to be supportive of a reconciliation between welfare nation-
alism and liberal principles. nonetheless, the classical liberal distrust 
towards (welfare) nationalism still exists and many mainstream liberal 
scholars reject the arguments of liberal nationalists. as david miller 
shows, critics claim, first, that since most contemporary societies are 
multicultural or at least confronted with large immigration flows, per-
sonal autonomy becomes more a matter of choosing elements from 
different cultures.50 however, these arguments might, if so, refer main-
ly to typical immigration countries with a number of enrooted and 
recognised ethnic structures like the United states, canada, australia 
and, to a limited extent, Great Britain and france, whereas most eu-
ropean welfare states such as Germany, austria, the netherlands, and 
the scandinavian states remained homogenous in ethnic terms until 
the post-war period and they lack any established cultural basis for 
individuals’ (especially for the members of the core nation) freedom 
of choice.51 
The second major argument against the normative upgrading of lib-
eral (welfare) nationalism is that individuals in contemporary socie-
ties usually have multiple identities of a familial, local, ethnic, religious 
or professional character and they thus have no particular dominant 
identity. Therefore, it is claimed that liberal states should guarantee the 
49 miller, david (1995) on nationality, 92. 
50 miller, david (2008) ‘nationalism’, 536. 
51 as depicted, for instance, by Waldron: Waldron, Jeremy (2000) ‘What is cosmopoli-
tan?’, The Journal of political philosophy Vol. 8, number 2, 227–243. 
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equal treatment of all identities52, whereas nationalism would favour 
the dominant “national” identity to the detriment of other identities, 
and usually against the principles of justice, liberty and against peo-
ple’s “happiness”.53 consequently, this would violate the liberal princi-
ple of equal citizenship.54against this argument it can be emphasised 
that empirical studies on personal and collective identity demonstrate 
that national identity remains the strongest and by far unchallengeable 
identity.55 
Third, critics of liberal (welfare) nationalism reject the argument 
that democracy and social justice need a strong shared sense of na-
tionality56 and consider citizens’ identification with their political 
community, also on a strictly political basis and not necessarily on a 
national one as sufficient57. consequently they argue that many ethnic 
minority groups – for instance immigrant groups – could be includ-
ed into the community as equal citizens.58 This argument against the 
normative upgrading of liberal (welfare) nationalism seems to be the 
52 see for example habermas, Jürgen (2005) ‘equal treatment of cultures and the limits 
of postmodern liberalism’, The Journal of political philosophy Vol. 13, no. 1, 1–28
53 Berlin, isaiah (1981) against the current: essays in the history of ideas, oxford: ox-
ford University press, 342–343. 
54 miller, david (2008) ‘nationalism’, 537. 
55 for instance recently lechner, J. frank (2007) ‘redefining national identity. dutch 
evidence on Global patterns’, international Journal of comparative sociology, Vol 48(4): 
355–368, see also smith, tom W. and seokho Kim (2006) ‘national pride in compara-
tive perspective: 1995/96 and 2003/04’, International Journal of Public Opinion Research 
Vol. 18, issue 1, 127–136. 
56 abizadeh, arash (2004) ‘liberal nationalist versus postnational social integration: on 
the nation’s ethno-cultural particularity and ‘concreteness’, nations and nationalism 10 
(3), 231–250. 
57 see dzur, albert W. (2002) ‘nationalism, liberalism, and democracy’, political re-
search Quarterly 55 (1), 191–211. 
58 see for this argument crepaz, markus m. l. (2007) trust beyond Borders: immigration, 
the Welfare state and identity in modern societies, ann arbor: University of michigan 
press; see also Banting, Keith/Johnston, richard/Kymlicka Will/soroka stuart (2006) 
‘do multiculturalism policies erode the welfare state? an empirical analysis’ in Banting, 
Keith and Kymlicka, Will (eds.) Multiculturalism and the Welfare State: Recognition and 
Redistribution in Contemporary Democracies, oxford: oxford University press, 49–91. 
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most plausible one. however, a successful identification on exclusively 
civic terms with a national political system or a “constitutional patri-
otism” requires the existence of political institutions designed to deal 
with complex multicultural contexts. in the realm of most european 
welfare states the structures and character of political conciliation and 
social institutions reflect more the democratic development based on 
nation and nationality than a set of more abstract political principles 
free from national contexts.59 
in sum, even if the concept of liberal nationalism remains debat-
able, it provides us with good arguments for a normative reconciliation 
between welfare nationalism and liberalism. 
59 see Greenfeld, liah (1992) nationalism: five roads to modernity, cambridge, mass.: 
harvard University press.

chapter 3
Welfare nationalism and competitive 
community
pauli Kettunen
introduction
nationalism is constitutive of modern political forms of social life. it 
postulates the nations, however defined, as primary political units. 
Thus it provides legitimisation for the territorial political entities called 
nation-states and for the international system based on nation-states. 
nationalism is also a crucial ingredient in the nation-states bearing the 
character of a welfare state. The evolving of the welfare-state character 
of nation-states, in turn, has remarkably affected the forms and con-
tents of nationalism, not least by reshaping national identities and the 
notions of nation-state citizenship.
Through the transformations called globalisation, national welfare 
states have been challenged. Yet it is far from evident that this means 
a diminishing role for nationalism. nationalism does not only appear 
in protectionist or racist reactions against the global mobility of capi-
tal, information, ideas, and people, or in ethnic conflicts in countries 
of collapsed statehood. it is also an inherent part of the globalised 
economy, appearing, especially, in the concern for “our” competitive-
ness. in this chapter i will argue that, as an integral aspect of globalisa-
tion, the national welfare states like those referred to by the concept of 
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the “nordic model” have been gradually but profoundly transformed 
through the nationalism associated with and nourished by global eco-
nomic competition.  
it is reasonable to recognise the limits of nation-state capacities in 
the globalised economy. nation-states are important but not the sole 
norm-giving actors in the emerging multi-level structure of global gov-
ernance. There are various national, international and transnational 
players, including transnational organisations of regional integration, 
most notably the european Union, worldwide regulative institutions 
such as the international monetary fund, the World Bank, the World 
trade organization and the Gs with a changing and varying number 
of countries and leaders, as well as transnational companies and inves-
tors. The global governance relying on and facilitating the free play of 
the competitive market became a target of critique by the “anti-globali-
sation” movements that emerged in the late 1990s and by a much wider 
range of political actors and public opinion when the global economic 
crisis began in 2008. critics have questioned the capacities of the na-
tion-states, and of the international system of nation-states, to secure 
the functioning of global capitalism, and many of them, notably those 
active in transnational non-governmental organisations, have made 
efforts to promote social and democratic forms of global governance. 
such efforts may be aimed to move elements of national welfare states 
onto the level of transnational regulative arrangements. 
nevertheless, defining globalisation as a national challenge is still a 
widely adopted way of dealing with this transformation. This perspec-
tive is certainly not only associated with nostalgic welfare nationalism 
or protectionist recipes that appear in the discussion on globalisation 
and economic crisis. since the early 1990s, some scholars have em-
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ployed the concept of “competition state” to grasp the modes in which 
the functions, institutions and discourses of the nation-states have 
changed in connection with national responses to globalisation.1 This 
transformation obviously also includes changes in the nationalistic le-
gitimisation of the nation-state as well as in the shaping of identities 
and in notions of citizenship. 
The changes seem to be at the same time paradoxical and controver-
sial. They are paradoxical because the competition state, while fulfill-
ing imperatives of “our” competitiveness, seems to point to the notion 
of a warm community instead of a cool society that has been arguably 
associated with the nordic-type welfare states. The changes are, how-
ever, not just paradoxical but also inherently controversial. While the 
emphasis on “us” in the making of competitive territorial (most nota-
bly national) communities is an integral part of globalised economic 
competition, the very same transformations may also either erode the 
solidarity based on common spatial ties or help to open new cross-
national and cross-territorial perspectives for defining “us”.
in what follows, i first examine the notion of national society in the 
making of the nordic welfare state. secondly, focussing on the swed-
ish economist and policy planner Gunnar myrdal, the emergence of 
the critique of welfare-state nationalism is discussed. The myrdalian 
post-World-War-ii visions of national and worldwide “created har-
mony”, with their optimistic confidence in “enlightened citizenry”, are 
then contrasted with some turn-of-the-millennium ideas of national 
1 cerny, philip G. (1990) The changing architecture of politics. structure, agency, and the 
future of the state. london: sage publications; streeck, Wolfgang (1998) ‘industrielle 
Beziehungen in einer internationalisierten Wirtschaft’, in Ulrich Beck (ed.) politik der 
Globalisierung. frankfurt am main: suhrkamp; palan, ronen & abbot, Jason, with phil 
deans (1999) state strategies in the Global political economy. london and new York: 
pinter.
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and transnational social harmony, notably those associated with the 
concepts of “corporate citizenship” and “social partnership”. i will ar-
gue that these concepts have reflected and contributed to the chang-
ing relationship between the public and the private, which has been 
a crucial aspect in the reshaping of the nation-state as a competition 
state, and to the changing relationships between consensus and com-
promise. in conclusion, the popular concept of “model” is associated 
with the changing role of the nation-state as well as with the role of 
competitiveness for euronationalism and for the motivation of social 
policies in the eU.                 
The society of virtuous circles and symmetries
‘society’ has been a popular concept in the nordic countries. The con-
cept in its nordic usage bears those characteristics of the modern idea 
of society which in debates on postmodernity and globalisation have 
been deemed as unsustainable. ‘society’ has been fixed to the nation-
state, referred to an integrated entity with its own subjectivity, and in-
cluded progress as an inherent code of the future.2 in the 19th century 
when the modernising nation-state society emerged as the framework 
for the “social question”, the concept of society in the nordic countries 
as well as elsewhere in europe came to refer both to a normative power 
and to a target of empirical knowledge. The normative criteria and ca-
pacities associated with society were applied to the empirical society in 
which need, poverty, class divisions, discontent and a lack of discipline 
2 featherstone, mike (1995) Undoing culture. Globalization, postmodernism and 
identity. london: sage publications; touraine, alain (1995) critique of modernity. 
cambridge, mass. and oxford: Blackwell; Beck, Ulrich (1997) Was ist Globalisierung? 
irrtümer des Globalismus – antworten auf Globalisierung. frankfurt am main: 
suhrkamp.
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was recognised. normative society was a representation of the interest 
of the national whole in a dual sense: it referred, on one hand, to the 
interest of the national economy above private economic interests and, 
on the other hand, to the social principle that put limits to economic 
action in the name of society.3
a nordic specificity seems to be, however, that the concept of soci-
ety is provided with a particular normative power. ‘society’ was and is 
often used as a term for the state or public power in a way that would 
be hardly comprehensible in english, french or German political lan-
guages. arguably, this usage of ‘society’ – samhälle (swedish), samfund 
(danish), samfunn (norwegian), samfélag (icelandic) or yhteiskunta 
(finnish) – reflected and legitimised the crucial role of the state in the 
processes through which europe’s northern periphery was integrated 
into the expanding capitalist economy. as the interest of the national 
economy as well as the social principle putting limits to economic ac-
tion were advocated in the name of society, the message gained extra 
influence from the association of society with the state at the same 
time as it directly provided governmental interventions with societal 
legitimation. 
The nordic countries came to be small open economies that were – 
each country in its specific way – highly dependent on export and ex-
posed to the cycles and crises of the world economy. This international 
dependence provided prerequisites for strong notions of the national 
economy and national society. in the 1930s, these notions acquired 
wider meanings. The relationships between the three normative as-
pects of ‘society’ – the interest of national economy, the social limits of 
3 Kettunen, pauli (2000) ‘Yhteiskunta – ‘society’ in finnish’, finnish Yearbook of political 
Thought 2000, Vol 4. Jyväskylä: sophi, 159–197.
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economic action, and the state and public power – and between them 
and the empirical society were reshaped in a way that was crucial for 
the development of the nordic welfare states.  
drawing from the experiences of the Great depression and the rise 
of fascism in europe, as well as reflecting class structures, the so-called 
scandinavian class compromises included the political coalitions of 
“workers and farmers”, i.e. the social democrats and the agrarian par-
ties, and the national consolidation of the practice of collective ne-
gotiations and agreements in industrial labour markets. a virtuous 
circle was supposed to connect the interests of worker-consumers and 
farmer-producers on the one hand, and of workers and employers on 
the other. The class compromises manifesting this mode of thought 
contributed to the shaping of a “dualist economy”4: a considerable 
openness to, and thus dependence on, world markets were combined 
with the protection of some nationally highly valued sectors, above all 
agriculture, and with internal egalitarian and consensual negotiated 
regulations concerning, in particular, the relationships between labour 
and capital. These arrangements proved to be not only a means for 
protecting the national society from external economic risks but also a 
source of international economic competitiveness.
The practical significance of the new Keynesian-type employment 
and economic policies before World War ii has been debated, nota-
bly concerning the case of sweden. researchers have questioned the 
role of conscious contra-cycle measures for the overcoming of the eco-
nomic crisis or pointed out that, after the depression, unemployment 
4 cf. palan & abbot 1999, 103–120.
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still remained high.5 on the level of political discourse, however, the 
ideas of a virtuous circle indicated important changes in the 1930s. The 
virtuous circle included something more than just organised economic 
interests in a positive-sum game. it was also a virtuous circle between 
equality, efficiency and solidarity, which, in a sense, can be seen to be 
based on three different ideological strains of nordic modernisation 
processes: the idealised heritage of the free, independent peasant, the 
spirit of capitalism, and the utopia of socialism . The virtuous circle was 
supposed to be achieved through compromises between different col-
lective interests and with the support of social planning within a na-
tional society.
a crucial part of scandinavian class compromises in the 1930s was 
the reinforced idea of parity between labour market parties organised 
symmetrically at various levels of national society. The principle of 
collective agreements had much earlier already achieved a recognised 
status and practical significance in denmark, sweden and norway. in 
this respect the september agreement of 1899 between the danish 
central organisations of workers and employers provided a model. in 
the 1930s, trade unions and employer organisations, urged on by ex-
periences of widespread and harsh industrial conflicts, were ready to 
further specify the rules of the game and to consolidate the system of 
negotiations and agreements. This transformation, as expressed in the 
norwegian hovedavtal in 1935 and the swedish saltsjöbaden argee-
ment in 1938 between the peak organisations of workers and employ-
5 Gustafsson, Bo (1993) ‘Unemployment and fiscal policy in sweden during the 1930s: 
myths and reality’, in W. r. Garside (ed.) capitalism in crisis. international responses 
to the Great depression. london: pinter publishers, new York: st. martin press, 60–61; 
Unga, nils (1976) socialdemokratin och arbetslöshetsfrågan. framväxten av den ’nya’ 
arbetslöshetspolitiken. arkiv avhandlingsserie 4, stockholm.
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ers, can be seen as a redefining of universal and particular interests. 
labour market parties reciprocally recognised the particular, and not 
the universal, and therefore legitimate nature of their interests. They 
committed themselves to taking into account through their mutual 
compromises the universal interest that was assigned to ‘society’ and 
included objectives such as the prevention of damaging conflicts, the 
promotion of rationalisation, and the increase of purchase power.6  
no doubt, defining the universal interest of society remained a con-
tested question and dependent on the changing relations of power. 
The nordic social democrats, especially the social democratic trade 
union leaders, included the collective agreements of labour market 
parties into the concept of “nordic democracy”. in Norden, probably 
in sweden the most successfully and in finland the least successfully, 
the social democratic movement was able to establish the parity of 
labour market parties as a normative standard of the ‘society’ itself, 
which could then be turned against the prevailing asymmetries. The 
strong trade unions were supposed to extend democracy in two senses, 
both as a “popular movement” and as one of the two “parties” making 
parity-based agreements in the labour market.7 
Virtuous circles and party symmetries did not simply refer to the 
existing state of affairs. They were conceived as normative standards of 
the society, containing the code for its future change and reform. This 
6 This mode of thought was formulated, e.g. in a swedish governmental committee report 
that paved the way for the saltsjöbaden agreement of 1938, by proposing that the 
labour market parties should “depoliticise” their mutual relationships in order to be able 
to realise, through their compromises, the interest of “society”.  soU 1935:65. Betän-
kande om folkförsörjning och arbetsfred, del i. förslag. statens offentliga Utredningar 
1935:65, stockholm, 129.
7 Kettunen, pauli (2010) ‘The sellers of labour power as social citizens – a Utopian 
wage-work society in nordic visions of welfare’, in helena Blomberg & nanna Kildal 
(eds.) Workfare and welfare state legitimacy, nordWel studies in historical Welfare 
state research 1. helsinki: nordWel.
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understanding of society included the idea of immanent critique ac-
cording to which the normative standards of society were assumed to 
serve as criteria through which society was able to criticise and revise 
itself. 
not only the contents of what was conceived of as the normative 
standards of society but also the possibilities of applying them as cri-
teria of social criticism were a matter of hegemonic struggle. in the 
1930s, nordic social democrats were successful in defining the na-
tional community with critical criteria associated with an inclusive 
concept of ‘people’ (folk).8 among such critical definitions, the swed-
ish people’s home (folkhem) became the best known. The social dem-
ocrats captured the metaphor of home that had been popular among 
the right-wing nationalists and proved that the social circumstances 
did not fulfil this criterion. They consequently attached new political 
meanings to this metaphor.9 Under conditions of increased political 
power of social democracy, the gap between normative standards and 
social reality was then to be filled by the action of the labour move-
ment and by public planning – social engineering10 – relying on sci-
entific knowledge. in this way, in turn, the social democrats reshaped 
8 christiansen, niels finn (1992) ‘socialismen og fædrelandet. arbejderbevægelsen 
mellem internationale og national stolthed 1871–1940’, in ole feldbæk (ed.) dansk 
identitetshistorie 3. folkets danmark, 1848–1940.  København: reitzel; Götz, norbert 
(2001) Ungleiche Geschwister: die Konstruktion von nationalsozialistischer Volksge-
meinschaft und schwedischem Volksheim. die kulturelle Konstruktion von Gemein-
schaften. 4. diss. Baden-Baden: nomos.
9 Götz 2001; larsson, Jan (1994) hemmet vi ärvde. om folkhemmet, identiteten och den 
gemensamma framtiden. stockholm: arena.
10 hirdman, Yvonne (1997) ’“social planning under rational control”. social engineering 
in sweden in the 1930s and 1940s’, in pauli Kettunen & hanna eskola (eds.) models, 
modernity and the myrdals. renvall institute publications 8. helsinki: The renvall 
institute for area and cultural studies, University of helsinki, 55–80; marklund, carl 
(2008) Bridging politics and science. The concept of social engineering in sweden and 
the Usa, 1890–1950. doctoral dissertation. florence: european University institute.
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the values and norms which could be conceived of as normative stand-
ards of the society and, thus, as criteria of immanent critique and the 
basis for political action and planning. in the very same process, social 
democracy became the central factor of national integration. 
The welfare state and the welfare world
in 1934 the swedish social scientists and policy planners alva and 
Gunnar myrdal published the book Kris i befolkningsfrågan (crisis in 
population Question). This book is often referred to as a document of 
how the ideologies of rationalisation and nationalism became united 
in the welfare-state project. The vitality of the population of a nation 
had been a major concern of conservative nationalists, yet in the 1930s 
the social democratic reformers seized on the population question. 
This question was included in the social democratic agenda of social 
reform which the social democrats were now in a more powerful po-
sition than before to define as the national agenda. 
The myrdals argued for “prophylactic social policies” aiming to raise 
“the quality of human material” in sweden. one of their major objec-
tives was to improve social environments for children’s upbringing and 
education. in some cases, the interest of society would make sterilisa-
tion necessary, although “even in the future society must in many cases 
be content with separating children from their unsuitable parents and 
thus from damaging environmental impacts”.11 no doubt, the question 
of the improvement of social environments was for the myrdals much 
wider, and “society” had to use many other rational methods of profy-
lactic social policies. in any case, at the same time as the myrdals’ book 
11 myrdal, alva & Gunnar (1934) Kris i befolkningsfrågan. stockholm: Bonniers, 260.
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demonstrated the transformation bringing the social democracy into 
the centre of national integration, it was also a manifestation of the re-
sponsibilities, duties and rights of “society” to intervene in the sphere 
of private interests and in the lives of individuals and families.
after World War ii, alva and Gunnar myrdal became famous as 
advocates not only for the international role of sweden but also for 
solutions to worldwide problems of peace and development. associ-
ated with this global orientation was a critique of the nationalism and 
state-centredness of the welfare state. Beyond the Welfare State (1960), 
based on Gunnar myrdal’s lectures at Yale University in 1958, was an 
attempt to solve two problems of the welfare state: detailed bureau-
cratic control and nationalism. 
The solution was not liberalistic deregulation but the perfection of 
planning or “created harmony”. it had long been clear to myrdal that 
no natural harmony or equilibrium of private interests existed. how-
ever, the “created harmony” was neither a world of widespread state 
intervention. myrdal presented in Beyond the Welfare State a three-
phase history of planning. The phase of prehistory included uncoordi-
nated public interventions as attempts to solve the problems caused by 
“the quasi-liberal state of mass-poverty, much social rigidity, and gross 
inequality of opportunity”. Then attempts at the coordination of these 
interventions by planning were initiated and increasingly expanded. 
This meant more direct state intervention. however, this second phase 
would prove to be a transitional one:
in this transitional phase of the development towards the more per-
fect democratic Welfare state, while coordination and planning are 
becoming gradually more thorough, under the pressure of continually 
growing volume of intervention, both by the state and by collective 
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authorities and power groups beneath the state level, it often happens 
that people confuse planning with direct and detailed state regula-
tions. The opposite, however, is true; there is still a such large volume 
of intervention because the measures are not ideally coordinated and 
planned. 
from the transitional second phase, however, the third phase would 
emerge. The perfection of planning could mean an actual decrease of 
state intervention:
The assumption is a continued strengthening of provincial and mu-
nicipal self-government, and a balanced growth of the infra-structure 
of effective interest organizations. This would, in its turn, presume an 
intensified citizens’ participation and control, exerted in both these 
fields.12 
in the “created harmony” all relevant interests were institutionally 
articulated and nobody, especially not the economically powerful, had 
any right to claim their particular interests were universal. The insepa-
rable connection of planning and education was essential for myrdal: 
everybody would be able to reflect his or her interests in a wider social 
framework. indeed, while in Crisis in Population Question a key no-
tion had been “the improvement of the quality of human material”, in 
Beyond the Welfare State it was “a more enlightened citizenry”.
most importantly, “created harmony” should and would be realised 
not only within a national framework but also on a global scale. in the 
late 1950s, myrdal was critically aware that the “welfare state is nation-
alistic” and that there was a discrepancy between “national integration 
12 myrdal, Gunnar (1960) Beyond the Welfare state. economic planning in the Welfare 
stats and its international implications. london: duckworth, 67–68. 
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versus international integration”. he found nationalism in the under-
developed countries vital for modernisation: in these countries there 
were “rational grounds for more nationalistic economic policies” and 
the “political need for nationalism”. promoting modernisation and ra-
tionalisation in the world presupposed, however, that the developed 
countries would overcome their welfare-state nationalism.13 The inte-
gration projects aimed at closed regional arrangements – such as those 
that had appeared in europe – were not suited to the goal that myrdal 
called a “Welfare World”.
at the national level, the creation of harmony meant “to recondition 
the national community in such way that for the most part it can be left 
to the cooperation and collective bargaining of the people themselves, 
in all sorts of communities and organisations beneath the formal state 
level, to settle the norms for their living together”. internationally, cre-
ated harmony meant that “economic balance in the world, and at the 
same time national stability and progress in all countries, should be se-
cured by inter-governmental planning and concerted action, directed 
towards a coordination of national policies in the common interest”.14 
The vision of a national “created harmony” can be seen as an attempt to 
contrast Western welfare states with the unregulated liberalist econo-
my, on the one hand, and the soviet model of direct intervention of the 
totalitarian state, on the other hand. myrdal’s vision of international 
“created harmony”, or a Welfare World, in turn, was an attempt to over-
come both east-West and the north-south confrontations. myrdal’s 
trust in the possibility of a virtuous circle between national integration 
and welfare, and international integration and balance was crucial. 
13 myrdal 1960, 111–117, 151–155.
14 myrdal 1960, 74, 213.
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a critical reader might find here a problem concerning the frame-
work of agency. one may say that the move from the welfare state to 
a welfare world presupposed and included a widening of the mean-
ings of ‘us’. obviously, ‘we’ defined through the national solidarity as-
sociated with the welfare state and ‘we’ defined through international 
solidarity were not identical. in order to overcome the discrepancy 
of “national integration versus international integration” and create 
a virtuous circle between these two processes of integration, myrdal 
put his confidence in “the international idealism of all people, which 
i believe is a reality”.15 here myrdal was actually applying his general 
principle that social research and political reforms should start from 
an empirical identification of prevailing values and a choice of some of 
them as value premises for research and reform. inherent in myrdal’s 
thought was the idea of a rational choice of value premises: those really 
existing values should be chosen that corresponded to the processes of 
rationalisation and, thus, the triumph of enlightenment principles.16 
as an empirical fact that myrdal believed to be true, “the interna-
tional idealism of all people” provided value premises for extending the 
welfare state into a welfare world. one may detect here an element of 
spontaneity included in the myrdalian “created harmony”, yet it would 
be consciously constructed on knowledge-based self-government and 
the organisation of interests as well as on international agreements. 
The vision combined planning, divergent interests and democracy in a 
15 myrdal 1960, 214.
16 Kettunen, pauli (1997) ‘The society of Virtuous circles’, in Kettunen pauli & eskola, 
hanna (eds.) models, modernity and the myrdals. renvall institute publications 8. 
helsinki: The renvall institute for area and cultural studies, University of helsinki, 
153–173; strang, Johan (2007) ’overcoming the rift between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ – Gunnar 
myrdal and the philosophy of social engineering’, ideas in history, nr. 2. 
93
Welfare nationalism and competitiVe commUnitY
way that can be seen as a critical elaboration of the nordic confidence 
in the possibility of virtuous circles and symmetrical social relation-
ships within a nation-state society. 
corporate citizenship
in the discussion on globalisation and transnational integration since 
the 1980s strong emphases have been placed on harmony. in part, they 
have appeared in the form of neo-liberalist assumptions on the self-
regulating market that, however, were severely questioned by the crisis 
that began in 2008. constructions of harmony have also been included 
in other ways in the mainstream of globalisation rhetoric. in the search 
for “our” competitiveness it is still mostly the national entities that this 
“we” refers to. The reproducing of local, regional and, especially, na-
tional “imagined communities”17 seems to be an integral part of glo-
balisation. The emphases on self-regulation and community bear some 
resemblances from myrdal’s “created harmony”. in the context of self-
regulation and community we can also find the theme of citizenship 
discussed in a way that might remind one of myrdal’s reliance on “a 
more enlightened citizenry”. i will focus on a recent specific extension 
of the concept of citizen: the idea that not just human beings but also 
large transnational business companies are citizens.18
The idea of being “a good corporate citizen” in all their different 
environments of action emerged in the first years of the 21st century 
into the value manifestos of numerous large business companies. The 
17 anderson, Benedict (1983) imagined communities. reflections on the origin and 
spread of nationalism. london and new York: Verso.
18 i have examined this topic in more detail in Kettunen, pauli (2005) ’corporate citizen-
ship and social partnership’, in lars-folke landgrén & pirkko hautamäki (eds.) people, 
citizen, nation. renvall institute, helsinki 2005, 28–49.  
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expression may have appeared occasionally in american management 
texts as early as in the 1980s, yet it only gained popularity since the 
late 1990s. corporate citizenship was then rapidly adopted even in 
academic milieus. The Journal of Corporate Citizenship was first pub-
lished in 2001 and several research institutes were founded in the field 
of corporate citizenship during the first years of the 21st century, e.g. 
in the United states, Britain, australia and Germany. a growing num-
ber of government units, consultancies and think-tanks dedicated to 
“corporate social responsibility” and “corporate citizenship” have been 
launched.19 
“corporate citizenship” was raised as an affirmative response to de-
mands for “social responsibility” in enterprises and demands to adopt 
a “stakeholder” instead of a narrow “shareholder” perspective. The 
wider introduction of the concept coincided with the rise of move-
ments criticising the neo-liberalist direction of globalisation. “corpo-
rate citizenship” indicates a need and will to respond to the critique 
of the impacts of globalisation on the poor majority of the world and 
to the critique of the policies of transnational companies in countries 
with low wages and few socio-political norms. it is a concept aimed 
to reorientate the discussion on the needs, possibilities and forms of 
global governance and global democracy.
at the World economic forum in davos in 1999, the General sec-
retary of the United nations, Kofi annan, urged business leaders to 
respond to the emerging critique of globalisation by means of col-
19 matten, dirk & crane, andrew (2003) corporate citizenship: towards an extended 
theoretical conceptualization. iccsr research paper series no. 04-2003. nottingham: 
international centre for corporate social responsibility, nottingham University Busi-
ness school.  (www.nottingham.ac.uk/business/ iccsr/pdf/researchpdfs/04-2003.pdf)
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laborating for “good corporate citizenship”. This initiative led to the 
foundation of the programme and network called Global compact 
in 2000 with Un support.20 The vigilant role of intergovernmental 
organisations in adopting and diffusing novel concepts is also worth 
noting. “corporate citizenship” was included in the agendas of the eU, 
ilo and oecd. for example, the ilo carried out “The management 
and corporate citizenship programme”. The programme was aimed 
to help to “build the supportive systems and the managerial compe-
tencies that enable enterprises to be productive, competitive and vi-
able and at the same time meet the increasing social expectations on 
business”.21 corporate citizenship clearly belongs to the field of issues 
in which the intergovernmental organisations such as the ilo and, 
still more influentially, oecd primarily produce comparative knowl-
edge and, thus, promote “bench-marking” and the diffusion of “best 
practices” instead of aiming at legally binding conventions.
The World economic forum has held its position as a leading arena 
for advocating corporate citizenship. a landmark in the triumph of 
this concept was the joint statement on “Global corporate citizenship 
– The leadership challenge for ceos and Boards” that was signed by 
the ceos of 34 large multinational corporations at the World eco-
nomic forum 2002 in new York. The leaders and boards were advised 
to “define the issues”, “agree on company’s spheres of influence”, and 
“identify key stakeholders”. The issues to be defined included “good 
corporate governance and ethics”, “responsibility for people”, “respon-
sibility for environmental impacts”, and “broader contribution to de-
20 rowe, James K. (2005) ‘corporate social responsibility as business strategy’, in  ronnie 
d. lipschutz with James K. rowe, Globalization, Governmentality and Global politics. 
regulation for the rest of us? london / new York: routledge, 130–131.
21 http://www.ilo.org/dyn/empent/ (september 2009).
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velopment”. The categories of company’s spheres of influence, in turn, 
were divided into “core business operations”, “host communities”, “in-
dustry associations”, and “public policy realm”. The stakeholders to 
be identified were included in two main categories. The first category 
comprised “investors, customers and employees”, while the second was 
a mixed collection of “other stakeholders” such as “business partners, 
industry associations, local communities, trade unions, non-govern-
mental organizations, research and academic institutions, the media 
and government bodies – from local municipalities to regional, state 
and national governments and international bodies such as those in 
the United nations system”.22
“corporate citizenship” implicates a structure of global govern-
ance different from the myrdalian late 1950s vision of a Welfare World 
based on the bridging of national and international integration. it is 
paradoxical that at the time of loosened spatial ties of capital, the hum-
ble community-oriented concept of “corporate citizenship” was intro-
duced. Yet, this paradox reflects the fact that territorial communities, 
most notably national communities, are reproduced as a part of glo-
balised economic competition.23 “corporate citizenship” is a concept 
referring to a membership in a community, but it is not a concept for 
discussing rights and duties as the concept of citizenship convention-
ally was. it is not primarily associated with one’s relationship to the 
22 World economic forum 2002. Global corporate citizenship – The leadership chal-
lenge for ceos and Boards. www.weforum.org/pdf/Gcci/Gcc_ceostatement.pdf.
23 cf. sassen, saskia (2000) ‘territory and territoriality in the Global economy’, inter-
national sociology, Vol. 15, no. 2, 372–393; sassen, saskia (2006) territory, authority, 
rights: from medieval to Global assemblages. princeton: princeton University press; 
rosamond, Ben (2002) ‘imagining the european economy: ‘competitiveness’ and the 
social construction of europe as an economic space’, new political economy, Vol. 7, 
no. 2, 157–177.
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state, but with the sphere of voluntary activities to which the concept 
of “civil society” has been, since the 1980s, frequently applied. 
in the rhetoric on corporate citizenship, the key word is “respon-
sibility”, and the basic idea is governance through responsible self-
regulating companies. This “neo-voluntarism”24 does not mean any 
essential hostility towards official norms set by legislation or collective 
agreements. Thus, for example, “human and labour rights” are men-
tioned in several parts of the description of issues in the 2002 decla-
ration. Varying forms of trade union participation may be associated 
with the schemes of corporate social responsibility (csr) of different 
companies. several transnational companies have made international 
framework agreements with international trade union federations 
concerning some general principles in their csr programmes, includ-
ing the right of unionisation and sometimes even a role for national 
and local trade unions in implementing and monitoring the pro-
grammes.25 however, the very idea of stakeholders, and also the way 
in which it was expressed in the 2002 declaration on Global corporate 
citizenship, means a redefining of the relationship between public and 
private, and a redefining of the role of collective labour market agree-
ments.   
The manifestos on corporate citizenship remind us of previous 
company paternalism that especially in the early 20th century was char-
acteristic of many large industrial enterprises regarding their internal 
social relationships as well as their relationships to the host communi-
24 cf. streeck 1998, 408.
25 croucher, richard & cotton, elizabeth (2009) Global Unions, Global Business. Global 
Union federations and international Business. london: middlesex University press, 
57–68.
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ties. however, it is important to pay attention to a profound change 
concerning the role of spatial ties.  
a market relationship has developed between business environ-
ments and business companies. one aspect of this change is a turn-
around of the positions of public and private. national and local public 
authorities are behaving as market actors as they try to produce at-
tractive business environments and sell them to enterprises and inves-
tors, pointing out, for example, their high levels of “human capital” 
and “social capital”. private enterprises, in turn, are active in creating 
self-regulating norms and sanctions, e.g. in the form of various certifi-
cates in social and environmental issues, as an alternative to legal con-
straints. “corporate citizenship” is an expression for this turnaround 
of the positions of public and private. at the same time it indicates that 
not only the constructors and sellers of business environments but also 
the leaders of business companies have to take into account the needs 
of the popular legitimacy of their policies. for companies this means, 
most obviously, a sensitivity to consumer attitudes.
however, the influence that transnationally operating enterprises 
exert on their actual or potential business environments is Janus-faced. 
This can be illuminated with support from the american economist 
albert o. hirschman, who has distinguished between the alternative 
ways actors respond to the changes in the milieu of their activities: 
exit, voice and loyalty. freely interpreting hirschman’s distinction, exit 
means leaving an unsatisfactory milieu, while voice refers to attempts 
to exert influence on the environment and loyalty to the commitment 
in its modes of functioning.26 The processes called globalisation, nota-
26 hirschman, albert o. (970) exit, Voice, and loyalty. responses to decline in firms, 
organizations, and states. cambridge, mass. and london: harvard University press.
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bly the deregulation and globalisation of financial markets, have great-
ly increased the differences between various economic actors concern-
ing their opportunities to choose between these alternatives. The exit 
option is present in a new way to transnational economic actors, i.e. 
transnational enterprises and ever more so to transnational investors. 
most importantly, the exit option is a powerful silent means to use an 
influential voice.
The exit option is one side of the Janus face, while the other side is 
“corporate citizenship”. These two faces can be met in the debates in 
which globalisation is defined and dealt with as a national challenge. 
adopting such a national horizon of action, politics is oriented to re-
shaping the nation state as a “competition state”. in the competition 
state, the relationship between politics and economies appears to have 
two sides. on one hand, politics is shaped as the reactive fulfilling of 
economic necessities, which, in turn, are associated with the exit op-
tion of companies and investors. on the other hand, politics is aimed 
at the active creation of an innovative context for competitive compa-
nies. in the spirit of “corporate citizenship”, varying forms of “public 
private partnership” emerge in the projects for creating and exploiting 
competitive business environments, engaging national and local pub-
lic authorities, universities and other institutes of research, education 
and training, large and small enterprises, and various kinds of volun-
tary organisations.
obviously, “corporate citizenship” refers to citizenship that is pro-
foundly different from the myrdalian idea of “enlightened citizenry”, 
which consists of human beings capable of self-government, the mu-
tual recognising of their particular interests, and the overcoming of 
the nationalism of the welfare state. firstly, this is not an “enlightened 
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citizenry” of human beings but business companies. secondly, the 
rhetoric on “corporate citizenship” and “stakeholders” pushes aside a 
crucial idea implicit in myrdal’s emphasis on the recognition of all rel-
evant interests27 and explicit in the nordic ideals of symmetrical labour 
market relations. 
The idea was that the interests of business companies as employers 
are no more than a category of particular interests and that this  will be 
ensured through collective and public regulation of labour relations, 
empowering the weaker party (workers) to take care of their interests 
and constraining the stronger party (employers) from presenting their 
interests as universal. This idea appeared at the “macro” level of the 
national economy and society, but also at the “micro” level of the busi-
ness economy and enterprise. one can found a more or less explicit 
distinction between “enterprise” and “employer” in which the general 
interest of the enterprise was not just identified with the action of man-
agement but rather conceived as an outcome of the parity-based agree-
ments and negotiations between employees and employer with their 
particular interests. 
in this way, “industrial democracy” in the nordic countries was 
strongly associated with the widening and deepening of the system of 
collective agreements instead of referring to a separate parallel institu-
27 it is worth noting that for myrdal the balance of interests concerned not only different 
interests of different groups but also different interests in connection to different roles 
of individuals. he was concerned that collective bargaining was exclusively organised 
according to the role of the income earner. The absence of proper articulation of con-
sumer interests resulted in inflationary tendencies and made direct state interventions 
necessary to correct the bias. myrdal 1960, 78–86.
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tion of personnel participation.28 This meant that trade unions, with 
their considerable power to set the agenda on working life issues, be-
gan to draw management issues into the sphere of collective industrial 
relations. however, in the 1980s a change occurred and the direction 
altered. in defining questions and solutions concerning work and em-
ployment, the perspective of management, and in particular, of human 
resource management, became predominant. trade unions, adopting 
a defensive position, were reoriented to promote the notion that the 
institutions of collective industrial relations were beneficial for the ef-
fective management of competitive business.      
corresponding to the hegemonic primacy of the management per-
spective over the industrial relations perspective, the transnational 
rhetoric of national business interest organisations tends to send the 
message that they represent the universal interest of “economy” in re-
lation to the particular and biased interests of trade unions and pub-
lic authorities. in fact, in many european countries, e.g. in all nordic 
countries, separate employer organisations have been abolished. The 
representation of enterprises as employers has been included as just 
one part in the business interest organisations that represent the inter-
est of the “economy” in relation to many different “stakeholders”, com-
petitiveness appearing as the core of this universalised interest. 
on the other hand, for “global corporate citizens”, national business 
interest organisations are but one category of “stakeholders”. What 
28 Knudsen, herman (1995) employee participation in europe. london: sage publica-
tions; Kettunen, pauli (1998) ’Globalisation and the criteria of ‘Us’ – a historical 
perspective on the discussion of the nordic model and new challenges’, in daniel 
fleming, pauli Kettunen, henrik søborg & christer Thörnqvist (eds.) Global redefin-
ing of Working life – a new nordic agenda for competence and participation? nord 
1998:12. copenhagen: nordic council of ministers, 33–80. 
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kinds of motives can tie a transnational company to a national busi-
ness or employer interest organisations? This is at least as fundamental 
a question as are the problems of trade union membership that used 
to dominate the research on industrial relations. There are plausible 
motives, and an obvious one is the logic of buying services, i.e. ser-
vices of interest representation. We might assume that the need, avail-
ability and quality of such services are among the variables according 
to which the leaders of transnational corporations assess different po-
tential national environments of business. in turn, the nation-states 
in their hard market competition as sellers of business environments 
for competitive economic performance may include the good-working 
systems of collective conflict regulation and consensus making as com-
petitive advantages into brands of their own.29 arguably, this is just one 
of the divergent ways in which “competition states” and competitive 
national communities may be shaped through the encounters of trans-
national economic actors and national institutions, yet it can also be 
seen as a crucial aspect in how the nordic welfare states and collective 
agreement systems are motivated and modified to serve competition-
state functions.30 We can also find this kind of argumentation in the 
discussion on the “european social model”, and it is inherent in the 
vocabulary concerning the social dimension of the european Union in 
29 in finland, a commission for developing the country brand of finland was nominated 
in 2008 by foreign minister alexander stubb. it was chaired by Jorma ollila, the presi-
dent of the boards of shell and nokia, who has on several occasions – also when active 
as the ceo of nokia in 1992–2006 – expressed his views on the economic benefits of 
the “nordic model”. The report of the brand commission was published in 2010. 
30 andersen, torben m., holmström, Bengt, honkapohja, seppo, Korkman, sixten, 
söderström, hans tson & Vartiainen, Juhana (2007) The nordic model – embrac-
ing Globalization and sharing risks. helsinki: The research institute of the finnish 
economy etla.
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which “social partners” and “social dialogue” are among the key con-
cepts. 
social partnership
in discussion on the societal role of business companies, “corporate 
citizenship” is not the only community-oriented expression. at the 
time of increasing asymmetries between capital and labour, especial-
ly concerning their spatial ties, the positive symmetrical expressions 
of “social partners” and “social dialogue” have been widely adopted. 
Thus, according to the language of the european Union, “social dia-
logue” between “social partners” is a crucial mode of action on the “so-
cial dimension” of european integration. “social partners” is the term 
for trade unions and employer organisations. indeed, one connotation 
of being a citizen is thereby attached to large transnational companies. 
in eU texts, social partners are characterised as actors of civil society 
and, consequently, the european social dialogue is presented as a way 
of creating a european civil society. since “civil society” in this usage 
means the sphere of citizens’ voluntary association, enterprises, associ-
ated in their employer organisations, thus qualify as citizens.
in the mid-1980s “social dialogue” between “social partners” was of-
ficially introduced in the procedures of european integration. The sta-
tus of social dialogue has been confirmed in the maastricht and am-
sterdam treaties of the european Union as well as in the constitutional 
lisbon treaty. numerous joint opinions and declarations have been 
given as results from branch-level, or “sectoral”, as well as peak-level, 
or “cross-industry”, social dialogue, the issues of training and educa-
tion being among the easiest ones for achieving a common stance. Yet 
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rather few examples exist on agreements resulting in binding norms, 
and no signs appear of a rapid emergence of a european-level system 
of collective labour-market agreements proper. The social dialogue is 
a procedure in the “social dimension” of the eU, and in the field of 
social policies the eU-level arrangements are supposed to play merely 
a complementary role in relation to national practices. however, the 
very notions of “social partners” and “social dialogue” are compatible 
with ideas of soft governance, including non-binding coordination or, 
as is the case with the current eU principle of open method of co-
ordination, general frameworks for varying national arrangements. 
furthermore, european social dialogue has played and still does play a 
role through its discursive power.31
reading eU documents that deal with or are produced by social di-
alogue, one can make two observations. firstly, in the talk about social 
partners, very little is usually said about the diverging compositions 
of various social partners. The increased global asymmetries between 
capital and labour disappear behind the symmetrical figures of social 
partners and social dialogue. secondly, there are rarely any hints about 
confronting interests or compromises between the interests. european 
social dialogue is described as “force for innovation and change”, “a key 
to better governance”, or “a force for economic and social moderniza-
31 concerning opm see e.g. zeitlin, Jonathan & pochet, philippe, with lars magnusson 
(eds.) (2005) The open method of coordination in action: The european employment 
and social inclusion strategies. Brussels: pie-peter lang. – on the adoption of the idea 
of framework agreements in the eU social dialogue, e.g. larsen, trine p. & andersen, 
søren Kaj (2006) ‘autonomous framework agreements –a new Way of promoting the 
european social model? an empirical study of implementing the telework agree-
ment in denmark, sweden, Germany, hungary and the UK’, in miroslav stanojevic & 
Jana nadoh Bergoc (eds.) The future of social models. industrial relations in europe 
conference (irec).  ljubljana, slovenia 31 august – 2 september 2006. conference 
proceedings. ljubljana: faculty of social sciences, University of ljubljana (cd publica-
tion). 
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tion”. in these contexts, industrial relations and labour legislation are 
typically assessed by the criteria of “quality”, reflecting the lessons of 
total quality management.32 in both respects, the eU rhetoric on social 
partners and social dialogue excludes modes of thought and action 
that used to be crucial in nordic traditions. 
in the marxian tradition of critical theory, the symmetrical appear-
ance of labour market relationships is seen as an ideological disguise 
hiding the basic asymmetry of capital and labour. on the individual 
level, the relationship between worker and capitalist appears as a free 
market relationship, yet it is essentially – as Karl marx concluded – a 
relationship of subordination and exploitation. social liberal reform-
ers, when defining the “labour question” and its solutions in the late 
19th century, shared the view that a basic asymmetry prevailed in in-
dividual employment relationships. They concluded that the weaker 
party, workers, were in need of protection provided by social legisla-
tion and collective agreements, yet at the collective level, in the form 
of collective agreements, parity would be achieved. This “ideology of 
parity”33 directed the development of labour law in Western countries 
in the 20th century. for critical theory, however, the symmetry at col-
lective level is also a mere formal appearance that conceals the funda-
mentally different compositions of the two labour market parties. one 
of the most influential contributions in this critique of ideology is the 
analysis on ”two logics of collective action” by claus offe and helmut 
Wiesenthal, who focus on the basic differences beyond the symmetri-
32 see e.g. the industrial relations in europe reports that the european commission has 
published every second year since 2000. 
33 Bruun, niklas (1979) Kollektivavtal och rättsideologi. en rättsvetenskaplig studie av 
de rättsideologiska premisserna för inlemmandet av kollektivavtalet och kollektiva 
kampåtgärder i finsk rättsordning efter år 1924. Vammala: Juridica.
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cal outlook of trade unions and employer organisations concerning 
the actors they represent as well as their modes of creating and articu-
lating collective interests.34  
however, in the nordic traditions of industrial relations, which were 
shaped by influential trade unions associated with reformist social-
ist movements, the symmetry of labour market parties came to mean 
something more than just a juridical form of regulating labour market 
conflicts or an ideological disguise of the basic asymmetry of capital 
and labour. The symmetry of collective labour market agreements be-
came a criteria for an immanent critique, i.e. the mode of critique in 
which society is criticised by means of the normative standards that 
appear as the standards of society itself. since the 1930s and especially 
after World War ii the widening of the field of issues regulated through 
collective negotiations and agreements was conceived of as a process of 
democratisation. The vision included also the levelling of the asymme-
try of individual employment relationship through collective action or 
“movement”, which served to counteract and restrict individual com-
petition in the market place. especially in swedish debates on working 
life reform, we can recognise a politically effective Utopian idea ac-
cording to which the collective-level parity between the labour mar-
ket parties has to be extended and woven into individual employment 
relationships, a vision of a kind of social citizenship within wage-work 
relationships.35
34 offe, claus  & Wiesenthal, helmut (1980) ‘two logics of collective action: Theoretical 
notes on social class and organizational form’, political power and social Theory, vol 
1, 67–115.
35 cf. Winner, langdon (1995) ‘citizen Virtues in a technological order’, in andrew 
feenberg & alastair hannay (eds.) technology and the politics of Knowledge. Bloom-
ington and indianapolis: indiana University press.
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since the 1980s, the premises for the nordic image of symmetry 
between labour market parties was weakened by a variety of develop-
ments: the multinational and transnational character of companies in 
the global economy; their restructuring in accordance with the net-
work principle; the increase in so-called “atypical” employment re-
lationships; and the growing fluidity of the boundary between wage 
work and entrepreneurship. it became more difficult to identify, or-
ganise, bring together and centralise the different labour market par-
ties within a national society. The idea of the worker as the weaker part 
of the wage-work relationship tended to be marginalised through the 
ethos of entrepreneurship at the same time as, on the other hand, the 
asymmetry between capital and labour increased due to the dramatic 
growth of the mobility of financial capital.
 “social partners” and “social dialogue” are concepts in a discourse 
in which the ideas and practices of collective negotiations and agree-
ments are discussed from the point of view of their compatibility with 
the new needs of european or national competitiveness. By means of 
these concepts such ideas and practices are defended in a way that fo-
cuses on proving them compatible with and beneficial to economic 
competitiveness. The concepts are very much part of the rhetoric of 
international organisations, not only the eU but also the ilo. in the 
1990s the ilo adopted “social dialogue” into its vocabulary in which 
“tripartism” (government-employers-workers) remained the old and 
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still lively core concept.36 While “corporate citizenship” emerged as a 
management concept for responding to the critique of neo-liberalist 
globalisation, “social dialogue” has reflected an attempt of the eU 
commission to engage business companies in a strategy which aims at 
european competitiveness based on knowledge, innovation, relatively 
high social norms, and trade union participation. 
at the same time as social partners are presented as a natural ele-
ment of any society, they are, on the other hand, described as voluntary 
organisations of civil society structured on the lines of democratic rep-
resentation.37 Thus, large transnational enterprises are provided with 
the qualities of active citizenship, which, no doubt, they themselves 
also wish to adopt, as the expression “corporate citizenship” indicates. 
“social partners” as actors of “civil society” could be discussed by a 
conceptual historical contextualising of this particular usage of the 
concept of “civil society”. another line of interpretation could take its 
point of departure in the Gramscian analysis of hegemony. for antonio 
Gramsci, the “integral state” referred to the complex of state machin-
ery and the modes of organising economic interests in “civil society” – 
36 on its website, the ilo explains social dialogue as follows: “The main goal of social 
dialogue itself is to promote consensus building and democratic involvement among 
the main stakeholders in the world of work. successful social dialogue structures and 
processes have the potential to resolve important economic and social issues, encourage 
good governance, advance social and industrial peace and stability and boost economic 
progress.” http://www.ilo.org/global/about_the_ilo/mainpillars/socialdialogue/lang--
en/index.htm (september 2009).
37 for example, in his opening address in the seminar on “european social dialogue and 
civil dialogue” in 2003, roger Briesch, president of the european economic and social 
committee (eesc), stated that the eesc has aimed to “strengthen the role and the 
position of organised civil society and its various components, in particular the social 
partners, both within and outside the eU”. www.esc.eu.int/president/speeches/ docs/
Briesch_dialogue_social_100603_en.pdf.  – The idea of employer organisations as a part 
of civil society is also included in the lisbon treaty. it maintains that “The economic 
and social committee shall consist of representatives of organisations of employers, of 
the employed, and of other parties representative of civil society, notably in socioeco-
nomic, civic, professional and cultural areas.”
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the complex within and through which hegemony is established.38 The 
Gramscian concept of hegemony can be applied to a specific type of 
power that is evident in the discussion on social partnership and social 
dialogue. it is the power of agenda setting – the power of making the 
questions that are seen as relevant and legitimate. struggles between 
rivalling responses tend to conceal this power. Thus, the controversies 
concerning the answers to “how to make europe or a country competi-
tive in the globalised economy” seem to reinforce the “self-evident” 
and, hence, legitimate role of competitiveness as the primary goal.
for trade unions and defenders of the welfare state, not least in the 
nordic countries, it has been easy to support a competitiveness strat-
egy recognising the need of social protection and the role of nego-
tiations and agreements on issues to do with social policy, the labour 
market and working life. it has not been so easy to recognise that the 
notion of symmetry in “social partners” and “social dialogue” is dif-
ferent from the ideal of symmetry that used to be influential in the 
development of nordic industrial relations. nor has it been easy to 
recognise the changes in agenda setting through the new meanings 
and imperatives of competitiveness.
in the nordic countries, trade unions and employer organisations 
have not been “social partners”, but “labour market parties”. a particu-
lar nordic feature has been the stress on the logic of the labour market 
rather than more communitarian concepts of labour relations. This is 
reflected, e.g. by the aforementioned fact that separate arrangements 
of employee participation (cf. Betriebsräte in Germany) have been ei-
38 Gramsci, antonio (1971) selections from the prison notebooks of antonio Gramsci. 
edited and introduced by Quintin hoare and Geoffrey nowell-smith. london: law-
rence and Wishart. 
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ther relatively unimportant or integrated with the system of collective 
agreements and the accompanying system of shop stewards. 
The promoting of the functioning of the labour market has played a 
crucial role in the making of the nordic systems of social security, pub-
lic social services and industrial relations. This does not easily fit with 
the famous thesis of Gøsta esping-andersen on “decommodification”. 
With this concept, esping-andersen refers to policies that liberate peo-
ple from their dependencies on markets, notably from the uncertain-
ties associated with the character of labour as commodity.39 in fact, the 
nordic patterns of the welfare state and industrial relations have not 
rested on a denial of the fact that labour is a commodity and not even 
on an attempt to abolish such a state of affairs. The nordic model has 
been associated with the construction of a modern society, in which 
wage work is the overwhelming social form of work and institutions 
are based on the normalcy and support of wage work, including the 
work of women outside the home. two principles have been parallelly 
reinforced and mutually related: universalist social citizenship and the 
normalcy of wage work.
  “social partnership” has its roots in ideas which differ from an 
orientation to conflicts and compromises between particular collective 
interests as has been characterised the nordic countries. The term it-
self (Sozialpartnerschaft) seems to have emerged in austria after World 
War ii, and referred to common efforts for national economic and po-
39 esping-andersen, Gøsta (1985) politics against markets. The social democratic road 
to power. princeton: princeton University press; esping-andersen, Gøsta (1990) The 
Three Worlds of Welfare capitalism. cambridge: polity press.
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litical recovery and to overcoming previous cleavages.40 its major fea-
tures can be found in social catholicism, which took shape in the late 
19th century. in the post-World War ii decades, especially in austria 
and West Germany, the notion of “social partnership” seems to have 
had a potential to combine the traditions of social catholicism and 
social democracy. The (social democratic) “dualism of labour and 
capital”41 could be interpreted within the framework of the (catholic) 
organicist idea of a community in which every member is committed 
to fulfil his own function for common good. This idea implies a norm 
which reduces societal relationships to personal relationship – a cru-
cial aspect of the catholic understanding of the principle of subsidi-
arity in the “social dimension” of the eU.42 
compromise and consensus
The discursive power of the notion of “social partnership” not only 
stems from the anchorage of this concept in long traditions of europe-
an social thought, but also from its resonance with current tendencies 
40 in 2000, richard hyman sent a query on the history of this concept to the labour 
historians’ discussion list labnet, moderated by international institute of social his-
tory, amsterdam. on the basis of the answers he received, he then concluded that 
the term seems to have first been used in austria. http://www2.iisg.nl/lists/archives/
lab06.00.4.asp?sort=thread. – for the historical context of austrian ”social partnership” 
see rainio-niemi, Johanna (2008) small state cultures of consensus. state traditions 
and consensus-seeking in the neo-corporatist and neutrality policies in post-1945 
austria and finland. doctoral dissertation. helsinki: faculty of social sciences, Uni-
versity of helsinki.
41 Brüggemann, ernst (1994) die menschliche person als subjekt der arbeit. das ,prinzip 
des Vorrangs der arbeit vor dem Kapital’ und seine Umsetzung in der heutigen Gesells-
chaft. abhandlungen zur sozialethik. herausgegeben von anton rauscher und lothar 
roos. Band 33. padenborn/münchen/Wien/zürich: ferdinand schöningh, 254.
42 cf. van Kersbergen, Kees (1995) social capitalism – a study of christian democracy 
and the welfare state. london: routledge, 187–197; van Kersbergen, Kees & Verbeek, 
Bertjan  (2004) ‘subsidiarity as a principle of Governance in the european Union’, com-
parative european politics, 2,  142–162.
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in social political agenda setting. a crucial change can be described as 
a shift from the principle of compromise to the principle of consensus. 
i apply here the distinction elaborated by frank ankersmit between 
compromise and consensus. compromise is based on the mutual rec-
ognition of the particular instead of the universal nature of the inter-
ests in question, and the political process does not aim to remove this 
state of affairs. consensus, in turn, presupposes a commitment to a 
common interest defined beforehand, and in the political process only 
those aspects of the particular interests of the participants are recog-
nised which bear elements of the given common interest.43  
consensus as an ideal may easily exclude the interests and ideas of 
the actors who do not wish to commit themselves to the common in-
terest. But even as a shared ideal, consensus does not mean the absence 
of conflicts. at least two types of conflicts might occur. firstly, a deep 
disagreement may prevail concerning the appropriate definition of the 
common interest and/or the right to represent the common interest. 
The conflicts in which both parties strongly appeal to a universal in-
terest may grow bitter and fatal, as means for regulating them hardly 
exist. secondly, within the limits of a shared definition of the common 
interest, a varying space may be open for the articulation of conflicting 
particular interests. however, compromises are, in this case, just a nec-
essary way of rescuing the previously defined common interest rather 
than being a way of defining it.
in nation-state societies, the decisions that are not just made by the 
coercive power of the strongest forces often include elements of both 
consensus and compromise, and in conflicts, both these ideals may be 
43 ankersmit, f. r. (2002) political representation. stanford: stanford University press, 
193–213.
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recognised. The relationship between these two principles, however, 
varies and changes. The making of the nordic welfares states and in-
dustrial relations systems included the strengthening and institution-
alisation of compromises between different particular interests, and 
this was legitimised by the confidence in the virtuous circle of social 
equality, economic growth and widening democracy. The nationalism 
associated with globalised economic competition, notably with the 
making of competitive communities in the competition between busi-
ness environments, reinforces consensus and weakens compromise.      
in their discussion on the competition state, palan and abbot 
strongly stress the diversity of the particular modes in which the com-
petition state can be embedded in different nation-states and realised 
through different “state strategies”.44 indeed, the change may take place 
within a remarkable institutional continuity, through an “institutional 
conversion”45. old institutions of the welfare state and industrial rela-
tions can be and have been modified to serve new functions of the 
competitive community. concerning working life, collective interest 
representation and even high social norms are considered not only as 
“rigidities”, but rather widely, as competitive advantages, as factors pro-
moting the commitment of workers and the innovativeness of firms 
and their managements. much of the ideological power of knowledge, 
training and innovation in the nordic countries stems from the prom-
ise that competitiveness and its preconditions in the global economy 
can – or even must – be seen from a wider perspective than that of 
neo-liberalist deregulation. The concept of “social capital” has gained 
44 palan & abbot 1999, 36–39.
45 Thelen, Kathleen (2003) ‘how institutions evolve – insights from comparative histori-
cal analysis’, in James mahoney & dietrich rueschemeyer (eds.) comparative histori-
cal analysis in social sciences. cambridge: cambridge University press, 228–230.
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popularity while it has opened up new possibilities to revitalise ideas 
of the virtuous circle between social cohesion and economic success in 
the context of the competition state. 
it makes a difference whether or not an individual’s opportunities to 
make her or himself competitive are shaped by more or less egalitar-
ian systems of education and training, and it also makes a difference 
whether or not the encouragement of knowledge-based competition 
in working life is connected with collective institutions of social regu-
lation. nevertheless, a tension appears in nordic discussions between 
what are presented as institutional preconditions of competitiveness 
and how the contents of competitiveness are conceived. at the same 
time as egalitarian institutions and participatory practices can be de-
fended as preconditions for knowledge-based competitiveness, true 
membership in a competitive community is a matter of individual 
competitiveness. This consists of communicative and innovative skills 
and talents and reflexive capabilities of monitoring oneself from the 
point of view of competitiveness. from this sphere, the principles of 
social equality and collective interests have been pushed aside.  
conclusion: the nationalism of models
in conclusion, the concept of “model” deserves some attention. The 
current discussion on models is inspired by the encounters between 
globalised capital and national institutions, and it indicates increasing 
reflexivity as an aspect of globalisation. The popularity of the concept 
of “the nordic model” since the 1980s implies such a shift of perspec-
tive. reflexivity is nourished by the imperatives of competitiveness, 
which include the need for continuous comparisons in order to learn 
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the universal “best practice” or to find the “difference”, i.e. an edge, 
one’s own particular competitive advantage. european integration has 
provided an important context for the discussion on models. 
an interesting ambiguity appears in the current usage of the con-
cept of model. it may refer to a structure that has become threatened 
through globalisation, or it may refer to a way of responding to the 
challenge. The former meaning is obvious in the discussion on the 
threats against the “nordic welfare-state model”. The latter, in turn, is 
manifested in the praising of “the danish model” of “flexicurity”46, or 
“the finnish model” as a paragon of consensual competitiveness in a 
new knowledge-based society47, or “the nordic model” in general, as-
sessed to be capable of embracing globalisation by means of risk shar-
ing48. in both cases – the model as a target of threats or the model 
as a response – globalisation is dealt with as a national challenge. Yet 
the ambiguity of the concept of model indicates the changing role of 
the nation state, which can be characterised by the concepts of welfare 
state and competition state. instead of a shift from the welfare state to a 
competition state, the change reflected by the two sides of the concept 
of the “nordic model” can be interpreted as a conversion in which 
welfare-state institutions are modified to serve competition-state func-
tions.
 The defence of the welfare state seems to contribute to this change. 
for those defending the welfare state, it appears to be natural to argue 
that the welfare state also provides crucial means for responding to 
46 madsen, per Kongshøj (2004) ‘The danish model of ‘flexicurity’: experiences and les-
sons’, transfer. european review of labour and research, Volume 10 (2), 187–207.
47 castells, manuel & himanen, pekka (2002) The information  society and the welfare 
state. The finnish model. oxford: oxford University press.
48 andersen et al. 2007.
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the competitive challenges: that the high levels of social security and 
social services are not only compatible with economic competitiveness 
but also themselves provide competitive advantages. This kind of argu-
mentation was also reflected and encouraged in the lisbon strategy of 
the eU, 2000, with its vision of a virtuous circle between social policy, 
economic policy and employment policy. The guiding principle of the 
social policy agenda 2000–2005, implementing the lisbon strategy, 
was “to reinforce social policy as a productive factor”.49 as the revised 
lisbon strategy, 2005, was focused on economic growth and job crea-
tion, the need of legitimating social protection as “a productive factor” 
was actually reinforced. This argument may express an “economisa-
tion” of social policy in two different senses: as an argument for the 
recognition of the economic importance of social protection, but also 
as an argument for reforming social policy in a way that it could meet 
the demand of being a productive factor in global competition. 
focusing on globalisation as a national challenge or as a European 
challenge implies, respectively, nationalist or euro-nationalist agenda-
settings. Within this framework, different and conflicting political al-
ternatives can be identified, including nostalgic welfare nationalism or 
xenophobic and racist right-wing nationalism. These modes of nation-
alism are, respectively, either powerless or destructive alternatives for 
the different projects concerning national competitiveness. any effec-
tive politics focusing on globalisation as just a national challenge or 
as just a European challenge – including those oriented to defend the 
national welfare state or the so-called european social model – seems 
49 com(2000) 379 final. communication from the commission to the council, the 
european parliament, the economic and social committee and the committee of the 
regions. social policy agenda. Brussels: european commission.
to be bound to reinforce the role of economic competitiveness in the 
defining of a political agenda. a crucial question is whether the con-
clusions from the current global economic crisis will reinforce the log-
ic of national competition state, perhaps associated with a reinvention 
of some protectionist elements, or whether these conclusions will open 
a space for inter- and transnational economic and social regulation.

part ii  
Welfare state nationalism:   
comparative perspective 

chapter 4 
nationalism and Welfare state politics
in Belgium, canada, and  
the United Kingdom1
daniel Béland and andré lecours
despite the recent proliferation of literature on nationalism and on the 
welfare state, little has been written to explore the possible interaction 
between these two crucial political constructions.2 for instance, stu-
dents of social citizenship have pointed to the link between national 
identity and welfare provisions, but they have seldom analyzed this 
connection in reference to substate nationalism.3 as for specialists of 
1 This chapter is a revised and updated version of Béland, daniel and lecours, andré 
(2005) The politics of territorial solidarity: nationalism and social policy reform 
in canada, the United Kingdom, and Belgium, comparative political studies, 38 (6) 
august, 676–703. readers interested to know more about this topic can read our 2008 
oxford University press book devoted to it: Béland, daniel and lecours, andré (2008) 
nationalism and social policy: The politics of territorial solidarity, oxford: oxford 
University press. The authors wish to thank fred Block, angela Kempf, Guy lecavalier, 
nicola mcewen, Bruno palier, philip resnick, and charles tilly for their comments on 
previous drafts of this chapter. The authors also acknowledge the support of the social 
science and humanities research council of canada. The authors are responsible for 
all the translations in this paper.
2 a significant exception here is the work of mcewen, nicola (2006) nationalism and the 
state: Welfare and identity in scotland and Quebec Brussels, peter lang. on the rela-
tionship between nationalism and public policy, see erk, Jan (2003) “Wat We zelf doen, 
doenWe Beter”: Belgian substate nationalisms, congruence and public policy’, Journal 
of public policy, 23 (2), 201–224. 
3 for example: marshall, t.h. (1964) ‘citizenship and social class’ in class, citizenship 
and development, , Garden city: doubleday, 65–122. 
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nationalism, they seldom analyze the welfare state, focusing instead on 
the state, language, culture, ethnicity, and religion.4 
This chapter examines the relationship between substate national-
ism and the welfare state in canada, the United Kingdom, and Bel-
gium. it formulates two broad arguments. first, it explains how, in 
these countries, identity construction and territorial mobilisation 
inherent to substate nationalism typically involve a social policy di-
mension. second, the chapter shows that substate nationalism affects 
welfare-state development by reshaping social policy agendas while, 
in some contexts, strengthening the policy autonomy of regional enti-
ties. in conducting our analysis of the changing relationship between 
substate nationalism and welfare-state politics, we pay close attention 
to the mediating effect of institutions, ideological forces, and socioeco-
nomic cleavages.
The politics of nationalism and social policy
nationalism is a complex phenomenon that takes different forms in 
different societies and whose specific nature is still the subject of de-
bate.5 despite the lack of agreement on the origins and dynamics of 
nationalism, most scholars believe that it involves two main elements. 
The first is an identity most frequently derived from the sharing of 
common markers such as language, religion, or ethnic origins (real 
or imagined). The second is the existence of concrete processes of ter-
4 for example: Guibernau, montserrat and hutchinson, John (eds.) (2001) Understand-
ing nationalism, cambridge, UK: polity press. 
5 smith, anthony d. (1998) nationalism and modernism, london: routledge
 This chapter focuses on substate nationalism, that is, nationalist movements that emerge 
within multinational states and seek increased political autonomy for the community 
they claim to represent, or simply an independent state.
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ritorial mobilisation;6 it seeks to gain or maintain for a group—the 
nation—a measure of self-government most often in the form of au-
tonomy or independence. nationalism features identity prominently 
but it is first and foremost a form of politics. Therefore, nationalism is 
inseparable from the power struggles in which its claims are grounded. 
The identity dimension of nationalism usually features a distinct cul-
ture and/or history. cultural distinctiveness, especially in language, 
can serve as a criterion for defining the national community (i.e. for 
specifying who should be included and excluded from it). moreover, 
once the contours of the nation have been shaped, culture becomes a 
powerful reference for national identity. for example, nationalist lead-
ers can trace the history (real, reinvented, or imagined) of a cultural or 
linguistic group in such a way as to emphasise its continuity, resilience, 
and dynamism.7 
social programs can be depicted by nationalist leaders as symbols 
of a wider set of values, societal priorities, and political culture. But the 
incorporation of social policy into identity may also have a ‘bottom-
up’ dynamic because social programs are a concrete manifestation of 
the existence of a political community. as much as culture and lan-
guage, health and social services as well as income-maintenance pro-
grams are present in the everyday life of citizens, where they can both 
reinforce and illustrate collective solidarity. for instance, in multilin-
gual societies, health and social services involving person-to-person 
contacts can directly participate in the development of substate identi-
ties. language issues and the debates over the delivery of health and 
6 Brass, paul r. (1991) nationalism and ethnicity: Theory and comparison, london: sage.
7 hobsbawm, eric (1992) nations and nationalism since 1780: programme, myth, reality, 
cambridge, UK: cambridge University press. 
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social services intersect because such services necessitate verbal com-
munication. as for income-maintenance programs, they can also con-
stitute identity-building tools because the program’s eligibility criteria 
and benefit structure can reflect specific values. moreover, nationalist 
mobilisation is frequently centred on cultural distinctiveness. in re-
tracing or reinventing the history of their groups, nationalist leaders 
often define an enemy that is said to threaten the cultural integrity of 
their group.8 if the enemy tag is applied to a central government rather 
than, or in addition to, another group, jurisdictional battles stemming 
from the federal or decentralised nature of political systems can trigger 
nationalist mobilisation at the substate level. in such a context, social 
protection becomes the focus of a political competition. The nature 
of this competition is quite different from the one that may occur in 
other policy areas, because most social programs are openly redistrib-
utive and because they directly raise the question of the boundaries 
of territorial solidarity. social policy is frequently at the heart of the 
idea of a community and is, therefore, connected with sets of collec-
tive values. in this context, social policy becomes part of a broader 
mobilisation discourse by nationalist leaders who argue that social 
programs are threatened by the selfish and irresponsible actions of the 
other government(s) and that increased political autonomy, or even 
independence, represents the only way to preserve the quality of social 
protection for the community. 
Beyond their instrumental uses of social policy for mobilisation, na-
tionalist movements have a tendency to create social programs within 
the institutions they control. after all, both nationalism and the wel-
8 Brown, david (1999) ‘are there good and bad nationalisms?’, nations and nationalism, 
5, 299–301.
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fare state are framed in reference to the idea of solidarity.9 nationalism 
depicts itself as the political expression of a special sense of solidarity 
among human beings.10 although social insurance fragmentation can 
weaken this logic, the welfare state has the potential to strengthen so-
cial and economic solidarity between citizens. in this setting, broad 
ideas about solidarity can lead to the creation of formal relationships 
involving rights and responsibilities.11 national solidarity is an ideo-
logical construction that owes much to nationalism as a political force 
and, in advanced industrial societies, to the welfare state. in multina-
tional states, the formal solidarity of citizenship, as expressed by the 
welfare state, is often not congruent with the cultural and linguistic 
solidarity of substate nationalism. Thus, members of a community that 
considers itself a nation distinct from the one projected by the cen-
tral state usually give priority to this substate national bond. in this 
context, nationalist movements will promote the congruence between 
social citizenship and their nation’s perceived boundaries. The push for 
independence is sometimes understood as an attempt to bring about 
this congruence. But independence is generally perceived as a radical 
option that is politically difficult to achieve for several reasons, most 
notably, because garnering popular support for secession is not an easy 
task. considering this, nationalist movements are more likely to seek 
the partial congruence between their national community and social 
9 The concept of solidarity refers to a sense of interdependence that brings individuals 
together. social programs are frequently seen as a concrete expression of solidarity, see 
Béland, daniel and hansen, randall hansen (2000) ‘reforming the french welfare 
state: solidarity, social exclusion and the three crises of citizenship’, West european 
politics, 23 (1), 47–64. 
10 derriennic, Jean-pierre (1995) nationalisme et démocratie: réflexion sur les illusions 
des indépendentistes québécois, Québec, canada: Boréal.
11 miller, david (1995) on nationality, oxford, UK: clarendon, 67–68. 
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programs, or at least to move gradually toward their full coincidence 
by promoting the decentralisation of such programs.
What impact on Welfare state development?
during the post-war era, the expansion of modern welfare states 
typically concentrated power in the hands of the central state while 
reinforcing existing nation-building efforts related to political cen-
tralisation. in countries like canada and the United Kingdom, the 
emergence of modern social citizenship has been a tool of economic 
and social integration. as nicola mcewen argues, ‘in multinational 
states, where there exists a nation or nations within the state, the rec-
ognition of social and other citizenship rights may serve an important 
integrative function, reinforcing an attachment to the national state 
that can complement an identification with an historical-cultural na-
tion within state’s boundaries.’12 for this reason, nationalist leaders are 
likely to criticize or even oppose the centralisation frequently associ-
ated with welfare-state development.
since the shift during the late 1970s and early 1980s from welfare-
state expansion to the politics of retrenchment and restructuring,13 
nationalist movements have mobilised to fight perceived fiscal inequi-
ties and to expand territorial autonomy in social policy. Because ma-
jor change remains possible despite the weight of existing institutional 
12 mcewen, nicola (2001) The nation-building role of state welfare in the United Kingdom 
and canada, in salmon, t. c. and Keating, m. (eds.) The dynamics of decentraliza-
tion: canadian federalism and British devolution, montreal/Kingston: mcGill-Queen’s 
University press, 85–105 (87). 
13 pierson, paul (1994) dismantling the welfare state? reagan, Thatcher and the politics of 
retrenchment, cambridge, UK: cambridge University press. 
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frameworks and policy legacies,14 nationalist mobilisations can have a 
strong impact on the development of social programs.
substate nationalism can affect welfare state development in at least 
two related ways. first, nationalist actors can reshape the social policy 
agenda while promoting new policy alternatives.15 for example, na-
tionalist forces have pushed for welfare state decentralisation as well 
as ‘fairer’ fiscal redistribution among regions. When nationalist actors 
take power in a region, they generally reshape the social policy agenda 
of their region and, sometimes, of the country as a whole. although 
nationalist movements, like other political actors, cannot have total 
control over the policy agenda, they can successfully pressure regional 
and national policymakers to deal with the issues they deem impor-
tant. Because issues raised by nationalist movements can have broad 
social and political implications for the country as a whole, they can 
impact social policy development at the state level. for instance, in 
canada and the United Kingdom, policies enacted in Québec and 
scotland in the name of ‘national distinctiveness’ have impacted state-
level policy debates on issues like child care and long-term care for the 
elderly, respectively. more dramatically, in Belgium, nationalist mobi-
lisation in flanders has transformed welfare-state decentralisation into 
an unavoidable political issue across the country. 
second, nationalist mobilization can reinforce institutional auton-
omy of their region in the field of social policy governance. The re-
14 cox, robert h. (2001) ‘The social construction of an imperative: Why welfare reform 
happened in denmark and the netherlands but not in Germany’, World politics, 53, 
463–498. 
15 The concept of agenda points to ‘the list of subjects or problems to which governmental 
officials, and people outside of government closely associated with those officials, are 
paying some serious attention to at any given time’, see Kingdon, John W. (1995) agen-
das, alternatives and public policy (2nd ed.), new York: harpercollins, 3. 
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lationship between substate nationalism and institutional autonomy 
is twofold. on one hand, substate nationalism can help preserve or 
increase the institutional autonomy of the regional entities in which 
they operate. in this context, such entities tend to push for more social 
policy autonomy in the name of national solidarity. on the other hand, 
the institutions shape the capacity of nationalist movements to impact 
social policy outcomes. This is true largely because autonomous sub-
state institutions increase the capacity of a nationalist movement to 
develop specific programs and, in some contexts, oppose policy cen-
tralisation. even if nationalist mobilisation can alter them, pre-existing 
institutions carry much weight. for example, while canadian federal-
ism has long granted Québec much autonomy in the field of social 
policy, flanders and scotland were, until recently, part of more cen-
tralised political systems, a situation that limited their ability to enact 
their own social programs.
The Three cases
This comparative analysis focuses on three cases: canada and Québec, 
the United Kingdom and scotland, and Belgium and flanders. The ra-
tionale for this selection is straightforward largely because canada, the 
United Kingdom, and Belgium are, along with spain,16 the only coun-
tries with extensive welfare states and strong nationalist movements. 
They are ‘comparable cases’ insofar as they are liberal-democratic 
states with advanced economies. simultaneously, they feature politi-
16 We chose to limit ourselves to three countries to offer a more in-depth discussion of 
each case. canada, the United Kingdom, and Belgium were each preferred to spain for 
a practical reason: These countries feature only one prominent nationalist movement 
whereas spain presents two, catalonia and the Basque country. in this context, includ-
ing spain with two other cases in our research design would have taken us beyond the 
scope of a short book chapter.
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cal, institutional, and ideological differences that should help us tackle 
multiple aspects of the relationship between substate nationalism and 
social policy. in order to understand the variations in the configura-
tion of this important relationship, we must analyze institutional, so-
cioeconomic, and ideological differences between our three cases. The 
following analysis stresses these three types of factors, which are often 
interconnected. 
first, at the institutional level, this analysis shows that existing ter-
ritorial decentralisation facilitates nationalist mobilisation while in-
creasing the profile of nationalist parties and substate governments 
that impact agenda-setting processes. second, at the socioeconomic 
level, regional inequalities affect the way nationalist movements mo-
bilise while impacting the content of the policy alternatives they pro-
mote. less prosperous regions such as Québec and scotland tend to 
promote redistribution within and beyond regional borders (because 
they gain from it), whereas richer regions like flanders tend to depict 
economic interregional transfers as unfair (because they lose from it). 
Third, at the ideological level, factors like religious values, in conjunc-
tion with changing patterns of inequality, can affect the identity, as well 
as the dominant ideological orientation, of a nationalist movement. 
for instance, in regions where traditional religious values prevail, 
nationalism is more likely to promote conservative social and family 
policies than in more secular ones. alliances between nationalists and 
left-wing actors like the labour and the feminist movements are likely 
to have the opposite ideological effect. 
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canada
institutional factors are important for understanding why Québécois 
nationalism has become so involved in the politics of social policy. 
canada is a federal state, and the constitution assigns separate juris-
dictions to the federal government and to the 10 provinces. in theory, 
each level of government has full power within its own legislative do-
main. provincial governments have exclusive authority to enact legis-
lation in policy areas like education, health care, and social assistance. 
But since the 1940s the federal government has used constitutional 
reforms as well as its spending power to enter domains of provincial 
jurisdiction such as family policy, old-age pensions, and unemploy-
ment benefits. in the immediate post-war era, the Québec government 
of conservative prime minister maurice duplessis opposed this cen-
tralist tendency, and nationalism became mostly a reactive force in the 
field of social policy.17 
Beginning in the 1960s, however, nationalism in Québec assumed 
a positive social policy dimension. at the ideological level, the shift of 
Québécois nationalism toward a more progressive vision of the role of 
the state in society coincided with the institutional and political de-
cline of the catholic church, as well as with the rise of a new elite seek-
ing the political, social, and economic modernisation of the province, 
which had been dominated by conservative leaders for more than a 
century. overall, this statist shift paralleled the transition from a na-
tionalism centred on religion to one based on language.
17 angers, françois-albert (1997) ‘les relations federales-provinciales sous le régime 
duplessis’, in Gagnon, a.-G. and sarra-Bournet, m. (eds.) duplessis: entre la grande 
noirceur et la société libérale, montreal, canada: Éditions Québec-amériques, 231–281; 
marshall, dominique (1997) nationalisme et politiques socials au Québec depuis 1867, 
British Journal of canadian studies, 9 (2), 301–347.
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from a socioeconomic standpoint, Québec remained a poorer 
province where the english-speaking minority controlled most of 
the economy, and the nationalist elite successfully used the provincial 
state to modernize the economy of the province while reducing social 
inequality between the two main linguistic groups. in the context of 
their struggle, this modernising elite, acting through the Parti Libé-
ral du Québec (plQ), gradually took over responsibilities previously 
assumed by the catholic church, notably education and health care. 
Because of these ideological and socioeconomic factors, as well as the 
above-mentioned institutional autonomy of the province within the 
canadian federal system, social policy and Québécois nationalism 
were connected very early on. The election of the Parti Québécois (pQ) 
in 1976 was essential in building this connection between Québécois 
identity and the province’s social programs because the pQ presented 
itself as a social-democratic party and enacted a number of progressive 
social policies immediately after it took power.18 With the 1980 refer-
endum on independence, the social policy dimension of Québécois 
nationalism became an integral part of the pQ’s mobilisation strategy 
as it played up the dual themes of language and progressive politics. as 
the pQ enjoyed strong connections with labour unions and the femi-
nist movement, independence was depicted both as an emancipation 
project for francophones living in the province and as a chance to cre-
ate a truly social-democratic society.19
18 mcroberts, Kenneth (1993) Quebec: social change and political crisis, toronto, 
canada: mcclelland and stewart, 267. 
19 But according to Keith Banting, attachment to federal social policies may have contrib-
uted to the defeat of the separatist camp in 1980. see Banting, Keith G. (1999) ‘social 
citizenship and the multicultural welfare state’, in cairns, a. c. et al. (eds.) citizenship, 
diversity, and pluralism: canadian and comparative perspectives, montreal, canada: 
mcGill-Queen’s University press, 108–136. 
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although the strong ties between the pQ and the social democratic 
ideology somewhat declined during the 1980s and 1990s in a context 
of fiscal austerity20, the connection between the Québécois identity 
and progressive social policy remains strong to this day. The empha-
sis on language to articulate the Québécois identity exposes Québec 
nationalist politicians to charges of ethnic nationalism, to which they 
are typically sensitive. in this context, strengthening the relationship 
between nationalism and progressive social programs allows the pQ 
to project a more inclusive vision of nationalism. although the french 
language remains central to the expression of the Québécois identity21 
but it coexists with a social policy dimension. to an extent, these are 
inseparable issues in Québec, as in other regions of multilingual states 
like Belgium, as education, health, and social services tend to become 
the focus of claims about language rights.
The core argument of the pQ, as well as the plQ, is that Québec 
has a different political culture from the rest of canada, that it is more 
collectivist, egalitarian, and compassionate. as proof of this national 
character, the pQ suggests that Québec resisted the neoliberal turn 
taken elsewhere in canada and in much of the developed world. This 
claim is debatable because, in the late 1990s, Québec’s pQ government 
struggled to eliminate the deficit much like many other jurisdictions. 
But during this same period, the pQ also instituted a publicly funded 
child-care system (the so-called 5-dollars-a-day day-care program) 
and a publicly funded universal drug plan. it kept university tuition 
fees the lowest in north america. The pQ government also adopted an 
20 Béland and lecours (2008). 
21 rocher, françois (2002) ‘The evolving parameters of Quebec nationalism’, international 
Journal on multicultural societies, 4. retrieved march 1, 2009, from http://www.unesco.
org/most/ vl4n1rocher.pdf/.
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‘anti-poverty law’, which forces the province to guarantee income sup-
port for low-income Québécois.22 commenting on this policy, then-
premier Bernard landry said that the ‘Québec model’23 was not only 
about economic regulation but also about wealth redistribution. social 
policy was also at the centre of the pQ’s nationalist mobilisation strat-
egy during its tenure (1994–2003). This connection is the combined 
product of an ideological and an institutional component. The pQ ac-
cused the federal government, described as centralising and domineer-
ing, of threatening Québec’s distinctively progressive social policies 
and, therefore, the very foundations of the nation. The pQ’s program 
argues that ‘unitary canada is developing following a vision different 
than ours, and its decisions stand in the way of our [social] projects’ 
(parti Québécois, 2000, p. 160). in this context, the pQ suggests that 
independence is the only sure way of preserving these policies. as we 
mentioned above, the definition of the Québec nation along social pol-
icy lines transcends partisan politics. The other major party in Québec, 
the plQ, has historically espoused similar positions on social policy 
issues. as for the Action Démocratique du Québec (adQ), a nationalist 
party that supports neoliberal ideas like partial health care privatisa-
tion, it gained much political ground in the aftermath of the 2008 pro-
vincial election but now faces a rapid decline that calls into question 
the long-term viability of right-wing social politics in Québec.
considering the high level of decentralisation inherent to the cana-
dian federal system and the enduring left-wing orientation of politics 
in Québec, Québécois nationalism has long played an agenda-setting 
22 lessard, denis (2002) Québec dépose un projet de loi antipauvreté, la presse, June 8, 
a1–a2.
23 The ‘Québec model’ typically refers to a model of socioeconomic organisation that 
stresses state interventionism and corporatism. 
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role within and beyond the province’s borders. This happened first in 
the 1960s by supporting social policy expansion yet at the same time 
seeking to adapt to its decentralist vision of federalism. in 1965, for 
example, legislation to introduce a second tier of earnings-related pen-
sions—the canada and Québec pension plans—was adopted after a 
long bargaining process between the federal government and the 10 
provinces. as a result of Québec’s campaign for greater provincial 
autonomy and nationalist socioeconomic policies, two separate but 
highly coordinated earnings related schemes were created.24 since 
then, surpluses accumulated in the Québec pension plans have been 
invested in the province’s economy to stimulate french canadian en-
trepreneurship. 
in the mid-late 1990s, Québecois nationalists reacted against fed-
eral retrenchment initiatives while rejecting an intergovernmental 
agreement aimed at improving the regulation of canadian social pol-
icy. indeed, the social Union framework agreement (sUfa) of 1998 
emerged as a provincial response to unilateral decision making in the 
aftermath of significant retrenchment measures.25 after two decades 
of fiscal austerity that led to significant cuts in federal transfers to the 
provinces, sUfa represented an attempt to stimulate ‘collaboration’ 
between ottawa and the 10 canadian provinces.26 during the second 
half of the 1990s, the provinces fought back to force the federal gov-
ernment to adopt a more collaborative approach and stop discretion-
24 Bryden, Kenneth (1974) old age pensions and policy-making in canada, toronto, 
canada: University of toronto press. 
25 Bashevkin, sylvia (2000) ‘rethinking retrenchment: north american social policy 
during the early clinton and chrétien years’, canadian Journal of political science, 33, 
7–36; see also rice, James J. and prince, michael J.  (2000) changing politics of cana-
dian social policy, toronto: University of toronto press.
26 Théret, Bruno (2001) ‘la protection sociale dans le pacte fédéral canadien: histoire 
d’une crise et de son dénouement’, critique internationale, 11, 145–160. 
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ary retrenchment that was detrimental to them. in august 1998, even 
Québec’s pQ government had joined the interprovincial coalition on 
this issue.27 The final version of sUfa was quite different from the ini-
tial interprovincial plan, which included the right for any province to 
opt out of any canada-wide welfare measure falling within provincial 
jurisdiction—with full compensation. if the final agreement main-
tained the option for self-exclusion, it was limited to provinces that 
had already introduced a similar program.28 according to a political 
scientist29, this final agreement simply exacerbated the recent concen-
tration of power in canadian intergovernmental relations. But sUfa 
has had limited impact on canadian politics precisely because the 
Québec government refused to sign it.
a striking and more recent example of agenda setting by Québécois 
nationalism in the canadian federal system is the theme of ‘fiscal im-
balance’ developed by the Québec parties. fiscal imbalance refers to 
the fact that provinces have power over policy areas that are expensive 
to fund (primarily health and education) while the greater taxation 
power is with ottawa. in 2001, the pQ government organized a Com-
mission sur le Déséquilibre Fiscal (commission on fiscal Unbalance), 
and Québec premier Jean charest referred to this issue regularly as 
one critical to canadian federalism. at first, the federal government 
denied that such an imbalance exists, but most other provinces rallied 
around the idea to pressure ottawa into increasing funding for health 
27 noël, alain (2000), Without Quebec: collaborative federalism with a footnote, institute 
for research on public policy Working paper, Vol. 1.
28 mcewen, nicola (2001) ‘The nation-building role of state welfare in the United King-
dom and canada’, in salmon, t. c. and Keating, m. (eds.) The dynamics of decentraliza-
tion: canadian federalism and British devolution, montreal/Kingston: mcGill-Queen’s 
University press, 85–105 (99).
29 noël, alain (2000) Without Quebec…, 11.
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care. facing these provincial pressures, in 2004, after years of provin-
cial mobilization, paul martin’s liberal government finally agreed to 
notably increase federal health-care spending. two years later, the new 
prime minister, conservative stephen harper, pledged to fix the fiscal 
imbalance and, later, transferred billions of dollars to Québec through 
as a major reform of the federal equalisation program, which aims at 
helping poorer-than average provinces offer the same public services 
as wealthier provinces.
The United Kingdom
much like in canada, the post-war development of the welfare state 
in Britain became a focal point for national integration. But different 
from the situation prevailing in canada’s federal system, concentration 
of state sovereignty in Westminster facilitated the advent of a more 
centralised welfare state in the United Kingdom. immediately after the 
second World War, the labour government enacted crucial pieces of 
social policy legislation such as the 1946 national health service act.30 
in the following decades, other legislation reinforced the path toward 
political centralization in the British welfare state. although local and 
regional powers enjoyed significant levels of administrative autonomy, 
political decisions were made in Westminster and many social benefits 
were distributed directly by the British state. in this context, the role of 
the scottish office (a regional department of the British government) 
remained essentially administrative. involved in the implementation 
and administration of social policy measures such as health care, hous-
ing policy, and public education, this department had no legislative 
30 Glennerster, howard (2000) British social policy since 1945 (2nd ed), london: Black-
well publishing. 
137
nationalism and Welfare state politics
autonomy and acted as a mere lobby within the British state defending 
and promoting scotland’s interests to the British cabinet.31 as opposed 
to the provinces within the canadian federation, scotland had limited 
political autonomy when facing the central government. for example, 
most cash benefits originated from a British welfare state designed in 
london. from a regional standpoint, the fact that the British welfare 
state was ever present in the daily life of scots reinforced their politi-
cal and social integration with the United Kingdom. in this context, 
scots (especially members of the working class) could identify with 
popular British social programs related to the idea of shared social citi-
zenship.32 a product and symbol of political centralisation, the British 
welfare state as strong an agent of national cohesion as the empire had 
once been.33 
despite this, in the 1980s and 1990s, a scottish national identity as-
sociated with progressive politics blossomed. several factors explain 
this important development. first, the interventionist politics and 
regional planning of the 1950s and 1960s represented an important 
contextual element for the evolution of the scottish identity34, as did 
the fall of the colonial empire. second, the transformation over the 
last 30 years or so of the scottish national party (snp) into a left-wing 
organisation bringing issues like nuclear disarmament to the forefront 
of scottish politics set up a wider association between nationalism and 
left-leaning politics. however, the decisive force behind the increasing 
31 Keating, michael and midwinter, arthur (1983) The government of scotland, edin-
burgh: mainstream publishing, 24. 
32 mcewen, nicola (2002) ‘state welfare and the impact of welfare retrenchment on the 
conational debate in scotland’, regional and federal studies, vol. 12, no. 1, 66–90. 
33 Bennie, lynn/Brand, Jack and mitchell, James (1997) how scotland votes, manchester, 
UK: manchester University press. 
34 harvie, christopher (1998) scotland and nationalism: scottish society and politics 1707 
to the present (3nd edition), london: routledge, 125–130.
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importance of social policy preferences for scottish nationalism was 
the combined product of ideological and institutional factors. on one 
hand, the neoliberal discourse and policies of the Thatcher and ma-
jor conservative governments (1979–1997) in power at Westminster 
alienated many citizens in scotland, as their government appeared to 
attack institutions (nationalised industries, the education system, local 
government, social welfare) that embodied the scottish identity.35 
on the other hand, Thatcherite unilateral policies like the poll tax 
showed that scotland was politically powerless to effectively counter 
decisions made in Westminster.36 The result is a scottish national iden-
tity that, ideologically, closely mirrors the Québécois identity and is 
now tied to notions of egalitarianism and social justice as well as to 
progressive social policy preferences. although this image might be 
exaggerated in the political discourse, it seems to have a sociological 
basis, at least when it comes to economic and fiscal redistribution. for 
example, scots are more likely than the english to strongly agree or 
agree with redistribution (50%–38%).37 They are also more likely to 
support the elimination of up–front tuition fees in universities (38%–
30%), and to agree that insuring a decent standard of living for the 
elderly is the government’s responsibility (85%–80%).38 overall, social 
35 mccrone, david (2001) Understanding scotland: The sociology of a nation, london: 
routledge.
36 Jones, Barry and Keating, michael (1988) Beyond the doomsday scenario: Governing 
scotland and Wales in the 1980s. strathclyde papers on Government and politics no. 
58, University of strathclyde, Glasgow, United Kingdom. 
37 paterson, lindsay (2002) ‘Governing from the centre: ideology and public policy’, in 
curtice, J./mccrone, d./ park, a. and paterson, l. (eds.) new scotland, new society?, 
edinburgh, UK: polygon, 196–218 (200).
38 paterson, lindsay (2002) Governing from the centre… 204 and 207. 
 on social issues such as abortion or homosexuality, there are usually no significant dif-
ferences between scotland and england. see paterson, lindsay (2002) Governing from 
the centre… and park, alison (2002) ‘scotland’s morals’, in curtice, J./mccrone, d./
park, a. and paterson, l. (eds.) new scotland, new society?, 92–122. 
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policy preference is even more central to scottish nationalism than to 
Québécois nationalism because the former is not grounded in ‘hard’ 
cultural markers like language. This remark should not hide the fact 
that the articulation of scottish nationhood in terms of social policy 
preference is a relatively recent phenomenon. 
at the centre of the historical reproduction of the scottish identity 
are the survival and development of distinct civil-society institutions 
(the church, the legal system, the currency) after the Union. But to-
ward the end of the 20th century, being scottish became synonymous 
with espousing progressive values and policies. This was a clear de-
parture from the Unionist conservatism associated with the empire 
that reigned in scotland during the first half of the 20th century.39 The 
change in scottish identity is perhaps most strikingly revealed by the 
steady loss of electoral support for the conservative party in scotland 
since the mid-1970s in favour of labor and, to a lesser extent, the snp. 
indeed, whereas the conservative vote was the same in scotland as in 
england through the 1940s and 1950s, by the 1980s, support for this 
party in scotland was reduced to almost half of what it was in eng-
land.40 
in scotland as elsewhere, transformations in political institutions 
are likely to affect sub-state identity formation. The 1998 scotland 
act created a scottish parliament and a scottish executive but with-
out dividing sovereignty, which formally remains with Westminster. 
The act specifies ‘reserved matters’, that is, policy areas where the U.K. 
government retains exclusive responsibility. ‘social security’ is one of 
these areas. The scottish executive has the power to act in all the fields 
39 mccrone, david (2001) Understanding scotland…,110. 
40 mccrone, david (2001) Understanding scotland…,108.
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not listed as reserved. These so-called devolved matters include health 
care, social work as well as education and training.41 in this context, the 
scottish executive provides the statutory and financial framework for 
nhs scotland while administrating schools and universities. it is also 
active in tackling issues such as housing, homelessness, social exclu-
sion, and child poverty (in partnership with the British government). 
over time, devolution is likely to sustain or even accentuate the link 
between scottish identity and preferences for progressive social policy 
because the scottish parliament now has the institutional autonomy to 
implement such policies. at the symbolic level at least, two initiatives 
enacted in the years following devolution proved important in further 
defining scottish identity in terms of progressive politics: the elimina-
tion of up-front tuition fees for university students and the establish-
ment of free personal care for the elderly.42 
The possibility of distinctiveness in the area of social policy is also 
a key element of nationalist mobilisation in scotland. The idea that 
political autonomy would enable scotland to enact progressive social 
legislation (i.e. legislation said to be in harmony with scottish egalitar-
ian values) was at the centre of the drive for home rule.43 for example, 
when asked in 1997 if they thought the new parliament could improve 
education, 71% answered yes.44 overall, surveys conducted after the 
devolution referendum of 1997 showed that those supporting devolu-
tion thought that it could bring much-needed improvements in vari-
41 in theory, Westminster can still legislate on devolved matters but, through the so-called 
sewell convention, will not do so against the wishes of the scottish parliament. 
42 mcewen, nicola (2003, march–april) Welfare solidarity in a devolved scotland. paper 
presented to the european consortium for political research, Workshop The Welfare-
state and territorial politics, edinburgh, UK. 
43 mcewen, nicola (2002) state welfare and the impact of welfare retrenchment…, 79.  
44 surridge, paula (2002) ‘society and democracy: The new scotland’, in curtice, J. et al. 
(eds.) new scotland, new society?, edinburgh, UK: polygon, 123–141 (134). 
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ous social programs such as the nhs and social services.45  here again, 
the framing of the home-rule issue in terms of social policy during the 
1980s and 1990s emerged in reaction to the discourse of Thatcher’s 
conservative government. This is partly why the conservative party 
opposed devolution in scotland in the late 1990s. since it has formed 
the scottish executive at holyrood in 2007, the snp has kept promot-
ing independence. in november 2009, the snp-formed scottish exec-
utive published a White paper on independence which makes the case 
that an independent scotland would be ‘fairer,’ ‘greener’, and ‘healthier,’ 
as well as ‘wealthier’, ‘smarter’ and ‘safer.’ The snp self-identifies as a 
left-leaning nationalist party, although the scottish nationalist dis-
course is increasingly making the case that independence can not only 
serve to achieve greater social justice in scotland but also to generate 
new wealth. 
recently gained institutional autonomy increased the agenda-set-
ting potential of nationalism within scotland. in fact, the achievement 
of devolution has increased the institutional autonomy of scotland in 
social policy. The scottish example thus illustrates the potential re-
lationship between agenda setting and the quest for institutional au-
tonomy. furthermore, because the drive toward home rule was largely 
framed in terms of scotland’s necessity to be able to design and enact 
progressive social programs, nationalism has weighed heavily on the 
policy agenda of the scottish executive. The above-mentioned elimi-
nation of up-front university tuition fees and the free personal-care 
program for the elderly represents policy choices falling squarely into 
the recent trajectory of scottish nationalism. 
45 mcewen, nicola (2002) state welfare and the impact of welfare retrenchment…
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Because of the increased institutional autonomy of the region, scot-
tish nationalism also presents agenda-setting potential within British 
politics at large. much like what has happened in canada with Québec, 
scotland now has the autonomy that allows it to become a source of in-
novation in the social policy domain and, as a consequence, put pres-
sure on the British government to implement similar programs. for 
instance, the scottish home-care-for-the-elderly program caught the 
eye of progressive organisations in england. Unison, an english trade 
union, distributed a poster contrasting a happy (scottish) senior, un-
der the heading ‘care free’, alongside a sad and lonely looking (english) 
one, under the heading ‘care fee’. although the British government 
made the choice not to follow the scottish executive’s lead in this par-
ticular case, further policy divergence could eventually put the British 
government in uncomfortable situations.
Belgium
like in canada and the United Kingdom, evolving institutional struc-
tures are essential to understanding the nationalism-social policy nex-
us in Belgium. Until the late 1960s, Belgium was a highly centralised 
state, and it took decades of nationalist mobilisation to decentralise 
many of the country’s institutions. This is a key difference between 
flanders and Québec, an autonomous province located in a much old-
er federal system that is engaged in a struggle to preserve and widen 
existing jurisdictions. in that regard, flemish nationalism has more 
in common with its scottish counterpart, which emerged in the con-
text of a politically centralised order. But like Québécois nationalism, 
flemish nationalism is linked more to culture and language than is 
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scottish nationalism. indeed, linguistic considerations were behind the 
emergence of flemish nationalism in the 19th century, as the flemish 
movement struggled for the formal equality of dutch and french in 
Belgium, and in the 20th century it strove for the creation of a mono-
lingual flanders. today, linguistic disputes persist in Belgium, albeit in 
a less severe form than in the past. These disputes revolve around the 
fate of the approximately 100,000 francophones living in Brussels’ pe-
riphery as well as the future of the bilingual electoral district of Brus-
sels/Bruxelles-halle-Vilvoorde. at the ideological level, the flemish 
movement was originally spearheaded by a strongly catholic flemish 
petty bourgeoisie and then evolved in close connection with the chris-
tian democratic world in Belgium. This connection, which is still vis-
ible today, helps explain why flemish nationalism has not associated 
itself with progressive social policy ideas in the same way as scottish 
and Québécois nationalism. in fact, the flemish identity is much less 
tied to distinct social policy, or policy preference, than the Québécois 
or scottish identity. The definition of the flemish nation is not yet in-
fused with references to distinct social policy values and principles. 
although the flemish identity is not really grounded in specific policy 
preferences, socioeconomic factors and, more precisely, regional in-
equalities strongly impact the relationship between nationalism and 
social policy in Belgium. flemish nationalism is infused with the eco-
nomic discrepancies that have characterised Belgium over the past half 
century. since the 1950s, Wallonia, once the economic stronghold of 
the country, because of its early and advanced industrialisation, has 
experienced a serious decline, while flanders, historically more ru-
ral and less developed, has successfully adjusted its structures to the 
post-industrial economy. This cleavage, combined with the major de-
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centralisation of power resulting from the federalisation process that 
mainly took place between the 1970s and the early 1990s, has led to 
policy divergence between flanders and Wallonia.
Because the flemish government has much more money to finance 
social programs than the francophone institutions,46 flanders can push 
its social policies further than Wallonia can. for example, in 2001, the 
flemish government established a care insurance scheme (zorgverze-
kering). The french community did not, because it does not have the 
financial means to finance such a program. Yet flemish nationalism 
is undeniably rooted in economic and social conservatism, and the 
acute knowledge of regional disparities largely frame the nationalist 
ideology, as flemish nationalists articulate the discourse according to 
which Walloons are state dependent, whereas flemings have an entre-
preneurial spirit. and at the centre of the flemish nationalist discourse 
is the belief that wealthy flanders is implicitly subsidising poor Wal-
lonia through a country-wide social insurance system. These transfers 
have become a source of political discord between the two commu-
nities, although their true extent and meaning is the object of much 
debate between flemish and francophone economists.
flemish leaders, especially from the christian democratic and 
liberal parties, have pushed for a federalisation (decentralisation) of 
the social insurance system.47 so far, the institutional features of the 
46 social security is mostly a federal prerogative, but federated units have some room to 
maneuver within certain policy areas. for example, preventive medicine is a community 
prerogative.
47 agalev, the flemish ecologist party, opposes such decentralisation. The flemish social-
ists are less enthusiastic than the liberals and the christian democrats about the idea, 
although this is largely because they fear that decentralisation could bring retrench-
ment; see Vaes, B (1998) ‘Un divorce de la sécurité sociale?’, in martiniello, m. and 
swyngedouw, m. (eds.) où va la Belgique? les soubresauts d”une petite démocratie 
européenne, paris: l’harmattan, 173–180 (175). 
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Belgian social insurance system have militated against radical social 
policy devolution. as compared with the post-war welfare states that 
emerged in canada and the United Kingdom, this system is divided 
among various occupational groups. such a Bismarckian fragmenta-
tion reduced the potential homogenising impact of social policy de-
velopment in that country. despite a gradual expansion of coverage 
that took place during the post-war and the fact that the social insur-
ance system is placed under the general control of the central state, 
economic solidarity at the centre of professional schemes is distinct 
from the universalistic logic of Beveridgian social citizenship present 
in canada and in the United Kingdom. labour unions —  including 
flemish ones — that participate in the management of these schemes 
generally oppose decentralisation.48 in addition, the consociational na-
ture of politics means that francophone parties would need to support 
the federalisation of social security for such an outcome to occur.
in spite of these institutional obstacles to social insurance decen-
tralisation, social policy matters now feature as prominently in flem-
ish nationalist mobilization as language did up until the 1960s. every 
flemish family, the argument goes, pays for a new car for every Wal-
loon family every year.49 Walloons are also accused of ‘costing more’ 
to the social insurance as a result of their bad life habits and ‘exces-
sive’ use of medical doctors, especially specialists. The rationale for 
the push for social policy decentralisation is similar to the one found 
in Québec: solidarity is situated within the framework of a national 
48 Béland, daniel and hansen, randall (2000) ‘reforming the french welfare state: soli-
darity, social exclusion and the three crises of citizenship, West european politics, 23 
(1), 47–64.
49 Vaes, B. (1998) ‘Un divorce de la sécurité sociale?’, 174.
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community that is flanders not Belgium.50 The position of the radi-
cal flemish nationalist party Vlaams Belang (formally Vlaams Blok) 
is particularly interesting for understanding the connection between 
substate nationalism and social policy in Belgium. The Vlaams Belang 
is a far-right nationalist party with, among other things, anti-immi-
gration and anti-european positions. in the field of social policy, the 
Vlaams Belang favours a conservative family policy that, for example, 
rewards stay-at-home mothers. This type of policy preference reflects 
a major ideological factor mentioned above: the enduring influence of 
catholicism in flanders, a region that never experienced a profound 
wave of secularisation such as the one encountered during Québec’s 
Quiet revolution of the 1960s. from the Vlaams Belang’s perspective, 
the divergent policy preference is almost beside the point. its literature 
makes it abundantly clear: flemings and francophones belong to two 
different nations.51 Therefore, the solidarity of flemings should not 
extend to francophones; rather, flemings should treat Belgian fran-
cophones with no more and no less generosity than they treat other 
peoples. The Vlaams Belang’s stance, which is rooted in conservative 
ideas about personal and family responsibility, illustrates the fact that 
a wealthier region can use nationalism to fight concrete mechanisms of 
redistribution in the name of a restricted form of social and economic 
solidarity. Beyond the Vlaams Belang, the moderate flemish parties 
also borrow from such a conservative rhetoric against economic redis-
tribution across regional and linguistic boundaries.
50 poirier, Johanne and Vansteenkiste, steven (2000) ‘le débat sur la fédéralisation de la 
sécurité sociale en Belgique’, revue Belge de sécurité sociale, 2, 331–379 (356–362). 
51 see the party program: Vlaams Blok (2003), een toekomst voor Vlaanderen (a future 
for flanders), 1–5; retrieved march 1, 2009, from http://vlaamsblok.be/pdf/program-
mabrochure.pdf/. 
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for these moderate flemish parties, the ultimate objective be-
hind the federalisation of social insurance is to take Belgium toward 
an ever more decentralised federal model, or even a confederation. 
from a short-term historical perspective, flemish social policy claims 
fall within a pattern of nationalist mobilisation, mostly centred on 
language, which coincided with the federalisation of the state in the 
1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. This points to a fundamental difference be-
tween Belgium and canada. in canada, as discussed above, there is 
an intense competition between the federal and Québec governments 
over who should protect those living in that province. in Belgium, 
where conflicts are fewer between the federal and the regional or com-
munity governments, the dynamic is different. on the flemish side, a 
decentralisation of social policy means that the country is evolving in 
the preferred direction of flemish nationalists. for francophones, the 
social insurance system is seen as the last ties that holds Belgium to-
gether as a political community; as a policy matter, it is much different 
than external commerce or agriculture, two fields recently decentral-
ised. for this reason, many francophones perceive flemish proposals 
to decentralise the social insurance system as an attempt to destroy 
what remains of Belgium.52
in social policy, thus far, flemish nationalism has not played an 
agenda-setting role in Belgium comparable to Québécois nationalism 
in canada. in flanders, few social policy innovations have been car-
ried out as a result of the drive to decentralise Belgian social programs. 
moreover, there has been no mimetic effect at the federal level; Belgian 
52 survey results show that in flanders, 36% of the population agrees with ‘splitting social 
security’, whereas support is 13% in Wallonia and 10% in Brussels (Baudewyns and 
dandoy, 2003). 
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federalism follows a decentralist path and the federal government is 
not looking to outdo the governments of communities and regions in 
any area. although there is some potential for flemish nationalism to 
play an agenda-setting role in social policy in relation to the french 
community, it may only materialise when the fiscal resources of both 
governments become comparable. as mentioned above, francophone 
politicians took notice of the flemish care insurance but did not have 
the fiscal means to implement a similar program in Wallonia.
This being said, the impact of flemish nationalism on the Belgian 
social policy agenda was felt at the broadest institutional level, as 
flemish nationalism questioned the very idea of a country-wide social 
insurance system. in the wake of flemish nationalism, various publi-
cations set the agenda for the decentralisation of Belgium’s social in-
surance system during the 1990s.53 in 1999 and 2001, fiscal autonomy 
was achieved but without the decentralisation of health care and fam-
ily policy. The failure of comprehensive social policy decentralisation 
largely is due to institutional factors, as this type of change would re-
quire constitutional change. The mechanisms for amending the Bel-
gian constitution are centred around the existence of the main linguis-
tic communities as opposed to different orders of government per se, 
which means that the key to change rests in central institutions where 
francophone parties have veto power. indeed, consociationalism in 
Belgium has translated into a constitutional obligation for Belgian gov-
ernments to have an equal number of flemish and francophone min-
53 Banting, Keith G. (1999) ‘social citizenship and the multicultural welfare state’, in 
cairns, a. c. et al. (eds.) citizenship, diversity, and pluralism: canadian and compara-
tive perspectives, montreal, canada: mcGill-Queen’s University press, 108–136; see also 
Béland and lecours (2008). 
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isters (article 99 of the Belgian constitution), and from the political 
understanding that federal decisions will be reached by consensus. in 
addition, the division of power relating to the Belgian social insurance 
system is laid out in so-called ‘special laws,’ that it, federal legislations 
of a constitutional nature, which are even more difficult to amend than 
the constitution; modifying a ‘special law’ requires a two-third overall 
majority in both chambers of parliament. some francophone parties 
would thus have to support the decentralisation of some parts of social 
security for that type of reform to proceed. 
discussion and conclusion
at the most general level, our three cases feature a connection between 
substate nationalism and social policy while suggesting the national-
ist movements can impact policy agendas at both the state and the 
sub-state levels. But particular institutional, ideological, and socioeco-
nomic factors account for significant cross-national differences in the 
specific political forms that emerge from the meshing of nationalist 
and welfare-state politics. The following discussion stresses the role of 
these factors while returning to the issues discussed in the first part of 
the chapter: identity formation, territorial mobilisation, decentralisa-
tion, and agenda setting. 
nationalisms in scotland and Québec have integrated notions of 
distinctive social programs and policy preferences into their identity 
much more than flemish nationalism. This is primarily because social 
policy is more likely to become a focal point of national identity if 
nationalists are typically left-leaning actors advocating its expansion 
(as it is the case in Québec and scotland but not in more conservative 
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flanders). moreover, the arguably more acute nature of linguistic ten-
sions in Belgium—as compared with canada—contributes to explain-
ing why flemish nationalism has not centred its discourse on the exis-
tence of allegedly distinct social policy preferences in flanders. Unlike 
Québécois leaders, flemish leaders are not obsessed with accusations 
of ‘ethnic nationalism’. This is true partly because flemings are domi-
nant in Belgium, and flemish politicians are not immediately looking 
to secure the sympathy of the international community for the recog-
nition of an independent state the way nationalists in Québec are.
The most important factors for explaining the prominence of social 
policy preferences in contemporary scottish identity are ideological 
(the unpopular discourse and policies of the conservative govern-
ments of margaret Thatcher and John major) and institutional (the 
incapacity for predevolution scotland to veto or to opt out of West-
minster social legislation). in recent decades, there has not been such a 
fundamental divergence in canada between the Québec and the federal 
government, whereas in Belgium, the historical preponderance of the 
christian democratic party (flanders’s leading party) and the coali-
tion governments have mitigated the potential consequences of ideo-
logical differences between dutch and french speakers. The increased 
decentralisation of Belgian federalism combined with flanders’s eco-
nomic strength would favour the development of more distinctive so-
cial policies if it were not for the institutional factors mentioned above.
We have said that on the issue of identity, Québec and scotland are 
strikingly similar. in both cases, the nation is ideologically construct-
ed through references to egalitarianism and social justice and by the 
corollary preference for progressive social policy. however, compar-
ing the articulation of the scottish and Québécois identities to social 
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policy requires some nuance. The notion of being Québécois is under-
pinned by a wide set of distinctive social programs that date back to 
the 1960s. contemporary scottishness has been couched in terms of 
divergent collective values from england but is not truly supported by 
divergent social policies, which are both too few and too recent. This 
difference is, of course, the product of institutional factors, as canadi-
an federalism has long allowed Québec to craft much of its own social 
agenda, whereas the United Kingdom gave no such liberty to scotland 
before devolution. even now, scotland’s more-limited institutional au-
tonomy, as compared with Québec, especially financially, constrains 
its ability to implement distinctive social policies and, therefore, the 
extent to which the scottish identity can be articulated in terms of a 
different social policy corpus. social policy has factored into national-
ist mobilisation in all three cases insofar as Québécois, scottish, and 
flemish nationalism have pushed for welfare state decentralisation. 
once again, here, the Québec and scottish cases are similar, whereas 
the flemish case stands somewhat apart. Both the pQ and the snp 
argue that independence is necessary for Québec or scotland to freely 
implement the (progressive) social policy agenda suited to the will of 
their nations. in the case of flemish nationalism, which has never been 
about promoting equality and redistributive justice, claims for the de-
centralisation of social programs are rooted in a socioeconomic factor, 
the wealth disparity between flanders and Wallonia, as well as to the 
weak sense of solidarity between the two linguistic communities. The 
three nationalist movements have had different degrees of success in 
decentralising social programs. scottish nationalism capitalised on the 
momentum in favour of home rule in the late 1990s to decentralise 
some aspects of social policy. as for Québec, it has arguably more con-
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trol over social programs than any other region in the Western world 
but seeks even more autonomy over this policy area—at least when 
the pQ forms the government. finally, in Belgium, it is at first glance 
surprising that there has not been much movement on this issue, be-
cause it is the majority group that seeks change. The sticking point here 
is the fact that, in addition to the main ‘social partners’, francophone 
leaders have strongly opposed the splitsing of social insurance. Because 
Belgian political practice requires decision making at the federal level 
to gather support across linguistic communities as the cabinet includes 
an equal number of flemish- and french-speaking ministers, fran-
cophones have so far succeeded in preventing bold social insurance 
decentralisation in Belgium.
in terms of the impact of substate nationalism on welfare-state 
politics, we have also noticed that Québécois, scottish, and flemish 
nationalism have all, albeit in different ways and to varying degrees, 
played significant agenda-setting roles. institutional factors heavily 
condition the opportunity for nationalist movements to shape sub-
state and state policy agendas. in the context of a federal system, Qué-
bec has developed many distinctive social programs when compared 
with the other canadian provinces, and it has also put pressure on the 
federal government to keep up with its progressive family policies. in 
the United Kingdom, there are signs that devolution for scotland has 
launched similar processes. importantly, flemish nationalism has not 
been an agenda setter in the same way as Québécois and scottish na-
tionalism. it has not implemented many distinctive social programs, 
partly because it is ideologically on the right but also as a consequence 
of the federal government retaining power over many social policy ar-
eas. nor has it triggered a mimetic effect. Because Belgian federalism 
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is one of ‘coming apart’ rather than ‘coming together’, as opposed to 
the situation prevailing in canada, the federal government is not in 
the business of outbidding regions or communities in any policy field. 
furthermore, the Walloon region and french community do not 
have the financial means to emulate flemish programs. overall, flem-
ish nationalism has set the Belgian political agenda in a broader, and 
perhaps a more fundamental, manner by challenging the legitimacy of 
the federal government to regulate the social insurance system. in do-
ing so, it is implicitly questioning the very meaning of solidarity in the 
context of a multinational state.
despite the fact that this study focused on three cases and that 
only one other, spain, would satisfy the double criteria of substate na-
tionalism and a well-developed welfare state, we believe it can pro-
vide insight into research on other types of territorial politics such as 
political regionalism and state nationalism. as for strong regionalist 
movements, they often resemble substate nationalism in their claims 
and discourses. in this context, they lend themselves to an analysis of 
their interaction with social programs. for example, italy’s northern 
league advocates decentralisation by arguing that the south of the 
country drains all the financial resources from the north54; this is not 
unlike the discourse of flemish nationalism in Belgium. in the name 
of distinct values of entrepreneurship and efficiency, it has laid claim 
to padania as a political community.
scholars could also consider the role of welfare provisions in build-
ing national identities at the state level. in multinational states such 
as canada and the United Kingdom, welfare-state development has 
54 tambini, damian (2001) nationalism in italian politics: The stories of the northern 
league, 1980–2000, london: routledge.
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had a nation-building dimension55 that deserves more attention. even 
less discussed is the relationship between national identity and social 
policy in unitary states. But in scandinavian countries, for example, 
there is strong evidence that national identity is closely related to social 
and economic policies. consider the example of sweden, where the 
‘social-democratic model’ has long been a powerful symbol of national 
identity, and where progressive social policy is a crucial aspect of this 
model. as hugh heclo and henrik madsen argue56, ‘social democrats 
have captured the idea of the nation – they have successfully interpret-
ed the [swedish] national identity as one of an ever-reforming welfare 
state.’ This seems true even today, as the growing influence of market 
liberalism has failed to eliminate political and ideological references to 
the social democratic model said to make sweden and other scandi-
navian countries unique57. it is hoped that future scholarship on both 
multinational and unitary states will draw on the theoretical insights 
formulated above to explore further the relationship between the wel-
fare state, national identity, and political mobilisation. 
55 Brodie, Janine (2002) ‘citizenship and solidarity: reflections on the canadian way’, 
citizenship studies, 6 (4), 377–394; see also mcewen, nicola (2002) ‘state welfare and 
the impact of welfare retrenchment on the conational debate in scotland’, regional and 
federal studies, vol. 12, no. 1, 66–90. 
56 cited in Blyth, mark (2002) Great transformations: economic ideas and institutional 
change in the twentieth century, new York: cambridge University press. 
57 cox, robert h. (2004) ‘The path-dependency of an idea: Why scandinavian welfare 
states remain distinct’, social policy and administration, 38 (2), 204–219.
chapter 5
The politics of inclusion and exclusion:
social policy, migration politics and 
Welfare state nationalism
patrick emmenegger and romana careja
for some time, the links between state, nation, citizenship, rights and 
duties were considered settled and seemed to be stable. Questions such 
as ‘What defines a nation?’; ‘What does it mean to belong to a nation?’; 
‘What are the rights and duties associated to this belonging?’; ‘is be-
longing automatic or something that must be earned and/or granted?; 
and, in the latter case, which conditions must be fulfilled?’ are now 
challenged by the crisis of the welfare state and globalisation processes, 
such as migration and the extension of human rights. 
some of the current reforms in the area of migration and social 
policy in Western europe can be understood only when the effects of 
two distinct processes are taken into account: 1) the motives for mi-
gration and 2) the increasing role of human rights in liberal democra-
cies. traditionally, Western policy makers interpreted migration from 
poor countries to Western europe as a function of available benefits 
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in receiving countries1 and calibrated the policy answers accordingly. 
considering that the current levels of immigration are too high, gov-
ernments are now attempting to reduce migration flows by reducing 
Western europe’s image as a welfare heaven. such policies are sup-
ported by voters who perceive that immigrants do not belong to the 
national community and therefore do not deserve to receive social 
benefits in times of need. 
second, processes of ‘post-nationalisation’ have restricted the toolkit 
of governments. initially, migration and social policies in post-war eu-
rope were based on the idea that immigrants’ stay would be temporary 
(‘guest workers’). however, transnational definitions of human rights 
decrease the state’s ability to exclude migrants from social benefits.2 as 
a result, Western european governments are forced to find new ways 
to regulate migration flows.3 
The chapter starts by discussing some of the links between citizen-
ship, nation, and welfare showing that initially, welfare schemes were 
envisaged only for those who contributed through work to the gen-
eral societal product and for citizens of their respective nation-states. 
We also show that the relationships covered by the term welfare state 
nationalism, between nation (nationality) and welfare standards, were 
permanently present, directly or indirectly, in the justification of social 
1 Borjas, George J. (1994) ‘The economics of immigration’, Journal of economic litera-
ture 32(4), 1667–1717. Thielemann, eiko r. (2006) ‘The effectiveness of Governments’ 
attempts to control Unwanted migration’, in craig a. parsons & timothy m. smeeding 
(eds.) immigration and the transformation of europe, cambridge ma: cambridge 
University press, 442–472, 442.
2 soysal, Yasemin nuhoglu (1994) limits of citizenship. migrants and postnational 
membership in europe, chicago il/london: University of chicago press. 
3 it should be added that most of these policies proved to be rather ineffective. according 
to favell and hansen, this is due to the states’ incapacity to send immigrants home and 
to market forces’ demands for more immigration despite a hostile public. favell, adrian 
& hansen, randall (2002) ‘markets against politics: migration, eU enlargement and 
the idea of europe’, Journal of ethnic and migration studies 28(4), 581–601.
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benefits schemes: in some cases defence or promotion of nation were 
used as a reason for the creation of welfare entitlements schemes, in 
other cases welfare standards have been used to define a nation and 
rally the citizens in its defence. We argue that a certain level of ‘nation-
alism’ continues to imbue the issue of allocation of welfare benefits, 
and it becomes most visible when this issue is raised with respect to 
the category of ‘migrants’. 
labour shortage in post-war europe led to the active recruitment 
of workers from poorer countries, first from within europe, later from 
outside europe. These were ‘guest workers’, a label which indicated the 
presumed temporary character of their stay. it was assumed that these 
workers would come only to work and would go home when work was 
no longer available. it was also assumed that they would not be a bur-
den for social benefits systems because they were expected to be young 
and healthy, to have no families to support, and to be enrolled in paid 
jobs. Böhning describes these migration policies as ‘mercantilistic’: 
“labourers were welcome, even actively recruited, but not supposed to 
stay or to bring their families.”4 This understanding of migration was 
exclusionary, and by clearly differentiating between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and 
by emphasizing the temporary nature of immigrants’ stay protected 
the identity of natives. 
This post-war pattern has been challenged in recent decades. The 
status of migrants in host countries has become a legitimate concern of 
international discourse and action. Under international scrutiny, host 
states can no longer treat their migrant populations as mere instru-
ments for economic production. rather, they have to respect inter- and 
4 Böhning, W. r. (1978) ‘international migration in Western europe: past, present, 
future’, international migration 16(1), 11–22, 16.
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transnational market and security arrangements, international codes 
and laws concerning the rights of individuals, international treaties 
and conventions on social rights and non-discrimination and, finally, 
international legal instruments to protect the rights of political refu-
gees (e.g. Geneva convention).5 When these transnational rules are 
not legally binding, social control plays a quite important role, which 
should not be underestimated. in many cases, however, noncompli-
ance can lead to penalties. one way or the other, the transnational 
rules constrain the national governments’ room of manoeuvre. most 
notably, they have put an end to the guest worker programmes in West 
european countries. 
This ‘post-national model’ of welfare allocation attacked the basic 
criteria of the post-war welfare provision systems, namely citizenship 
and labour market status, and by doing this opened immigrants’ ac-
cess to welfare benefits by immigrants. These transformations caused 
a tension between the real-world functioning of national welfare states 
and their ideational underpinnings that had to be resolved by national 
governments. We argue that the reaction of West european countries 
followed a three-pronged strategy to minimise the consumption of 
social benefits by immigrants. first, governments have enacted entry 
restrictions targeted to all individuals seeking permanent residence, 
with the exception of individuals who fall into categories protected by 
international treaties, such as political refugees and family reunifica-
tion. second, governments have restricted political refugees’ access to 
social benefits in order to separate ‘true’ political refugees from ‘bo-
gus’ refugees. finally, governments have embarked upon a process of 
5 soysal, Yasemin nuhoglu (1994) limits of citizenship…, 143–156.
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retrenching those social protection systems that provide a dispropor-
tionate amount of benefits to immigrants. We argue that these strate-
gies lead to a de facto restoration of the post-war social model, which 
distinguished between deserving and not deserving recipients. 
to substantiate these claims empirically, we show, using the euro-
pean Value survey Wave 3, that in a context which sees a continu-
ous growth of claims to social rights, citizenship status is one of the 
most resilient conditions for judging the deservingness of welfare en-
titlements. moreover, by reviewing recent migration and social policy 
reforms in france, Germany and Great Britain, we show that social 
policy reforms have focused on those areas that are characterised by a 
disproportionate share of benefits going to immigrants, and that gov-
ernments have attempted to restrict asylum seekers’ access to the terri-
tory and welfare state benefits. These three countries have been select-
ed because they represent different welfare and immigration regimes 
and absorb a large amount of immigrants coming to Western europe.
citizenship and nation
after being relatively stable in the modern period, nation-states have 
recently been contested as being the locus of political power or as the 
only legitimate source of political identity. sub-national or regional 
groups reject nation and choose linguistic, cultural or religious identi-
ties and claim the need to reconsider the rights and duties associated 
with belonging to a nation. often, such claims refer to welfare entitle-
ments. such processes are referred to with the concept of ‘welfare state 
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nationalism’.6 But this is only one sense in which the term is used. it is 
also used in reference to sweden’s reluctance to join the european Un-
ion, portrayed as a potential danger for the moral and welfare stand-
ards of folkhemmet,7 or in reference to danish resistance to nazi oc-
cupation8. however, as the following survey of some of the theoretical 
arguments which surrounded the birth of the idea of modern welfare 
benefits shows, the link between citizenship, nation and welfare has 
been a constant from the 19th century on. 
citizenship denotes an individual’s belonging to a political com-
munity defined by a territory and a set of laws. The quality of ‘being 
a citizen’ involves duties towards the community (such as respecting 
the laws and improving the wellbeing of the community, paying taxes 
and joining the army) and rights (such as taking part in social and po-
litical life). citizenship simultaneously includes and excludes: through 
citizenship, an individual is bound to his/her political community 
and to fellow citizens, but is separated from other political communi-
ties.9 citizenship bonds individuals to a political society (Gesellschaft), 
6 mcewen, nicola (2001) ‘The nation-Building role of state Welfare in the United King-
dom and canada’, in t. c. salmon & m. Keating (eds.) The dynamics of decentraliza-
tion: canadian federalism and British devolution, montreal: mcGill-Queen’s Univer-
sity press, 85–105. mcewen, nicola (2002) ‘state Welfare nationalism: The territorial 
impact of Welfare state development in scotland’, regional and federal studies 12(1), 
66–90; Béland, daniel & lecours, andré (2005) ‘The politics of territorial solidarity: 
nationalism and social policy reform in canada, the United Kingdom, and Belgium’, 
comparative political studies 38(6), 676–703; Béland, daniel & lecours, andré (2006) 
‘substate nationalism and the Welfare state: Québec and canadian federalism’, nations 
and nationalism 12(1), 77–96.
7 tragardh, lars (1999) ‘Welfare state nationalism: sweden and the spectre of the euro-
pean Union’, scandinavian review 87(1), 18–23. 
8 Kaspersen, lars Bo (2006) ‘The formation and development of the Welfare state’, in 
John l. campbell, John a. hall & ove K. pedersen (eds.) national identity and the 
Varieties of capitalism: The danish experience, montreal & Kingston/london/ithaca 
nY: mcGill-Queen’s University press, 99–132.
9 Klausen, Jytte (1995) ‘advocacy and state Building: t. h. marshall in the hands of 
social reformers’, World politics 47(2), 244–267; soysal 1994, 1–12.
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whose laws have been accepted by the citizens themselves as the basis 
for interaction. however, these hierarchical and contractual bonds are 
unlikely to succeed in keeping a community together unless they are 
founded upon ties originated in the awareness of belonging to a nation 
(Gemeinschaft).10 
Benedict anderson defined a nation as “an imagined political com-
munity [that is] imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”.11 
The limited and sovereign character is given by the fact that individuals 
themselves create ‘the nation’ and endow it with a series of attributes, 
which distinguish it from other ‘nations’. This process of creation and 
endowment has no definite end. although historically it is accepted 
that ‘formation of nations’ ended by the 19th century, this assertion can 
be certainly accepted only with respect to the nations which dominat-
ed the modern political era. recently, these nations themselves have 
come under challenge, and are confronted with the need to redefine 
themselves in response to claims raised by sub-national units.12 more-
over, if one applies a very generous definition to a nation, as the sum 
of political, cultural, social and economic achievements and identities 
of a group, then it is clear that the process of nation formation is end-
less: on a core of basic tenets, each generation adds its own contribu-
tion. Thus, the great picture shows individuals symbiotically related to 
their nation: the nation gives them identity while they give the nation 
10 Bellamy, richard (1992) liberalism and modern society: a historical argument. penn-
sylvania state University press, 177
11 anderson, Benedict (1991) imagined communities: reflections on the origin and 
spread of nationalism, london: Verso, 6–7
12 corcuera atienza, Javier, Brock, albert & Watson, cameron J. (2007) The origins, ide-
ology and organization of Basque nationalism, 1876–1903, center for Basque studies. 
ichijo, atsuko (2004) scottish nationalism and the idea of europe: concepts of europe 
and the nation, london: routledge. Greer, scott l. (2007) nationalism and self-Gov-
ernment: The politics of autonomy in scotland and catalonia, albany: state University 
of new York press.
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substance. humans are able to value their skills and to strive because 
they rely on resources created earlier by other members of their na-
tion. Thus, each of them has a duty towards their nation, and this duty 
requires them to give their best for ensuring the common good and the 
survival of the nation.13 
for a long time, wars were waged in the name of nations and the 
best individuals could do was to give their lives and their money.14 
however, as states became more stable, greatness of nations started 
to be understood more in terms of economic success, a process which 
coincided with the rise of liberal economic arguments. This process 
also involved a refining of the relationship between individuals (citi-
zens) and their nation (society). in this period the idea of creating the 
means to ensure citizens’ welfare also emerged. The next section will 
briefly present the theoretical justifications of liberals for accepting the 
establishment of welfare provisions, which at prima facie ran against 
their most basic tenets. as will be seen, these justifications are con-
nected to the role of individuals within society (nation), and have a 
strong pro-work bias. 
nation and the Welfare state
The liberals’ view of the economy, the state, the society and progress 
revolved around the idea that individuals have inalienable rights and 
that the role of the state was to provide the legal framework in which 
individuals can develop themselves to the largest extent, without 
harming their peers. The classical liberal thinking depicted a harmoni-
ous society, where individuals who wanted to work could work and 
13 Bellamy, richard (1992) liberalism and modern society…
14 Klausen, Jytte (1995) ‘advocacy and state Building…’, 249
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where the poverty was the result of vice (laziness). The liberals’ faith 
that the market could secure a place for each individual, so that his/her 
specific skills could be valued, was akin to ingenuity15 and they were 
often criticised for this ‘non-realistic’ premise. This assumption, how-
ever, was important for their argumentation: it allowed them to avoid 
uncomfortable questions related to social diversity and to insist on in-
dividualism and on the state’s non-intervention in citizens’ welfare.16 
however, the growth of poverty and unemployment, and the oc-
currence of economic crises forced liberal thinkers and politicians 
to admit that poverty was not only the result of vice, and that some 
measures for ensuring (a minimum of) social welfare were needed.17 
The justification of welfare benefits schemes was also influenced by 
the process of nation and state formation. in countries where mod-
ernisation took place in a context where state and nation were already 
established (such as france and Great Britain), the liberals’ attitudes 
towards social problems and welfare provision were very much in 
line with their classical arguments emphasising the individual effort 
to provide for one’s own welfare. The workers’ right to a minimum of 
guaranteed welfare was correlated with their duty to work and to make 
the best use of the opportunity given to them. The laws adopted at the 
beginning of 20th century, which “were designed to help only those 
who helped themselves”, ignored the needs of those who were not able 
15 This argument is reminiscent of the oikeopragia principle promoted by plato, according 
to which if each citizen of the polis performs a function according to his skills, then the 
collective good is ensured (plato in republic).
16 Bellamy, richard (1992) liberalism and modern society…
17 Bellamy 1992; peter flora & Jens alber (1981) ‘modernisation, democratisation and the 
development of Welfare states in Western europe’, in peter flora & arnold J. heidenhe-
imer (eds.) The development of Welfare states in europe and america, new Brunswick 
and london: transaction Books, 37–81. 
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to do so.18 only those who contributed to the general good were con-
sidered part of society, worth of attention and concern. That ‘society’ 
was always implicitly understood to be the ‘national’ society19 is re-
flected in the political, economic and social mechanisms envisaged, 
which were meant to maintain the great status of the french or British 
nations.20 in countries where the advent of liberalism coincided not 
only with modernisation, but also with state formation (such as Ger-
many), the liberals argued that in order to secure the country’s place 
on the map of europe, social progress was a must: “The national drive 
abroad must be accompanied by social progress at home”.21 
liberals insisted that only those who worked were entitled and de-
served to be helped in case of misfortunes22 and this view dominated 
the pre-war view on social welfare policies. as at the time labour force 
structure was defined by industrialisation, the subjects and the target 
of the liberals’ welfare schemes were the working men. moreover, the 
18 “The much vaunted old age pensions scheme [in Great Britain, authors’ note], being in 
a large part contributory, was designed to help those who helped themselves. The des-
titute, the so-called ‘unemployable’, and the casual labourers, whose plight formed the 
vast bulk of the social problem, were largely neglected by the new liberal legislation. The 
new labour exchanges failed to address their needs and the unemployment insurance 
scheme referred predominantly to those groups of skilled and organised workers most 
able to make provision for themselves in any case” (Bellamy 1992: 55).
19 cmiel, Kenneth (1996) ‘The faith of the nation and the Withering of the state’, ameri-
can literary history 8(1), 184–202.
20 The economist arnold toynbee accurately caught this liberal position in an essay gener-
ally defending state help, he remarked: “even if the chance should rise of removing a 
great social evil, nothing must be done to weaken those habits of individual self-reliance 
and voluntary association which have built up the greatness of the english people”. 
Quoted in Bellamy, richard (1992) liberalism and modern society…, 47.
21 Bellamy, richard (1992) liberalism and modern society…, 172. 
22 The importance of work as the basis for welfare entitlements is also visible in the 
conceptualisation of the swedish folkhemmet, where work is imbued with moral value. 
Klausen 1995. although marshall retains the importance of work in relation to welfare 
rights, he gives it a more instrumental value. if for durkheim, Bourgeois and British 
liberals, work entitled individuals to receive welfare, for marshall work gave the citizens 
the possibility to pay for welfare. roche, maurice (1992) rethinking citizenship: Wel-
fare, ideology and change in modern society, cambridge: polity press.
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first social welfare laws were given when immigration was not an is-
sue.23 Therefore, almost by default, the legislation concerning welfare 
schemes referred to national citizens. 
more than nationality, residency played an important role as a cri-
terion for the link between the poor and local communities. all the 
poor laws that were enacted after 1500 stated that every community 
is to feed its indigenous poor, while the welfare of others was not the 
community’s responsibility. in fact, the criterion of residency can be 
traced back to the second council of tours in 567, in which the catho-
lic bishops decided that every community had to feed its indigenous 
poor in order to avoid the roaming of the poor from one community 
to another.24 
nationality became more important during the development of 
modern welfare states. conservative reformers such as Bismarck and 
von taffe sought to weaken the revolutionary labour movement and 
tie the loyalties of the individual to the central state by offering gener-
ous social benefits to certain societal groups.25 They hoped that these 
social protection schemes would provide some legitimacy to the em-
pire, increase social cohesion and induce national identity.26 This ‘cit-
23 at the time, european countries were mostly countries of emigration. 
24 de swaan, abram (1988) in care of the state. health care, education and Welfare in 
europe and the Usa in the modern era, cambridge: polity press, 16–17.
25 esping-andersen, Gøsta (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare capitalism, princeton nJ: 
princeton University press, 24.
26 crepaz, markus m. l. & damron, regan (2009) ‘constructing tolerance: how the 
Welfare state shapes attitudes about immigrants’, comparative political studies 42(3), 
437–463.
166
patricK emmeneGGer and romana careJa
izen-making through social benefits’27 strategy was later followed by 
many other states, especially in times of crisis.28
ideas of the responsibility of individuals towards fellow citizens, 
which appeared in the liberals’ arguments with strong qualifications, 
were taken over and developed further by socialist thinkers, who cam-
paigned to extend it to include other categories, not only industrial 
workers.29 in their view, state intervention was the instrument to en-
sure the nation’s welfare, and thus nationalism became “a critical ideo-
logical prop for the positive state for the past 90 years”.30 
The post-war theoretical momentum for the arguments in favour 
of welfare provision bore marshall’s stamp. his famous 1950 essay 
presented social rights as following naturally from civil and politi-
cal rights. from here, many interpreted social rights as equal in type 
to political and civil rights, and claimed that social rights are to be 
granted automatically and unconditionally. other authors argued that 
this view misinterpreted marshall’s view by ignoring his insistence that 
“citizenship rights, particularly social rights, are to be reciprocated 
and paid for by the citizens’ duty to work”.31 
The idea that citizens have social rights has produced a major turn in 
the relationships between different groups in the society. The monop-
oly power to define who is entitled to receive benefits, who belonged 
to the state, was dismantled. individuals and groups argued that they 
27 leibfried, stephan & pierson, paul (2000) ‘social policy: left to courts and markets?’, 
in helen Wallace & William Wallace (eds.) policy-making in the european Union, 4th 
edition, new York: oxford University press, 267–292, 279. 
28 Katzenstein, peter J. (1985) small states in World markets: industrial policy in europe, 
ithaca nY/london: cornell University press. campbell, John l., hall, John a. & ped-
ersen, ove K. (eds.) (2006) national identity and the Varieties of capitalism: the danish 
experience, montreal & Kingston/london/ithaca nY: mcGill-Queen’s University press. 
29 flora and alber 1981.
30 cmiel 1996, 188.
31 maurice roche 1992, 20.
167
the politics of inclUsion and eXclUsion
themselves have the right to define their needs. Underdog groups used 
the rights-dominated conception in order to fight for recognition and 
inclusion in the formation of a coalition controlling policy-making.32 
however, the supporters of the rights-approach to welfare tend to 
ignore that social rights have a different quality than political and civil 
rights. While political and civil rights are indivisible, non-transferable 
and granted automatically, social rights are redistributive and depend 
on the fiscal capacity of the state and on the political mobilisation of 
certain groups.33 in other words, for social rights to be translated into 
real existing benefits the balance of power between ‘beneficiaries’ and 
‘providers’ matters, where the ‘providers’ are the taxpayers. The debate 
is not about providing or not providing welfare benefits, but about who 
should receive them. in this context, the most powerful means at the 
providers’ disposal is their possibility to decide on the criteria for de-
servingness. as long as the two groups overlap, problems are minimal. 
When they do not overlap, the groups’ divergent interests fuel tensions. 
While the rights-approach started as a domestic development, it re-
ceived a strong impetus from the evolutions in the international arena. 
The increased concern with human rights in conflict areas or in to-
talitarian regimes was translated in the effort of international actors to 
promote the standards and the means to protect human beings’ lives. 
By proclaiming the pre-eminence of human rights and the right of hu-
mans to be protected from the actions of the state or sub-state actors, 
the personhood rights became de-territorialized, and consequently, 
separated from the rights derived from the status of citizens. more im-
32 Klausen 1995.
33 Breiner, peter (2006) is social citizenship really outdated? t. h. marshall revisited. 
paper presented at the annual meeting of the Western political science association, 
albuquerque, march 17, 2006; Klausen 1995.
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portantly for the argument developed in this chapter, the international 
regimes of human rights pledged states to protect individuals against 
other states. 
The codification and institutionalisation of the human right stand-
ards has had several implications: 1) signatory states had to implement 
them, 2) they provided models for nation states actions and 3) they 
constrained the actions of the nation states. What is very important in 
the context of the previous discussion, which showed that social pro-
tection was envisaged by the national states for their own citizens, is 
the fact that under the international pressure, the same national states 
were required to provide the minimal welfare standards for citizens 
whom they were supposed to protect under international laws, but 
who were not their own citizens. This model of providing access to 
certain rights, based not on the affiliation to the political community 
(citizenship) but based on de-territorialised notions of persons’ rights 
is what soysal proposes under the name of a “post-national model”.34
it should not be understood that without the umbrella of interna-
tional organisations, states could mistreat the non-nationals living on 
their own territories. democratic states especially have always pledged 
to respect human rights, and the plethora of human rights organisa-
tions active on their territories would make sure that even those un-
protected by the citizenship status would have their rights respected. 
Therefore, as Joppke argued, basic constitutional principles would 
34 soysal 1994. maurice roche argues that “‘post-nationalism’ refers not only to transna-
tional political change, involving levels higher than the nation state […], but also to 
subnational change, involving the development of local and regional political culture 
and institutions.” in this paper we use the term in soysal’s sense, as an expression of 
transnational changes. roche 1992, 192–193, emphasis in the original.
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bind states’ hands in their actions against non-nationals.35 however, 
as liedtke and holzer et al. show in their respective discussions of the 
welfare provisions for asylum seekers in Germany and admission ratios 
in switzerland, nation-states, even when constrained by international 
conventions, still enjoy a great deal of discretion in applying them.36
Welfare state nationalism and perception of deservingness
in the preceding pages, we have argued that being considered part of 
the national community is one of the most important criteria for being 
considered as ‘deserving’ of social support in times of need. in the fol-
lowing, we substantiate this claim by providing empirical evidence on 
informal solidarity with different societal groups and the relationship 
between perception of immigration and the preference for condition-
ality of social benefits. 
Van oorschot discusses five criteria that influence the perception of 
deservingness of certain societal groups. people are considered to be 
more deserving of social support 1) if they cannot control the reasons 
for their neediness (responsibility), 2) if they are very needy of social 
support (level of need), 3) if they are close to ‘us’, i.e. belong to the 
national community, 4) if they display an expected form of behaviour 
or 5) if they have earned the support (reciprocity).37 of course, some 
of these criteria overlap. for instance, the likelihood of having con-
35 Joppke, christian (1999) immigration and the nation state: The United states, Ger-
many and Great Britain, oxford: oxford University press.
36 liedtke, matthias (2002) ‘national Welfare and asylum in Germany’, critical social 
policy 22(3), 479–497. holzer, Thomas, schneider, Gerald & Widmer, Thomas (2000) 
‘The impact of legislative deterrence measures on the number of asylum applications 
in switzerland (1986–1995)’, international migration review 34(4), 1182–1216. 
37 Van oorschot, Wim (2000) ‘Who should Get What, and Why? on deservingness cri-
teria and the conditionality of solidarity among the public’, policy and politics 28(1), 
33–48, 36.
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tributed to the community increases if the needy person in question 
belongs to that community. however, it is important to note that these 
five criteria do not rule out the possibility to consider immigrants very 
deserving of social support as, for instance, they could be seen either 
as not controlling the reasons for their predicament or as being in par-
ticularly needy situations.
in his empirical analysis using a sample of 1500 dutch respondents, 
van oorschot shows that out of 29 societal groups identified as ‘needy’, 
immigrants were considered to be the least deserving.38 a similar anal-
ysis has been conducted by appelbaum using a sample of 2000 Ger-
man students. she observes that target groups belonging to the nation-
al community that are seen as less responsible for their predicament 
are considered to be most deserving. at the same time, although refu-
gees from Kosovo and asylum seekers from Bosnia were considered 
to be the least responsible for their need of aid, they were still thought 
to be the least deserving of receiving aid.39 This finding shows that the 
collective identity plays a crucial role in judging deservingness. in a 
comparative study using european Values survey data van oorschot 
shows that immigrants across europe are considered to be less deserv-
ing of social benefits than the elderly, sick or disabled and unemployed 
people. moreover, he shows that conditionality of social benefits, i.e. 
the extent to which respondents make a difference between different 
38 Van oorschot 2000.
39 appelbaum, lauren d. (2002) ‘Who deserves help? students’ opinions about the 
deservingness of different Groups living in Germany to receive aid’, social Justice 
research 15(3), 201–225, 214.
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groups of needy people, is strongly influenced by their perception of 
immigrants.40 
in the following, we replicate van oorschot’s study using data on 
france, Germany and the United Kingdom provided by the third wave 
of the european Value survey (1999). deservingness is operational-
ised using respondents’ informal solidarity towards four groups of 
needy people. The exact wording of the question is: “to what extent do 
you feel concerned about the living conditions of: (1) elderly people in 
your country, (2) unemployed people in your country, (3) immigrants 
in your country and (4) sick and disabled people in your country?” 
respondents could choose among five answer categories ranging from 
1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). 
figure 1 displays average informal solidarity with different soci-
etal groups of needy persons for france, Germany and Great Britain. 
higher values indicate higher levels of informal solidarity. in all three 
countries, the same rank order can be observed. elderly people are 
seen to be the most deserving of social benefits followed by the sick 
and disabled. The unemployed are considered to be less deserving, es-
pecially in Great Britain. however, most important for the argument 
developed here is the fact that immigrants are clearly seen as the least 
deserving societal group of needy persons. This evidence supports our 
claim that identity and membership in the national community are 
very important determinants of informal solidarity.
40 Van oorschot, Wim (2006) ‘making the difference in social europe: deservingness 
perceptions among citizens of european Welfare states’, Journal of european social 
policy 16(1), 23–42.
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Figure 1: Informal solidarity with different societal groups of needy per-
sons (national averages)
 in a second step, we analyse whether support for conditionality of 
social benefits is influenced by attitudes towards immigration. condi-
tionality is the extent to which respondents make a difference between 
different groups of needy people. if a respondent is equally concerned 
with the living conditions of all four groups, his or her conditionality 
score is zero. if, however, a respondent is more concerned with the 
living conditions of certain groups than others, his or her condition-
ality score will be greater than zero. it is important to note that this 
definition is not dependent on the overall informal solidarity of the 
respondents. a respondent may or may not be concerned with the liv-
ing conditions of all aforementioned groups. in such a case his or her 
conditionality score will remain the same as long as s/he makes similar 
differences among groups in need. following van oorschot, the condi-
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tionality score is measured by the sum of absolute differences between 
a respondent’s answers to the four questions above, and therefore theo-
retically ranges from 0 to 16.41 
The general perception of immigration by the respondents is meas-
ured using two dummy variables. The wording of the first question 
is: “When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to [country] 
people over immigrants”. respondents that agreed with this statement 
have been coded one and zero otherwise. The wording of the second 
question is: “how about people from less developed countries coming 
here to work. Which one of the following do you think the govern-
ment should do?” respondents who answered with “put strict limits 
on the number of foreigners who can come here” and “prohibit peo-
ple coming here from other countries” have been coded one and zero 
otherwise. 
We further introduce several control variables into the statistical 
models: gender (male = 0, female = 1), age (years passed since birth), 
highest level of education reached (8 categories) and political stance 
through self-placement on a 10-point left-right scale. moreover, fol-
lowing van oorschot42, we introduce three variables that control for 
respondents’ general welfare state sentiments: (1) whether individuals 
or the state should take more responsibility in providing for people 
(1–10), (2) whether unemployed people should have to take any job or 
not (1–10) and (3) whether people who do not work turn lazy (1–5). 
The models are estimated using ols regressions with country dum-
mies (reference group: Germany) and robust standard errors. The self-
41 Van oorschot 2006, 29.
42 Van oorschot 2006. 
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placement on the left-right scale is only introduced in model 2 as it 
leads to a loss of 650 (out of 4046) observations. 
table 1 displays the results of ols regressions of the conditionality 
score on preferences for immigration and control variables. all vari-
ables, except gender, are highly significant in model 1. older and less 
educated respondents tend to score higher on our conditionality in-
dicator. respondents who think that unemployed people should take 
any offered job and that those who do not work become lazy receive 
a very high score on our conditionality indicator, while respondents 
who think that everyone should take the responsibility for providing 
for themselves receive a low score. in the context of the argument pre-
sented in this chapter, it is very important to note that respondents 
with an overall negative perception of immigration support high levels 
of conditionality of social benefits. moreover, these two dummy vari-
ables are characterised by the lowest probability of a type i error (ex-
cept the country dummies) and have a considerable substantive effect 
on the dependent variable. 
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Table 1: Determinants of conditionality (European Value Survey wave 
3, 1999) 
Dependent variable: Conditionality of informal solidarity
Model: (1) (2)
Gender (woman) 0.0925 0.0846
(0.85) (0.72)
Age 0.0140 *** 0.0137 ***
(4.19) (3.76)
Education (1–8) -0.1711 *** -0.1730 ***
(6.41) (5.99)
Welfare state sentiments:
Responsibility (individual–state) 0.1240 *** 0.1134 ***
(5.43) (4.51)
Unemployed accept any job (yes–no) -0.0831 *** -0.0404
(3.77) (1.67)
No work makes lazy (yes–no) -0.2786 *** -0.2610 ***
(6.10) (5.21)
Attitudes to immigration:
Scarce jobs for natives (no–yes) 1.1087 *** 1.1064 ***
(9.66) (8.84)
Inflow of immigrants (no–yes) 1.1640 *** 1.1140 ***
(10.42) (9.17)
Political stance (left –right) - 0.1578 ***
(4.78)
France (country dummy) 1.4032 *** 1.4056 ***
(11.55) (10.61)
Great Britain (country dummy) 2.1072 *** 2.1769 ***
(13.96) (13.30)
Constant 2.8177 *** 1.8680 ***
(8.96) (4.92)
Adjusted R2 0.1654 0.1735
N 4’046 3’396
Notes: Ordinary least squares regressions with country dummies and robust standard 
errors. Absolute t-value in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. 
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in model 2, we further control for the self-placement on a left-right 
scale. respondents who consider themselves to be right of the politi-
cal centre support a higher level of conditionality of social benefits. 
in general, the introduction of this variable leads to a decrease of the 
t-values of all independent variables. in the case of attitudes towards 
acceptable jobs for unemployed people, the coefficient even turns in-
significant. however, the two dummy variables measuring general at-
titudes towards immigration remain the most robust determinants of 
preferences for the conditionality of social benefits. 
in sum, respondents in france, Germany and Great Britain not only 
consider immigrants to be the least deserving group of needy peo-
ple, but their preferences for conditionality of social benefits are also 
strongly affected by their attitudes towards immigration. This clearly 
supports our claim that social benefits are considered to be mainly for 
members of the national community. 
migration and social policy reforms in france, Germany 
and Great Britain
in the following, we provide a condensed summary of migration and 
social policy reforms in france, Germany and Great Britain. We argue 
that West european countries have followed a three-pronged strategy 
in order to minimise the consumption of social benefits by immi-
grants. first, governments have restricted the access to the territory for 
immigrants from outside the european Union (so-called third country 
nationals), and allow entrance only to those groups which they are, 
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by international treaties, obliged to admit (immigration policies43). 
second, governments have restricted political refugees’ access to so-
cial benefits in order to separate ‘true’ political refugees from ‘bogus’ 
refugees (immigrant policies).44 finally, governments have embarked 
in a process of retrenching those social protection systems that provide 
a disproportionate amount of benefits to immigrants (social policies). 
our discussion of immigration and immigrant policies is based on the 
work of Geddes and several publications by the oecd if not otherwise 
indicated.45 
Immigration policies: france has a history of open borders. con-
cerned about low levels of population growth, the government even 
encouraged immigration from nearby countries such as italy or spain. 
however, due to the worsening of the labour market situation in the 
aftermath of the first oil price crisis, france suspended labour and fam-
ily migration. although the latter was later overruled by the council of 
state as it contravened the constitutional right to family life, the mid-
1970s demarcated a new epoch in french immigration policy. The bor-
ders were now closed. 
immigration became an increasingly politicised topic in the 1980s. 
not least due to the increasing popularity of the far-right front na-
tional, immigration control was set to remain on the political agenda 
43 immigration policies concern the regulation of migratory flows and the admission of 
foreign nationals. immigrant policies regulate immigrants’ lives in their host countries. 
44 note that 47 per cent of the respondents in the european social survey of 2002–03 
agreed that “most applicants for asylum aren’t in real fear of persecution in their own 
countries” while 22 per cent disagree. citrin, Jack & sides, John (2006) ‘european im-
migration in the people’s court’, in craig a. parsons & timothy m. smeeding (eds.), 
immigration and the transformation of europe, cambridge ma: cambridge University 
press, 327–361, 337.
45 Geddes, andrew (2003) The politics of migration and immigration in europe, los 
angeles ca/london/new delhi/singapore: sage. oecd (several years) international 
migration outlook, paris: oecd. 
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for the decades to come. although initially reluctant to endorse the 
topic, the mainstream parties became increasingly active. centre-right 
parties in particular saw a tougher stance on immigration as a pos-
sibility to weaken their far-right rivals. for instance, the 1994 pasqua 
law restricted family reunification and prohibited the regularisation of 
status of undocumented foreigners who married french citizens, while 
the 2003 sarkozy law introduced even tougher restrictions on entry 
and stay of asylum seekers.46 The left also supported restrictive legisla-
tion. for instance, the 1989 Joxe and 1997 chevènement laws tough-
ened immigrations controls, but the left also introduced new forms of 
protection and anti-discrimination policies. finally, france, together 
with Germany and others, was among the first countries that attempt-
ed to externalise immigration controls through european integration. 
Unlike france, Germany never attempted to be a country of immi-
gration. nevertheless, by 2006, almost 13 per cent of its population had 
not been born in Germany. historically, Germany has been character-
ised by relatively liberal asylum provisions, a right to return for ethnic 
Germans and an extensive guest worker programme. This programme 
had been designed to attract workers to Germany, but it envisioned 
their departure as soon as the economic situation would deteriorate. 
as the first oil crisis struck Germany, numerous migrant workers be-
came unemployed. But they did not leave. although unanticipated by 
policy makers, guest workers had acquired the right to stay.47 
46 Guiraudon, Virginie (2006) ‘different nation, same nationhood: the challenges of im-
migrant policy’, in pepper d. culpepper, peter a. hall & Bruno palier (eds.) changing 
france: The politics that markets make, houndmills/Basingstoke/hampshire: palgrave 
macmillan, 129–149, 145.
47 it is debated whether guest workers acquired the right to stay due to post-nationalism 
or whether Germany’s sovereignty was ‘self-limited’. soysal 1994. Joppke 1999. 
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after the first oil crisis, the guest worker programme was basically 
abolished and migration was limited to political asylum, family reuni-
fication and the return of ethnic Germans. ethnic Germans are people 
of German descent living outside the territory of the federal republic 
of Germany and later the reunified Germany. They were granted a par-
ticularly easy access to Germany and its welfare state. however, after 
the end of the cold War, as ethnic Germans came increasingly from 
places further away, resentment at their special treatment grew. By 
1996, local authorities were given the right to monitor and regulate the 
lives of ethnic Germans in a similar way as the ones of asylum seekers. 
The relatively liberal asylum provisions were due to self-imposed 
‘special obligations’ rooted in Germany’s particular history as a provi-
sional state, especially prior to reunification. as the public’s discontent 
with these policies increased, Germany turned to the european Un-
ion in order to enact more restrictive regulation and avoid domestic 
debates related to these ‘special obligations’. an amendment in 1993 
brought Germany in line with the other eU member states and with 
the dublin convention, and put an end to its liberal asylum provisions. 
in 2003, Germany received its first regulated immigration system. as 
argued by Geddes, although “the symbolic right to asylum remained, 
[…] the actual ability to exercise the right by entering German state 
territory was reduced.”48 
Great Britain shares with france the colonial legacy and the open 
borders for citizens of its colonies. Between 1948 and 1962, all subjects 
48 Geddes 2003, 82.
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to the crown had the right to move to Britain.49 after arrival, they were 
granted the same legal, social and political rights as the locals. consid-
ering the size of the British empire, this policy created an enormous 
pool of would-be migrants. 
This policy changed with three legislative acts adopted between 
1962 and 1971, which closed the door on large-scale labour migration. 
politics became increasingly concerned with the ‘problem’ of coloured 
immigration and the conservative government of harold macmillan 
argued that change was needed as the British islands were in danger 
of becoming overcrowded. although it initially opposed this policy 
change, the labour party soon noticed the electoral potential of the 
anti-immigration policies. The 1968 second commonwealth immi-
grants Bill, restricting the access to Great Britain for British citizens of 
indian origin that faced persecution in Kenya and Uganda as a result 
of africanisation policies, was passed by a labour government led by 
harold Wilson. These policy reforms led to a suspension of migration, 
with the exception of family members and asylum seekers. 
one particularity of the British approach is reluctance to cede power 
to supranational eU institutions. Unlike france and Germany, which 
saw european integration as a chance to enact more restrictive im-
migration policies than otherwise possible, Great Britain relied on its 
geographical advantages as an island on the northern edge of europe. 
moreover, unlike france and Germany, the British government was 
confronted with few institutional veto points and was able to enact re-
49 according to martiniello, colonial labour migration played the same economic role for 
france and Great Britain as collective labour recruitment (‘guest workers’) in Germany. 
martiniello, marco (2006) ‘The new migratory europe: towards a proactive immigra-
tion policy?’, in craig a. parsons & timothy m. smeeding (eds.) immigration and the 
transformation of europe, cambridge ma: cambridge University press, 298–326, 312.
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strictive policies on its own. as a result, the need for tougher immigra-
tion controls through european integration was considerably weaker. 
Immigrant policies: all three countries have in common that, despite 
their efforts to restrict immigration, actual immigration numbers did 
not decline. international obligations and national constitutional rules 
obliged them to accept political refugees and allow for family reunifi-
cation. moreover, governments sometimes supported, or at least did 
not oppose, the immigration of certain groups of workers. These work-
ers were often to fill certain labour market needs, such as nurses from 
south africa for hospitals in Great Britain. finally, the free movement 
of people within the european Union curtailed the governments’ abil-
ity to control the immigration of citizens of other european countries. 
as a result, governments increasingly turned to immigrant policies in 
order to control migration.
france’s immigrant policy is based on the idea that “as immigrants 
become ‘integrated’ then they disappear as a distinct component of 
french society”50. however, policy makers soon realised that some im-
migrants are easier to assimilate than others. This resulted in a distinc-
tion between ‘good’ european and ‘bad’ non-european immigrants, as 
the latter were considered to be unassimilable.51 This had important 
implications. for instance, the 1983 Badinter law empowered the po-
lice to use someone’s hair or skin colour to decide upon id checks.52 
50 Geddes 2003, 66. nevertheless, the french government hoped after 1973 that migrants 
would return to their homeland. according to Guiraudon, the government even con-
sciously refrained from integrating them in order to increase their incentive to return. 
Guiraudon 2006, 136. 
51 schain, martin a. (2006) ‘The politics of immigration in france, Britain, and the United 
states: a transatlantic comparison’, in craig a. parsons & timothy m. smeeding (eds.) 
immigration and the transformation of europe, cambridge ma: cambridge University 
press, 362–391.
52 This law was repealed in 1993. 
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during the last decades, france developed a rather tough stance 
on asylum seekers. according to delouvin, about 90 per cent of all 
claims for acceptance as a refugee are rejected by the french authori-
ties. moreover, in order to decrease the incentives of ‘bogus’ refugees 
to apply for recognition as asylum seekers, france has considerably 
restricted the access to social benefits. foreigners seeking protection 
must present themselves to the local authorities. Until the french of-
fice for the protection of refugees and state persons comes to a de-
cision on their case, they are allowed to stay but not to work. if the 
registration through the local authorities is delayed, for instance, due 
to missing documents, refugees do not have any access to social assis-
tance for several months.53 according to schuster, these measures are 
clearly targeted at so-called ‘bogus’ asylum seekers.54 however, they 
also complicate the lives of ‘real’ asylum seekers.
historically, Germany had a relatively liberal asylum seeker policy. 
however, the 1993 asylum compromise put an end to this tradition. 
This amendment brought Germany in line with the other eU member 
states and the dublin convention and introduced the concept of ‘safe 
countries of origin’. subsequently, Germany also introduced the con-
cept of ‘safe third country’, which means that asylum seekers lose their 
right to apply for asylum in Germany if they had entered the territory 
of a country that could provide protection against prosecution before 
they crossed the border to Germany. since all of Germany’s neigh-
53 delouvin, patrick (2000) ‘The evolution of asylum in france’, Journal of refugee stud-
ies 13(1), 61–73, 64–65, 71. 
54 schuster, liza (2000) ‘a comparative analysis of the asylum policy of seven european 
Governments’, Journal of refugee studies 13(1), 119–132, 123.
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bours are deemed ‘safe third countries’, the only legal way of entering 
Germany for asylum seekers is by air.55
The access to social benefits has been restricted by several acts. asy-
lum seekers are not covered by social assistance but by special systems 
at lower benefit rates during the first 36 months of their stay. however, 
these social benefits are not paid in cash but provided through in-kind 
benefits or vouchers. moreover, these vouchers are only valid in cer-
tain food stores. according to liedtke, these policies aim at complicat-
ing the social integration of asylum seekers in order to keep their im-
migration reversible as long as their long-term status remains unclear. 
put differently, “welfare state instruments are used rather to minimise 
or limit than to maximise asylum seekers’ well-being”.56
Great Britain’s initial attempt to deal with the immigration problem 
was to focus on the external borders. for instance, airlines, ferry com-
panies and truck drivers were liable to be fined if they brought in peo-
ple without the appropriate documentation. however, the measures 
were not very successful. in 2000, more than 80,000 people applied for 
political asylum in Great Britain. 
The government reacted by adapting the immigrant legislation. in 
1996, the conservative government decided to remove access to social 
benefits for ‘in-country’ asylum applicants. Thus, only if applications 
were made at a point of entry such as an air- or seaport, could asylum 
seekers expect to receive social benefits. The courts challenged this act 
by describing it as ‘barbaric’ as it could lead to the destitution of nu-
merous in-country applicants. as a result, the government adapted the 
act and decided that local authorities should be responsible for asylum 
55 liedtke 2002, 482. 
56 liedtke 2000, 493–494.
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seekers. as this policy led to an uneven distribution of costs, it proved 
to be very controversial. 
in 1999, the labour government of tony Blair went one step fur-
ther. it sought to address the problem of the geographical concentra-
tion of asylum seekers in london and the south east of Great Britain 
by developing a new dispersal system. The government also intro-
duced vouchers, which were to be given to asylum seekers in place 
of cash benefits. especially the introduction of vouchers has “helped 
to place asylum seekers outside the community of legitimate receivers 
of welfare state benefits.”57 however, due to strong protests by human 
rights nGos and to increasing costs, the British government has re-
cently abandoned the voucher scheme and returned to the previous 
cash-based system.58
in sum, a similar development can be observed in all three coun-
tries. access to social benefits for asylum seekers has been restricted in 
recent years. as argued by schuster on the basis of an analysis of asy-
lum policy in seven european countries: “The response [to the] ques-
tion ‘how low can the lowest common denominator go?’ would seem 
to be very low. The governments of the european Union are opting 
for offering the barest minimum possible to asylum seekers –the ac-
ceptance of a few token, carefully chosen refugees who will be entitled 
to minimal support from host governments (who rely increasingly on 
cash-starved nGos and charities to act as safety nets) for limited and 
renewable periods of time.”59
57 Geddes 2003, 194. see also sales, rosemary (2002) ‘The deserving and the Undeserv-
ing? refugees, asylum seekers and Welfare in Britain’, critical social policy 22(3), 
456–478.
58 Thielemann 2006, 457.
59 schuster 2000, 125.
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Social policies: so far, we have seen that all three countries tried to 
restrict access, and allow entrance only to those groups which they 
have to accept (political refugees and family reunification). moreover, 
in recent years, social benefits for asylum seekers have been consider-
ably retrenched. now, we would like to demonstrate that even when 
settled in their host countries, immigrants are still worse off than citi-
zens. furthermore, we show that minimum income protection and so-
cial assistance have been substantially retrenched since the 1990s, and 
disproportionally affected the economic well-being of immigrants. 
in all three countries, the labour market participation rate of native-
born and foreign-born residents is rather similar. however, important 
differences can be observed with regard to unemployment rates. in 
2006, the ratio of the unemployment rate of foreign-born to the unem-
ployment rate of native-born residents was 1.82 in france, 1.77 in Ger-
many and 1.35 in Great Britain (down from 1.57 in 2005).60 interest-
ingly, these differences are not reflected in participation rates in social 
transfer programmes. as morissens and sainsbury show using data 
from the luxembourg income study in the mid-1990s, participation 
rates of migrant households in unemployment insurance are smaller 
than the ones of citizen (native-born) households.61 
not surprisingly then, considerable differences between citizens 
and migrants can be observed with regard to socially acceptable stand-
ards of living. in france, migrant households are 3.57 times more 
likely to have a household income below the poverty line than citizen 
households. moreover, in migrant households from an ethnic minor-
60 oecd (2008) international migration outlook, paris: oecd, 87. 
61 morissens, ann & sainsbury, diane (2005) ‘migrants’ social rights, ethnicity and 
Welfare regimes’, Journal of social policy 34(4), 637–660, 650. 
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ity group, the likelihood even increases to 5.40. similar observations 
can be made for Germany and Great Britain.62 among residents whose 
main income is a regular salary, the poverty rates are 2.09 times high-
er for migrant households in Great Britain, 2.88 times in france and 
4.32 times in Germany than for citizen households. among residents 
whose main income is transfers, the poverty rates are 2.56 times higher 
for migrant households in Great Britain, 3.43 times in france and 3.86 
times in Germany than for citizen households.63 
as a result, many migrant households are dependent on social as-
sistance.64 however, as figures 2 and 3 show, social assistance and 
minimum income protection have been considerably retrenched in 
recent years.65 figure 2 displays the average of yearly social assistance 
standard rates for a single adult below retirement age without children, 
for a lone parent with two children and a two-parent family with two 
children in the period 1990 to 2005 standardised for the development 
of wages. as can be seen, in all three countries, the social assistance 
standard rates have decreased by between 8 to 17 per cent in the period 
under consideration. figure 3 displays the average yearly minimum 
income protection for the same three type-cases. minimum income 
protection is the sum of social assistance standard rates, housing sup-
62 in Germany, migrant households are 3.75 times more likely to have a household income 
below the poverty line than citizen households. in Great Britain, migrant households 
from ethnic minority groups are 2.68 times more likely to have a household income 
below the poverty line than citizen households. morissens and sainsbury 2005, 644. 
63 morissens and sainsbury 2005, 648. 
64 in social assistance, the participation rate of migrant households is 1.61 times higher 
in Great Britain, 1.92 times in france and 2.48 times in Germany than among citizen 
households. in the case of migrant households from an ethnic minority group in 
france, the participation is 2.65 times higher than among citizen households. morissens 
and sainsbury 2005, 650. 
65 see also nelson, Kenneth (2007) ‘Universalism versus targeting: The Vulnerability of 
social insurance and means-tested minimum income protection in 18 countries, 
1990–2002’, international social security review 60(1), 33–58.
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plements, refundable tax credits and other benefits. in france and 
Great Britain, both minimum income protection and social assistance 
standard rates decreased, while in Germany, minimum income protec-
tion slightly rose. however, this rise is mostly due to the slow develop-
ment of wages.66
it is important to note that the correlation between the retrench-
ment of minimum income protection and increasing politicisation of 
migration policies does not tell us anything about causality. as argued 
by menz: “While xenophobic rhetoric often links migrants with abuses 
of welfare state services, cuts have not usually been strongly linked to 
implicitly racist discourse.”67 however, it would be premature to rule 
out a causal connection. in contemporary europe, reform justifications 
based on racist or xenophobic arguments are unlikely to convince the 
median voter. however, as shown above, people in Western europe 
consider immigrants to be less deserving than native-born residents. 
policy makers can win public support for welfare state retrenchment 
by framing issues in terms of deservingness of welfare beneficiaries.68 
for instance, in all countries of Western europe between 41.5 (italy) 
66 however, it should be noted that German labour market policies have undergone 
considerable change in recent years. most importantly, the long-term unemployed have 
lost their access to social insurance benefits and are now covered by means-tested social 
assistance, so-called unemployment benefit ii. These reforms can be expected to con-
siderably affect the economic well-being of immigrants. Kemmerling, achim & Bruttel, 
oliver (2006) ‘‘new politics’ in German labour market policy? The implications of 
the recent hartz reforms for the German Welfare state’, West european politics 29(1), 
90–112. seeleib-Kaiser, martin & fleckenstein, timo (2007) ‘discourse, learning and 
Welfare state change: The case of German labour market reforms’, social policy & 
administration 41(5), 427–448.
67 menz, Georg (2006) ‘Useful’ Gastarbeiter, burdensome asylum seekers, and the second 
wave of welfare retrenchment: exploring the nexus between migration and the welfare 
state, in craig a. parsons 6 timothy m. smeeding (eds.) immigration and the transfor-
mation of europe, cambridge ma: cambridge University press, 393–418, 396.
68 slothuus, rune (2007) ‘framing deservingness to Win support for Welfare state re-
trenchment’, scandinavian political studies 30(3), 323–344.
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and 65.8 per cent (Belgium) tend to agree with the statement “people 
from these minority groups abuse the system of social benefits.”69 
moreover, as shown by larsen, labour market reforms follow a 
certain pattern: societal groups exposed to the harshest policies tend 
to be those that are seen as least deserving of social support.70 from 
this point of view, it is not surprising that in periods of retrenchment 
means-tested benefits prove to be more vulnerable than social insur-
ance systems.71 While the former pay a disproportionate amount of 
benefits to migrants, who are considered to not deserving, the latter 
pay benefits mostly to citizens.
69 crepaz and damron 2009, 448.
70 larsen, christian albrekt (2008) ‘The political logic of labour market reforms and 
popular images of target Groups’, Journal of european social policy 18(1), 50–63.
71 nelson 2007.
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Figures 2 and 3: Development of social assistance and minimum income 
protection, 1990–2005 .
Notes: data taken from the social assistance and minimum income 
protection data-set. Values standardized (1990 = 100). Url: http://
www2.sofi.su.se/~kne/ (access 28.1.2009).
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conclusions
in this chapter, we argue that confronted with the challenges posed 
by migration, West european countries follow a three-pronged strat-
egy: they enact entry restrictions targeted to all third country nationals 
seeking permanent residence, with the exception of individuals who 
fall into categories protected by international treaties such as politi-
cal refugees and family reunification; they restrict asylum seekers’ ac-
cess to social benefits in order to separate ‘true’ from ‘bogus’ political 
refugees; and retrench those social protection schemes that provide a 
disproportionate amount of benefits to immigrants. 
We show that these strategies, while conforming to international 
principles and agreements, seek to retain the post-war social model, 
which reserved the bulk of social benefits for the national citizens. 
moreover, we demonstrate that governments pursue such policies to 
satisfy the latent preferences of voters, who see immigrants as not de-
serving to receive social benefits. 
The first part of the chapter retraces the links between nation, citi-
zenship and welfare benefits and shows that these links have been es-
sential in defining the first modern welfare benefits schemes. The sec-
ond part, which analyses the individuals’ attitudes towards different 
groups in need, shows that nationals of france, Germany and Great 
Britain strongly associate the immigrant status to non-deservingness 
of social benefits. in other words, we show that in the collective per-
ceptions of nationals of these countries, the idea on which welfare 
states was funded – to provide help for the working members of the 
nation (citizens) – continues to be strongly embedded. The third part 
of the chapter surveys the policies enacted with respect to immigration 
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rules and benefits for immigrants. it shows that all the countries under 
investigation follow roughly similar strategies of limiting the access 
of those third country nationals who ask for permanent residence, of 
reducing the asylum seekers’ welfare entitlements and of retrenching 
welfare benefit programmes whose beneficiaries are likely to be im-
migrants. 
By simultaneously highlighting the regulatory capacities of states 
to assert control over migration and the transnational restrictions that 
undermine some strategies, we strike a balance between the ‘trans-
nationalist’ and the ‘state-centric’ strands of the literature. We argue 
that transnational processes have removed some strategies of regula-
tion from the governmental toolkit. This, however, did not stop West 
european governments from developing new –more or less effective 
–strategies in order to restore their capacity to act in the area of migra-
tory policy. These policies are the answer of Western societies to the 
challenge posed by the immigration of third country nationals to their 
collective identity as welfare societies. 
part iii 
citizenship, nationalism and Welfare: 
in-depth single country cases 
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chapter 6
citizenship and Welfare in the  
norwegian nation state.  
The immigration challenge 
    
Grete Brochmann
The welfare state has been a central component in the nation build-
ing process in norway after World War ii. Through social rights the 
nationals were to be included in society and become full citizens of 
the modern nation state. The nation state, on the other hand, should 
be strengthened through the eradication of social injustice. The nor-
wegian welfare state has developed as a dialectical project, shaped by 
and giving shape to central societal forces –  first and foremost through 
the so-called class compromise,1 later the gender issue, and – after the 
beginning of the 1970s – the significant challenge of ethnic diversity. 
The national ideology production attached to the welfare state became 
both the means and the end: national cohesion was a precondition for 
the development of the welfare state project, but was also seen as a 
consequence – a continuous benefit of the expanding welfare regime. 
The welfare state has thus been seen as a vehicle for post-war so-
cietal integration in the country – as a powerful motor in the grand 
nation-building process that took place after the war devastations. 
The welfare state project implied much more “than a mere upgrading 
1 The incorporation of workers and peasants into the grand welfare project.
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of existing social policies”, in the words of Gösta esping-andersen2 
(1996:2). apart from economic redistribution, the welfare state was a 
moral construct, an entity for institutionalised solidarity, presenting a 
“ray of hope to those who were asked to sacrifice for the common good 
in the war effort”.3  This essentially political project was necessary as a 
fully developed citizenship was seen as a precondition for the stabilisa-
tion of the vulnerable post-war democracy.  in norway, as in the rest 
of scandinavia, the philosophy of the welfare state has to a large extent 
been based on a model of equality and harmony, incorporating con-
flicts and contradictions through the extension of rights to its citizens.
how do welfare states with such high ambitions and a strong sense 
of egalitarianism as the norwegian one cope with the pressures of im-
migration and the challenges to national unity presented by growing 
immigrant populations? There are two basic dimensions to this ques-
tion; one substantial and one ideological. The substantial one deals 
with the actual extension of welfare goods to newcomers – the willing-
ness and the capacity of the welfare state to include new residents as 
social citizens. The ideological one deals with the question as to whose 
welfare state we are talking about– the “we-issue” in welfare policy – 
and possible efforts to adjust the grand story about the nation. as usual 
there are connections between substance and ideology, but in this ar-
ticle i will pay most attention to the ideological dimension, including 
justification for policy making in the field of immigrant inclusion. 
i am interested in how the understanding of (post war) nation 
building and policy making through the welfare state have influenced 
2 esping-andersen, Gösta (1996) after the golden age? Welfare state dilemmas in a 
global economy’, in esping-andersen, Gösta (ed.) Welfare states in transition. national 
adaptations in Global economies, london: sage, 2.
3 ibid.
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and possibly collided with another ideology production – the one de-
veloped in the wake of “the new immigration” from the early 1970s 
onwards – the so-called multicultural integration . i am particularly in-
terested in how the strong tradition of social citizenship governance 
in norway has been reconciled with claims for liberality towards new 
cultural minorities. The role of research will be discussed specifically 
in this respect.
Unit of analysis
international citizenship discourse is currently deeply embedded in 
questions of how to delineate the unit of analysis. citizenship used to 
– as a matter of course – be placed solidly in the realm of the nation 
state. hannah arendt, among others, contended bluntly that a citizen 
“is by definition a citizen among citizens of a country among countries. 
his rights and duties must be defined and limited, not only by those of 
his fellow citizens, but also by the boundaries of a territory”.4 today in-
ternational migration, the building of transnational communities and 
the influence of international human rights have challenged this tak-
en-for- granted-status of the national character of citizenship. scholars 
are criticised for the continuous use of nation states as an instinctively 
natural unit of analysis in studies of immigration. The challengers, 
some of which are labelled post-nationalists, have, on the other hand, 
been criticised for being normative and for confusing ideal-types and 
realpolitik. i will let this, in many ways important dispute, rest in this 
4 referred to in Bosniak, linda (2000) ‘citizenship denationalized’, indiana journal of 
global legal studies, 7, 448.
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context. i find, along with many other scholars,5 that when the ques-
tions under scrutiny deal with the inclusion of newcomers, rights and 
duties, and day-to-day coping strategies of individuals and authorities, 
it is difficult to disregard the importance of nation states. political disa-
greement in this realm is still solidly embedded in national contexts, 
and national budgets are the target for claims. citizenship depends on 
boundaries that separate insiders from outsiders, and the importance 
of boundaries are particularly high in relation to social citizenship as 
it touches sensitive issues like material redistribution, and embod-
ies dilemmas of equity, justice and reciprocity.6 The modern welfare 
states are nevertheless influenced by other nation states in their policy 
making (both through learning and positioning), and not least, inter-
national human rights have increasingly premised principles of equal 
treatment and the extension of specific rights to non-citizens. The 
somewhat contentious term “welfare nationalism” is thus in one sense 
intrinsic to the welfare state as such, yet at the same time slightly out-
dated. for all that, norway is the unit of analysis in this article (by or-
der), although many of the observations are akin to traits in the fellow 
scandinavian countries,7  and occasionally also to advanced welfare 
states more in general. 
 
5 calhoun, craig (2007) nations matter. culture, history and the cosmopolitan dream, 
london: routledge; Joppke, christian (2003) ‘citizenship between de- and re-ethniciza-
tion (i), archives europeennes de sociologie, 44;  Benhabib, seyla (2002), ‘transforma-
tions of citizenship: The case of contemporary europe, Government and opposition, 37, 
439–465.
6 ferrera, maurizio (2005) The Boundaries of Welfare. european integration and the new 
spatial politics of protection, oxford: oxford University press.
7 hagelund, anniken and Brochmann, Grete (2009), ‘from rights to duties? Welfare and 
citizenship for immigrants and refugees in scandinavia’, in Koniordos, sokratis m./
Baert, patrick/procacci, Giovanna/ruzza, carlo (eds.) conflict, citizenship and civil 
society, london/new York: routledge.
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citizenship and the welfare state
immigration policy in welfare states is generally divided into two main 
spheres: an external sphere of admission (who is given the opportuni-
ty to enter the country), and an internal sphere of rights and integration 
policy (what terms entrants are offered – i.e. the degree of inclusiveness 
of citizenship). 
politically and legally, these spheres are usually treated separately. 
regulation of admission to a country is closely connected with the na-
tion-state’s historical right to control its territory, whereas civil, social, 
and political rights for aliens who settle in a country are closely linked 
to the country’s long-term general development as a rechtsstaat – a 
state ruled by law. modern welfare states have furthermore developed 
policies to promote integration – a genuine incorporation of aliens into 
the community beyond the granting of rights pure and simple. 
developments in the wake of the so-called “new immigration”8 
brought to light an extensive and complicated interplay between the 
two main spheres of immigration policy, in which the welfare state 
plays a prominent role. Both spheres are relevant within discourses of 
“welfare nationalism”. The control over (legal) access to the territory – 
and in welfare states, hereby social citizenship – has been motivated by 
the welfare state: due to the rights attached to legal residency, restric-
tions in access policy have been seen as pertinent. Within the inter-
nal sphere, on the other hand, the economic housekeeping has made 
governments keep a specific eye on possible disproportionate welfare 
consumption by newcomers, and political parties have periodically ap-
pealed to the public on this issue. 
8 i.e., from countries outside the organization for economic cooperation and develop-
ment (oecd) from the end of the 1960s onwards.
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Citizenship has developed into a comprehensive analytical approach 
touching various disciplines and fields of research; gender, civil soci-
ety, economy, human rights, law, sociology, political science and an-
thropology. much of the attention is probably due to a central societal 
tension in our times – the one between pluralism and equal rights: plu-
ralism through growing cultural complexity and equal rights through 
the historically generated polity in liberal democratic states. The dis-
cussions touch the duality of the citizenship: the formal and the sub-
stantial – the rules of the game and the basis for a good life. much of 
the citizenship-discourse deals with the preconditions for the creation 
of well functioning and just societies in general, and does not have im-
migration as a central dimension in the first place. multicultural issues 
have nevertheless cropped up over recent years, impelled by increasing 
immigration in most western societies. 
however, the concept of citizenship covers several phenomena, 
and is used in contradictory ways. in the traditional, t.h. marshall 
inspired approach, the concept is reserved for the rights-dimension; 
juridical commitments between the state and the individual,9 and the 
status of citizenship is usually attached to the nation state as a commu-
nity – a cultural and spiritual collective, with the state as the performer 
of common decisions. increasing multicultural immigration, followed 
by integration endeavours in the recipient  societies, however, has in-
cited an extension of the concept to include questions of identity and 
9 marshall, t.h. citizenship and social class and other essays, cambridge, 1950.
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belonging.10 These are important dimensions for any citizen, yet the 
themes have been actualised and contrasted through the inclusion of 
newcomers, not having had their basic socialisation within the ma-
jority society. With such an extended approach, a person’s citizenship 
may refer to three distinct phenomena: firstly, his or her status as a le-
gal member of the state, defined by a series of civil, political and social 
rights, matched by a relatively small number of duties, like the duty to 
abide by the law; to pay tax and –for men – to do military service. sec-
ondly, his or her identity as a member of one or more political commu-
nities. This type of identity is often depicted in contrast to other, more 
particular identities, such as class, ethnicity, religion, gender and pro-
fession. and thirdly, the pattern of participation and civic virtues, such 
as loyalty, independence, work ethic, tolerance, courage and vigour.11
rights and social cohesion
furthermore, citizenship deals with two entities – state and society – 
and within these two entities different dimensions predominate; the 
judicial and the societal12 respectively. The judicial dimension deals 
with the formal rights and duties attached to individual membership 
in a state, acquired through birthright or naturalisation. The rights 
shall apply to all citizens and should be the same for all citizens; they 
10 see Kymlicka, Will and norman, Wayne (eds.) (2000) citizenship in diverse societies, 
oxford; lister, ruth (1997) citizenship: feminist perspectives, new York; spinner-
halev, Jeff (1999) ‘cultural pluralism and partial citizenship’, in Joppke, christian and 
lukes, steven (eds.) multicultural questions, oxford University press; Geddes, andrew 
and favell, adrian (eds.) (1999) The political belonging: migrants and minorities in 
contemporary europe, aldershot. 
11 op cit Kymlicka, Will and norman, Wayne (eds.) (2000) citizenship in diverse socie-
ties. 
12 i will use this term “societal” here to distinguish this sphere from the narrower mar-
shallian “social citizenship”, which deals with the rights dimension attached to welfare 
provision.
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are based in law, and qualifying for citizenship means one has a claim 
to those rights. moreover, it is the state that has the responsibility to 
abide by these rules. on the other hand, the state is sovereign in as-
signing citizenship to foreigners, and in defining the criteria for natu-
ralisation through the democratic institutions.
The societal dimension of the citizenship institution is much less 
precise. it concerns being “part of society”, subjectively and objectively, 
and it has to do with the social content of the membership. This con-
tent can be defined in various ways, but mostly it relates to issues like 
identity, loyalty, belonging, trust and the possibility of participation. 
an ideal typical societal citizenship implies living by rules and laws, 
participation in civil society and in democratic processes, acceptance 
of others as well as a subjective feeling of belonging. Weak societal citi-
zenship on an individual or group level may imply segregation, mar-
ginalisation and exclusion.  
There are obvious connections between the rights-sphere and the 
identity-sphere, yet they are not unambiguous. some writers talk 
about the integrative function of rights.13 rights can engender partici-
pation, which again can stimulate integration or inclusion. The formal 
institutions constitute a frame for the envisioned collective of nations. 
rights are necessary but not sufficient conditions for a full societal citi-
zenship. in human relations – where the basis for the extended societal 
citizenship is formed – the legal status is rarely central. one may con-
sequently have societal citizenship without being naturalised, and on 
the other hand, one may also be a legal citizen without being a societal 
citizen. formal citizenship has historically been regarded as member-
13 marshall, Thomas h. (1965) class, citizenship and social development, new York; 
Kymlicka Will (1995) multicultural citizenship, oxford: clarendon press.
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ship in a nation state, and embodies as such an “us/them”- dimension. 
citizenship is thus simultaneously exclusive and inclusive, a fact that 
also applies to societal citizenship. in other words, access and no-ac-
cess, belonging and not-belonging, are mutually constituting. 
marshall’s famous three step model contains the most important 
substantial aspects of citizenship, yet the order of the steps does not 
necessarily follow marshall’s pattern in reality, as many rights in mod-
ern liberal democratic states are decoupled from formal citizenship. 
during the second half of the 20th century, social citizenship was be-
ing fulfilled prior to political citizenship in many liberal welfare states. 
a legally established immigrant in norway immediately has access to 
civil and social rights, but will not achieve full political rights until he 
or she is naturalised. This phenomenon has prompted the distinction 
between citizenship and denizenship in literature, in which denizen-
ship denotes social and civil citizenship without political citizenship.14 
The citizenship discourse is normative in its essence. The precondi-
tions for good and just societies, necessarily build on some precon-
ceived notions of the content of what is good and just. even though 
liberal democratic societies are undergoing significant general changes 
normatively speaking, multicultural immigration may have reinforced 
the anxiety in many places. multicultural societies epitomise compet-
ing sets of values, which again interplay with other value conflicts, ex-
isting independently of immigration. 
14 hammar, tomas (1990)  democracy and the nation state, aldershot: avebury.
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The logic of immigration policy in welfare states
norwegian post-war history can fruitfully be understood in terms of 
an expanding welfare state and the gradual increase in citizens’ and 
residents’ rights. income security has been a basic pillar in this story, 
both in the form of social assistance and as social insurance. norway, in 
line with denmark and sweden, go further than any other countries 
along this line, which really gains momentum in the 1950s and reaches 
its peak in the mid 1970s.15 The system, that was designed to constitute 
a basic security net for all citizens from cradle to grave, has been gener-
ous – and herby also costly.16 
The universalistically-oriented norwegian welfare state with its tra-
dition for regulation, its large public sector, economic transfers to weak 
groups as well as the principle of equal treatment has in practice had 
two central implications in relation to the “new immigration”. firstly, 
controlling inflow into the country –the first gateway to the territory – 
has been seen as a prerequisite for maintaining the specificities of the 
system. The fundamentally generous welfare model, which embraces 
everyone but which can be undermined by excessive burdens, neces-
sitates selection and delimitation in relation to potential new members 
from elsewhere. This logic has been reemphasised along with the ex-
pansion of rights in the country. The more rights, the more caution. 
and caution has been manifested both in the form of blunt border con-
15 Korpi, Walter and palme, Joachim (1998) The paradox of redistribution and strategies 
of equality: welfare state institutions, inequality and poverty in the western countries, 
stockholm, referred in hansen, lars-erik (2001) Jämlikhet och valfrihet. en studie av 
den svenska invandrarpolitikens framväxt, stockholm: almqvist och Wiksell interna-
tional, 101.
16 lundberg, Urban and amark, Klas (2001) ‘social rights and social security: The swed-
ish welfare state 1900–2000’, scandinavian Journal of history, 26, 157–176.
203
citizenship and Welfare in the norWeGian nation state
trols and besides, increasingly via differentiation through categories.17 
different kinds of immigrants (distinguished partly by the motives for 
immigration), are given different residence status, which again activate 
different sets of rights, and hereby also the scope of expenditure. a 
fine-masked status hierarchy, reflected in the foreign laws, has been 
developed over the years in this respect. The juxtaposition of access 
control and extension of rights coins the basic tension between gener-
ous welfare structures and “unwanted immigration”; the welfare state 
is to be universal, yet only within its restrictively defined confines. 
secondly, the emphasis on equality, state management and welfare 
rights – have had a logical corollary in the integration policy. if this 
policy framework is to be maintained, new, legally accepted inhabit-
ants must be made a part of it. Good welfare states do not tolerate sub-
stantial elements of persons or groups that fall by the wayside, disturb 
the regulated world of work and burden social budgets. This reflects 
a basic recognition that a society cannot function smoothly if a large 
section of the population is marginalised and socially excluded. Be-
sides, organised labour has played a central part in politics, and has to a 
larger extent than elsewhere contributed to a regulated labour market. 
This again has had specific consequences for advanced welfare states, 
where an orderly labour regime is one of the basic preconditions for 
the operation and maintenance of the system. The labour Union has 
opposed any generation of a reserve army of cheap labour – inclined to 
undermine achieved standards in working life. consequently, there are 
important societal considerations behind the norwegian integration 
policies in addition to the liberal humanitarian principles.
17 tjelmeland, hallvard and Brochmann, Grete (2003) i globaliseringens tid 1940–2000, 
in Knut Kjeldstadli, Knut (ed.) norsk innvandringshistorie bd iii, oslo: pax.
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The immigration policy signals a duality here: many immigrants 
(apart from labour in demand) are not desired at the outset, but if they 
manage to enter anyway, they must be incorporated in some way or 
other. and The Good state must go further: it must lay the basis for a 
positive attitude in the population for the integration project to suc-
ceed. it must in other words create support for this policy, financed as 
it is through the income tax system.
The whole idea of the welfare state is economic redistribution in 
order to diminish social inequality, and in norway – as in the rest of 
scandinavia –the understanding is that economic equality has been 
a prerequisite for equal social citizenship.18 The idea has been that a 
high degree of social and economic equality is necessary for the crea-
tion of social cohesion and stability. for people to feel part of soci-
ety, access to goods that are highly valued in that society is necessary. 
This implies that integration and equality are linked together. Thus, a 
good society has been one with relatively small economic differences, 
achieved through economic redistribution, and social protection for 
all. This fully accomplished social citizenship was believed to engen-
der freedom for the individuals; freedom from dependence on kinfolk, 
freedom from anxiety related to the provision of basic needs and free-
dom to develop and prosper through education and good health.  The 
grand task of the welfare state has been to create the preconditions for 
this kind of citizenship.  This norwegian “good society” thus ideally 
harmonies two dimensions often seen as conflicting in society – free-
dom and equality.
18 Goul andersen, Jorgen (2003) over-danmark og under-danmark? Ulighed, vel-
fardsstat og politisk medborgerskab, arhus: aarhus universitetsforlag.
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The norwegian welfare system was formally intended to include 
newcomers as well. The systemic logic called for equal extension of 
the goods ingrained in the welfare societies. and besides, the humani-
tarian ideals spelt out in terms of international solidarity in the post 
war period, supported this policy ideologically. This support was later 
reinforced through the political radicalisation of the 1960s and 1970s.
in earlier times, receiving countries could wait for things to settle 
down over time. newcomers slowly adapted to the new conditions, at 
least after two or three generations, and in due course came to be much 
like the new home country’s population and changeable way of living, 
as the Us has been famous for. newcomers adjusted themselves and 
were included slowly through work, social processes and the gravita-
tion of time. immigrants were in fact gradually assimilated this way 
also in norway, or were actively pressured into adopting the major-
ity’s way of life, as we have seen was the case with some of the nordic 
minorities.19
But the modern welfare state has brought urgency into the system. 
These kinds of states do not have time to let history do the job, as in 
the meantime, the risk is that minorities and individual immigrants 
remain outside the labour market, suffer deprivation, possibly lead-
ing to negative “social inheritance” rather than mobility over genera-
tions. nor has there been political legitimacy to pressure anyone too 
strongly to become like the majority over night, due to the post war hu-
man rights legislation. This opportunity structure results from a com-
bination of systemic characteristics of the welfare state and the kind 
19 Kjeldstadli, Knut (2003) norsk innvandringshistorie bd. 1–3, oslo: pax.
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of immigrants having found their way to the region after the 1970s.20 
This is nevertheless why inclusion needs to be managed, at the same 
time giving leeway for internationally established human rights, which 
include the right for minority members to retain their distinctive cul-
tural characteristics. 
“a completed welfare mission”
Throughout the period since the initiation of the new immigration to 
norway, national politics have been strongly occupied on the social 
citizenship side. in accordance with the integration ideology, prevalent 
after the early 1970s, newcomers should be able to choose whether they 
would adapt culturally in the receiving society, or whether they would 
want to sustain their cultural background and original feelings of be-
longing. in the cultural sphere, the immigrants were to be “let alone” 
(sometimes lukewarmly backed up through some public funding for 
“their own” cultural activities etc.), whereas in the sphere of welfare 
they were targets for more or less extensive (although not necessar-
ily successful) efforts to be economically included. having the whole 
welfare state national integration project in mind – with its occasion-
ally quite paternalistic intervention in people’s private lives21 –this 
non-interference-policy in relation to immigrants’ way of life is highly 
interesting. it was as if the immigrants were not targets for the other-
20 here some would argue that there is a causal relationship between the two, i.e. that ad-
vanced welfare states serve as “magnets” for people who could claim rights according to 
international conventions. This contentious and complex relationship will not be dealt 
with here.
21 This was even more so in sweden, where the myrdal couple played a strategic role in the 
initiation of the idea of social engineering  –formulated during the 1930s, yet still very 
influential after WWii. in norway this was, to the same effect, labelled “upbringing of 
the people” (“folkeoppdragelse”). 
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wise ongoing and continuous nationhood formation. it was simply not 
vitalised or made relevant in relation to immigrants. This is interesting 
even more so, as the new immigration challenge was presented for the 
norwegian society at the time when the welfare state project hit the 
highest point in terms of the ideological production of its success – 
when the mission was seen as complete, so to speak. The norwegian 
historian francis sejersted labels the beginning of the 1970s as the 
“happy moment of the welfare state”.22 others have also emphasised 
the ethos of fulfilment in the cultural sphere: the end of the 1960s was 
seen as “the natural point of completion” for the grand pedagogical 
nation-building project the school system had taken on since 1814, 
when the country obtained its constitution.23 
how can we explain this puzzling coincidence – that the new im-
migrants were intentionally included in the nation state on the social 
side, but not on the nationhood side? Was it because it was conceived 
as “mission impossible”, i.e. the newcomers were culturally too strange 
and alienated to warrant the effort? or was it not necessary, seen from 
the point of view of the nation-builders of the welfare state, as their 
political legitimacy was secured through the traditional norwegian 
ethnos?    
i do believe that a combination of three factors contribute to ex-
plaining the phenomenon; the historical context, lack of political ex-
perience and the “relative autonomy of ideology”. 
The historical context has been spelt out: the norwegian post war 
welfare state formation was read as a (still in the late 1960s) more or 
22 sejersted, francis (2005) sosialdemokratiets tidsalder. norge og sverige i det 20. arhun-
dre, oslo: pax.
23 lorentzen, svein (2005) Ja, vi elsker. skolebokene som nasjonsbyggere 1814–2000, oslo: 
abstrakt forlag, 227.
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less unchallenged success story and the concomitant nation building 
project was seen as fulfilled, i.e. the nation was basically understood as 
one (if one were to disregard the sami population, which was in fact of-
ten the case). When the new immigrants started coming, the state had 
hardly any experience in handling this unfamiliar phenomenon, so it 
was intrinsic to approach the newcomers with familiar means – i.e. 
welfare state mechanisms. including people through equal treatment, 
social rights and if necessary, targeted policy making, had become the 
standard tools in norwegian welfare governance.24 on the nation side, 
we are left with very little documentation. There is a striking lack of 
reflection in public documents from this initial period as to what is 
later on often labelled “challenges to the nation”. The reason for this 
lacuna is most likely the fact that it was not seen as a challenge at the 
time. The self confidence of the welfare state nation was, as we have 
seen, rather high, and besides, nobody knew that immigration was go-
ing to escalate significantly in the decades to come. in tune with the 
general confidence in governance, the state obviously believed that im-
migration could lend itself to regulation. This was clearly manifested 
in 1975 when the so-called “immigration stop” was implemented; ac-
tually a policy introduced as a one year temporary regulation, believed 
to be a sufficient time period to get the immigration housekeeping “in 
order”.25 
24 for a more extensive documentation of this initial period in modern immigration 
policy making in norway see tjelmeland, hallvard and Brochmann, Grete (2003), i 
globaliseringens tid 1940–2000…, as well as Brochmann, Grete and Kjeldstadli, Knut 
(2008) a history of immigration. The case of norway 900–2000, oslo: Universitetsforla-
get.  
25 Brochmann, Grete (2003) i globaliseringen tid 1940–2000, del ii, in Kjeldstadli, Knut 
(ed.) norsk innvandringshistorie, Bd iii, oslo: pax, 137–387. 
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so, if the nation was not challenged, and the welfare state (let alone 
the labour market) took care of the newcomers, new ways of thinking 
could have some leeway. in the beginning of the 1970s new ideologies 
had already made their impact on norwegian politics: as in most West 
european countries, a grand wave of political radicalisation swept over 
society, and affected most corners of politics. most relevant in this con-
text is the eradication of traditional thinking in relation to minorities. 
The importance of ethnic roots, authentic culture and self determina-
tion constituted the core of the new philosophy. The integration ide-
ology that came out of this climate was developed at an early stage 
particularly in sweden – being a pioneer country (together with the 
netherlands) among welfare states. norway, being a latecomer, when 
compared to sweden in relation to multicultural immigration, simply 
imported most of the ideology from its neighbour. in these formative 
years, it was actually possible to trace formulations word by word from 
swedish documents on immigrant integration. The credo to the effect 
that minorities and immigrants should be able to choose to sustain 
their “own culture” while at the same time having equal access to the 
goods of the majority society, was simply adopted as a package from 
outside. according to a central official in the state administration at 
the time, “we knew all the correct words, yet we had no idea how to 
implement them”.26 
migration research in the initial phase
The radical rhetoric within the state administration was, on the oth-
er hand, a constant frustration to the embryonic migration research 
26 for further reading and documentation, see Brochmann ibid.
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community. as elsewhere in europe, the 1970s was a period of heavy 
radical transformation of academia. politics and academics were in 
fact nearly inseparable. academic disciplinary claims were made on 
banners at 1st of may demonstrations, and lectures were boycotted due 
to political content. as elsewhere, the state was one of the main targets 
for the left, generally speaking. to “disclose the class character of the 
state” was a recurring concern in most political contexts. so when the 
norwegian state at an early stage had appropriated the radical plat-
form, the left was stalemated. or rather, their major task was to unveil 
the state project at any point; to show that the rhetoric was hollow and 
that the public was cheated.
The social sciences in norway were completely dominated by the 
political left in the early years of the new immigration, and migra-
tion researchers were no exception. in fact a number of the central 
researchers during the initial years were also the most prominent po-
litical activists in the public. some of them also functioned as advisors 
for immigrants trying to find their way in the norwegian system. 
Both the state and the researchers on migration shared a strong 
problem-focus in relation to immigrants in the 1970s. analyses of the 
causes of the problems however, split the different actors. Basically the 
foreign worker phenomenon revealed, according to the researchers, 
comprehensive and serious weaknesses within norwegian society, and 
the authorities were accused of not having control of the development. 
The “foreign worker problem”, as it was frequently labelled in the me-
dia, was not real as such, only a symptom of already existing flaws in 
society; the left was against international labour migration in the first 
place. migration was a symptom of exploitation across borders within 
a worldwide capitalist system. The radical researchers were caught in 
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an important dilemma between long-term, collective internationalis-
tic interests and short-term, individual welfare concerns. in the long 
term the left worked for the abolishment of the need to migrate in the 
first place, yet in the short term it was necessary to assist the newcom-
ers very concretely in the norwegian context. it made no sense for ali 
or Kumar to be refused at the border in the name of internationalism. 
likewise, within the norwegian system, the left did the splits: sys-
tem-criticism went hand in hand with fine-tuned local advisory work 
among immigrants, and even cooperation with the authorities to im-
prove the situation for newcomers. The political process leading up to 
the introduction of the immigration stop in 1975 was a marker in the 
field. The left was split in the middle: some groups were in favour of the 
stop, as international migration was a capitalist evil, and other groups 
were against, basically because the stop was viewed to be designed in 
a discriminatory way. migration researchers were caught in the same 
quagmire.
during the 1970s – the first years of formulating an integration 
policy in norway – migration researchers had an interesting position, 
which may even constitute a national peculiarity. on the one hand 
these intellectuals raised harsh criticism against the state, which had 
stolen their rhetoric and therefore needed to be spotted time and again 
when theory and practice went apart. The language of accusation has 
hardly ever been stronger in the norwegian public than during these 
formative years. on the other hand, the very same intellectuals were 
extensively used as advisors and consultants by the very same state, 
when it came to concrete policies. There was a strong need in the state 
for knowledge about the newcomers and their backgrounds and cul-
tures, and the most resourceful persons in this respect were the in-
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tellectuals/activists from the left. “our knowledge and expertise was 
expeditiously put into use”, as one of the researchers sums up many 
years later.27 
some of the explanation for this at the time was the high concentra-
tion of politically radical individuals also within the state administra-
tion, who sympathised with the researchers on the outside, and who 
wanted to stretch the good intentions of the policy as far as possible. 
But the close relation between research and the state goes beyond this 
explanation on the individual level. norwegian social scientists have 
been called “organic intellectuals” in a Gramscian sense28, as they to a 
large extent have the welfare state as a major frame of reference, even 
when the analysis is very critical to state policies. The state is conceived 
as both the problem and the solution. on the other hand, there is also 
tolerance within the state system for some kind of criticism from the 
research community. The corporate state needs independent research-
ers to legitimise activities. 
The punch of the political left ebbed out during the first part of the 
1980s. social scientists continued, however, to be recruited from the 
left, or increasingly from the broad social democratic circuit.29 criti-
cism against the state turned milder at least in form. This tendency was, 
however, less prominent among migration researchers than among the 
rest of the research community. The language of strong criticism con-
tinued to be part of the dominant rhetoric in this group, and increas-
ingly phrased through accusations of institutional racism or discrimi-
27 Korbøl, aud (1988) Kulturforskjeller og gjensidig forståelse, oslo: institutt for sam-
funnsforskning.
28 antonio Gramsci saw such intellectuals as intrinsically interwoven with the authorities 
– as “experts in legitimizing power-relations”, paxlex 1979, bd. 3. oslo: pax forlag. 
29 This is actually still the case, at least among sociologists. see sosiolognytt (2009) “ni av 
ti sosiologer stemmer rødt”, vol 34, no 1, 16–18.
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nation. on the external side equally harsh criticism was raised against 
the state’s access policies. as the inflow of asylum seekers increased 
significantly in the late 1980s, the alleged inhumanly low acceptance 
rate was at the forefront. 
migration discussions in the 1990s
entering the 1990s the research discourse becomes more complicated. 
The social scientist ottar Brox wrote a book in 1991 called “i am not a 
racist, but....” (author’s translation),30 which played an important role 
in public and academic discussions.31 Brox actually placed “political 
correctness” as a theme on the agenda by inventing a new concept; 
“The moral-championship” (moralmesterskapet). one of his major 
points was that researchers in the field of migration strived to appear 
as morally good as possible rather than doing a good analytical job. – 
research became a presentation of self in the public and in the peer 
group of academics. researchers figured prominently among what he 
called the “moral elite”. one of Brox’ theses was that substantial self-
censorship was prevalent among researchers (and politicians) in fear 
of being called “racist”, with the result that debates were choked or nev-
er raised. even substantial facts generated through research were held 
back as they could empower racism in the public, according to Brox. 
furthermore, Brox analysed how the “moral left” and the increasingly 
forceful populist right reinforced each other’s positions. The book was 
naturally very controversial among his colleagues at the time.
30 Brox, ottar (1991) ”Jeg er ikke rasist, men...” hvordan far vi vare meninger om innvan-
drere og innvandring, oslo: Gyldendal. 
31 as it is beyond the scope of this article to review more comprehensively the norwegian 
discourse on migration, i will instead pick a few pieces that turned out to be significant 
and emblematic in the scholarly and public debate.
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in the political sphere the same year another intervention played 
into this schism: a leading labour politician, rune Gerhardsen,32 ac-
cused the norwegian establishment, absolutely including his own 
party, of being kind to a fault, or mistakenly nice to weak groups – im-
migrants in particular. Gerhardsen called this phenomenon Snillisme 
(literally kind-ism) – making an -ism out of being excessively under-
standing and accommodating.33  The snillisme-concept was originally 
coined by the leader of the populist rightist party (frp), which natu-
rally made the intervention even more dubious. The message of Ger-
hardsen was that the norwegian welfare state had to shape up its poli-
cies towards weak groups through making demands on the individuals 
instead of patronising them and clientelising them through generous 
public benefits.
among the researchers, ottar Brox was four years later followed 
by another book in the same spirit: Unni Wikan’s Towards a new Nor-
wegian underclass34(author’s translation). Wikan’s book was a bonfire 
of accusations against The Good state in line with Gerhardsen’s argu-
ment. But Wikan is a professor of anthropology, an expert on islam, 
with extensive fieldwork among muslim women in different parts of 
the world. Wikan’s arguments had much more impact, and as a mat-
ter of fact she was in the traditional norwegian manner invited into 
the very same state she was accusing of violating human rights (e.g. 
not protecting muslim women from their own community), and used 
as an advisor in reform efforts. she was also extensively used in tel-
32 rune Gerhardsen is, on top of everything, the son of the national political icon, einar 
Gerhardsen – labour party prime minister (1945–1951, 1955–1963, 1963–1965).
33 hagelund, anniken (2003) The importance of Being decent. political discourse on im-
migration in norway 1970–2002, oslo: Unipax.
34 Wikan, Unni (1995) mot en ny norsk underklasse. innvandrere, kultur og integrasjon, 
oslo: Gyldendal.
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evision programmes and in various types of meetings. Wikan’s book 
was even more controversial than the one of ottar Brox, and she was 
in many ways seen to incarnate the malevolence of majority thinking 
for the traditionally-oriented migration researchers as well as for parts 
of the immigrant community. Both Wikan and Brox were openly and 
more subtly rendered suspect in terms of their motives. accusations 
of racism (intentionally or non-intentionally) were lurking below the 
surface.
so after the entry into the field of new voices opposed to the tradi-
tional research approach to immigration and welfare, and opposed to 
the policy line of “excessive tolerance” and snillisme, it is possible to 
trace two clearly opposing lines in migration research. Yet the fault 
line was not very clear, and the premises for disagreement not always 
commensurable. 
entering a new century
since the late 1990s the migration discourse in norway has become 
steadily more complex. The amount of interventions has increased 
tremendously, and many new voices – among them gradually more 
with immigrant backgrounds – have entered the public scene. race, 
religion and gender have become the major themes of public conflict 
and dispute, yet the welfare state dimension still constitutes a central 
backdrop in the field.
marianne Gullestad (deceased in 2008) – an anthropologist who 
had earlier concentrated mostly on studies of norwegian everyday 
life – came out with a book in 2001on “The Norwegianness seen with 
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new eyes” (author’s translation)35, with extensive examples of racial-
ised ways of thinking among research colleagues – and in the public, 
generally speaking. This book, which also became very controversial, 
was very much in line with the (maybe former) mainstream mode of 
thinking from the 1970s and the 1980s. Thus, when Gullestad in au-
gust 2002 wrote a piece in one of the major newspapers accusing a 
young outgoing, transcending woman of pakistani background – Sha-
bana Rehman36 – for hindering more timid women from coming out, a 
full storm followed. Gullestad, also accusing rehman for not challeng-
ing the prejudices of the majority, made a series of people (researchers 
and others) jump on her. The emotional punch in this debate indicated 
a long accumulated aggression in parts of the public against people 
who tended to defend immigrants against the ways of the majority.
Unni Wikan’s second book on this issue which was published in 
2002, with the expressive title Generous Betrayal37, is a more advanced 
follow up of the book from 1995, but the theme is the same – the fail-
ure of the generous state to accommodate basic problems in multicul-
tural societies. in the following i will use this book as a catalyst, trying 
35 Gullestad, marianne (2002) det norske sett med nye oyne, oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
36 shabana rehman had become a phenomenon in norway. Being the first female stand-
up comedian, let alone as a first generation immigrant from a muslim family, she has 
provoked heavy turmoil first and foremost within immigrant circles. she was labelled 
“societal enemy number one” by a (labour party) politician – originally from pakistan –
in 2001. on the other hand, she has largely been embraced by the norwegian establish-
ment for being brave, funny and as an example for the new culturally hybrid generation 
of norwegians. in some ways shabana rehman represents the “oppressed”, at the same 
time criticising the cultural patterns the snillists serve to protect.
37 Wikan, Unni (2002) Generous Betrayal. politics of culture in the new europe, chicago: 
University of chicago press. 
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to delineate where the research front(s) are located today, and where 
conceptual fallacies and shortcomings can be identified.38
at a superficial level, there seems to be a dividing line in the research 
community between the ones who emphasise individual rights and the 
ones who accentuate cultural rights or group rights. sketchily we may 
say that the ones who stress group rights have the tendency to belong 
in the traditional research group, favouring a high degree of toleration 
towards the multicultural project – the belief that various “cultures” 
may thrive in parallel in society. on paper, this has been the official 
line of thinking in norwegian politics, supported by and partly formed 
by the research community from an early stage. in the 1990s the state 
proclaimed itself to be “multicultural”.39 The evil in this perspective is 
the lack of toleration in the majority, discrimination and racism. 
The ones who emphasise individual rights have traditionally been 
few, yet this group is increasing – and Unni Wikan with her book Gen-
erous Betrayal takes a long step forward in the direction of disregard-
ing group rights. The evil in this perspective is oppression of individu-
als by “culture” – norms and rules by the group they belong to. 
Through pointing to the fact that the human rights conventions 
comprise competing imperatives, Unni Wikan touches the nerve cen-
tre of the multicultural debate: the relationship between collective and 
individual rights may constitute unsolvable dilemmas with essential 
consequences for human beings. she does not however recommend 
that group rights should be abolished, only modified so that the states 
38 in doing this, i am indebted to my colleague tordis Borchgrevink, with whom i 
have written a more comprehensive review of this book: Borchgrevink, tordis and 
Brochmann, Grete (2003) ‘det generöse forräderi – individer og kollektiver under 
velferdsstatens vinger’, tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning, nr. 1 vol 44, 85–97.
39 stortingsmelding nr. 17. (1996–97) om det flerkulturelle norge. Kommunal og arbeids-
departementet.
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are less obliged to keep promises in relation to cultural protection. 
Wikan uses liah Greenfeld to support this view: “plainly put, cultural 
validation and empowerment of ethnic identity and ethnic diversity 
endangers liberal democracy.” 40 it is seen as abuse if groups exploit a 
liberal system to use force against their own members. Wikan’s master 
point is that the norwegian state serves this opportunity on a silver 
tray, through its excessive tolerance of cultural difference. Wikan illus-
trates this snillism with a citation: “Why is it, that if a norwegian won’t 
let his daughter marry an immigrant, it’s called racism, but if an immi-
grant won’t let his daughter marry a norwegian it’s called culture?”41. 
The main thesis of the book is that the fear of being called racist has 
made the state and its officials pursue a wrong policy – a policy that 
closes its eyes towards the oppression of particularly women and chil-
dren in the name of culture. 
Unni Wikan sees the state as an under-utilised tool for individual 
liberation from oppressing cultures . The traditionalists on the other 
hand regard the state as a vehicle for oppression through the majority’s 
intrinsic despise for foreigners; criticizing minorities’ culture under-
communicates similar traits in the midst of the majority and gener-
ates racism. consequently, the one position stays quiet on the other’s 
central theme.
This leaves us with a rather confused situation when it comes to rac-
ism, which in fact may be illustrative for the state of affairs: supporting 
collective rights can lead into racism in the sense that people are seen 
as functions of their ethnicity. Yet defence of individual rights quali-
fies for suspicion of the same. to quote from a public meeting in oslo: 
40 Wikan, Unni (2002), 161.
41 ibid. 103.
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“in norway we have two different kinds of racists; the racists and the 
anti-racists”.42
The overwhelming target of Wikan’s analysis is nevertheless the 
mistakenly kind welfare state. “The country is rich, indeed so rich that 
handing out social welfare becomes an easy way  – a cheap way – out of 
a difficult human situation”.43 and she claims that the Government has 
consciously avoided knowledge of the miserable situation among im-
migrant communities to escape accusations. as she calls this a cover-
up, we get the impression that the state is in fact not kind to a fault, but 
rather is up to “conscious suppression”. in whose interest this suppres-
sion is pursued remains unclear.
Wikan’s position, with a tentative reestablishment of individual 
rights as the guiding principle in the multicultural debate, falls short 
when it comes to the major dilemma: the authorities are bound by 
international conventions to pursue both individual rights and group 
rights at the same time: equal treatment as an individual and differ-
ential treatment through minority protection. The trick for all liberal 
democratic states is to avoid betrayal of the individual, whilst simul-
taneously being generous when it comes to religious rights; rights to 
equal treatment as to access to social benefits, and the right to marry 
out of free will.
What is striking in Wikan’s position is the centrality of the welfare 
state as a major premise – regardless. Wikan’s target for criticism is 
definitely the welfare state, yet she is still bound by the logic of the very 
same state: the alternative to what she labels “welfare colonisation” is 
not clear, yet it is adjacent to interpret it as an alternative welfare state, 
42 Thanks to tordis Borchgrevink for these points.
43 Wikan ibid, 63.
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as she wants targeted policies in favour of minority women and chil-
dren. The majority society and the state institutions could have been a 
gift to oppressed minority women and children, yet the state does not 
dare to use its power to this effect. it is possible to trace arguments in 
the text for both a strong (alternative) state and for one that is more 
laissez faire . she is in favour of the “social contract” implied by the tra-
ditional norwegian welfare state, but it has the wrong content. 
The most “holy cow”44 of the north?
The centrality of the welfare state in norway – both in terms of consti-
tuting nationhood and as a vehicle for economic redistribution – has 
by and large been beyond dispute. according to a norwegian expres-
sion, everyone potentially has a straw into the state budget, i.e. every-
one has claims on the state, and it is the state that gets the blame when 
things go wrong. even with the new immigration from the 1970s, wel-
fare governance long dominated both discourse and policy making. 
The state is supposed to protect immigrants from pressure within the 
majority to assimilate, yet when the state succeeds in this endeavour 
it receives accusations of failed integration.45 The ideology of integra-
tion implies a good portion of liberality towards minorities in their en-
deavour to maintain their original culture. at the same time the state 
should be aware that difference does not become a barrier when rights 
and benefits are allocated. and individuals may ask the state for pro-
tection against his or her own minority: circumcision and forced mar-
44 This label was used by christopher arzrouni in Weekendavisen 13.–19. april 2007.
45 in norway there have been examples of students with immigrant background intend-
ing to sue the state for their deficient skills in the norwegian language. Their claim is 
that being placed in special classes for students with limited knowledge of norwegian 
(targeted policy) has retarded their learning process.  
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riages have made minority women seek refuge in majority institutions. 
nonetheless many modern welfare states have felt the limitations of 
governance in this field. The states are torn by dilemmas and compet-
ing moral imperatives, and have neither the answers nor the means to 
handle many of the problems. today the state has to balance national 
values, human rights and realpolitik in complicated ways and where 
the field does not lend itself easily to policy making in the first place. 
The governing state is conceived as both the problem and the solution 
in relation to multicultural society. however, even though the welfare 
state as the centre of gravitation has not waned during the last decade, 
its role and function have become more controversial.
not only is the welfare state as such a central premise for how re-
searchers phrase analytical problems, there is also a tendency that the 
way in which the state tends to approach problems, also colour prob-
lem-analysis, and even suggestions for change, when such are asked 
for, from the research arena:46 despite the politically radical tradi-
tions in norwegian social science, there is a very high degree of trust 
in relation to the political institutions and the capacity of the state to 
solve problems. optimism as to what can be achieved through public 
measures still prevails. public measures are really the master recipe for 
problem solving, and researchers contribute to the continuity of this 
tradition by suggesting new measures when improvements are needed. 
during the last few years both the public and the scholarly dis-
course on immigration matters have become more multifaceted. 
46 one of the reasons for this is the substantial proportion of commissioned research in 
norway, a fact which also underlines the point in terms of the close connections to the 
state in norwegian social science. problem-solving has been the prime issue, whereas 
university research on immigration has been scarce until recently. This is, however, 
rapidly changing.
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among researchers, criticism of what is often labelled “methodologi-
cal nationalism” has been raised, which is also related to immigration 
research in norway,47 and more studies from a transnational perspec-
tive have been developed.48 at the same time new twists to welfare state 
approaches have also materialised. concern over the development of 
parallel societies in the wake of increased immigration and inadequate 
integration has in turn induced awareness of the basic cohesive forces 
in society; the preconditions upon which liberal democratic welfare 
states rest in order to ensure the continued welfare for all its members. 
although being a more general concern in today’s europe, this issue 
has crystallised through multicultural immigration. how are states to 
forge a new or renewed societal foundation to uphold treasured liberal 
democratic values, universal welfare and possibly a sense of bounded 
belonging, in a context increasingly featured by people’s diverse loyal-
ties and lifestyle preferences? states have a limited number of policy 
options to deal with this complicated and nebulous challenge. The sub-
stance is indistinct in itself, and besides, both goal and instruments are 
politically highly controversial.
nevertheless, the new explicit focus on social cohesion – which in 
norway has manifested itself in a recent White paper,49 and in discus-
sions related to the new citizenship law of 2005 – reflects that the 
nationhood issue has caught up with the multicultural discourse. The 
most concrete and material result of this development so far is prob-
47 andersson, mette (2007) ‘migrasjon som utfordring: Kritikk av metodologisk nasjonal-
isme’, in fuglerud, Øyvind and eriksen, t.h. (eds.) Grenser for kultur? perspektiver fra 
norsk minoritetsforskning, 1–22.
48 see e.g. Gran, espen (2008) imagining the transnational lives of iraqi Kurds, depart-
ment of sociology and human Geography, University of oslo; and fuglerud, Øyvind 
(ed.) (2004), andre bilder av “de andre”: transnasjonale liv i norge. oslo: pax.
49 Kommunal- og regionaldepartementet: stortingsmelding nr. 49 (2003–2004), mangfold 
gjennom inkludering og deltakelse.
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ably the reinforcement of the “single citizenship”-policy. The Govern-
ment (Bondevik ii at that time), chose – disregarding the majority of 
the preparatory expert committee who wanted dual citizenship – to 
conserve the single citizenship institute; strengthen the enforcement of 
it; and besides, introduce requirements as to language skills for natu-
ralisation.50
The message in the White paper, and implicitly in the new citizen-
ship law, can be read as a realisation to the effect that society needs 
some basic common values beyond the rule of law, in order to sustain 
the fundamental solidarity upon which the welfare state rests, i.e. to 
reproduce the historically established societal formation of the nor-
wegian nation state. This interpretation is in line with the philosopher 
michael Walzer’s basic assertion: A political community has the right 
to preserve the integrity of its form of life.51 in the norwegian case, the 
welfare state has clearly been a central part of the country’s form of 
life since 1945. The question is thus, whether national cohesion or a 
common sense of nationhood has been and is a precondition for the 
sustenance of this form of life in norway. This is obviously an incon-
clusive issue. different people will contend both premises and analy-
sis. The major challenge for governance is notwithstanding to uphold 
some social cohesion while at the same time remain flexible enough to 
incessantly secure the inclusion of newcomers. 
50 required skill: all applicants must have followed an authorised 300 hour language 
course, including 50 hours information about norwegian society.
51 Walzer, michael (1983) spheres of justice, new York: new Basic Books.
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Welfare nationalism?
as stated in the introductory part of this article, a “nationalist” ap-
proach to welfare can mean different things. politically, there is no 
doubt that the welfare state has played a prominent role as a prem-
ise for policy-making in the field of immigration. The modern re-
strictive regulation of access to the country has to a large extent been 
formed with welfare parameters in mind. residency in norway has 
been viewed as a scarce good, not least due to the income security 
apparatus. on the other hand, the intrinsic relation between labour 
market and welfare arrangements has spurred a generous approach of 
equal treatment when people have (legally) managed to settle. legal 
residency has released access to welfare rights by and large at a par 
with nationals. The state has also been a powerful actor implementing 
programmes directed at newcomers in a variety of policy fields. one 
may thus say that the norwegian authorities have acted in a “national-
ist” or exclusive sense in their (intended) access control, yet in a “non-
nationalist” and inclusive sense in their internal welfare instruments. 
This is however, an approach in line with most modern welfare states, 
although with variation in degree both as to external restrictions as 
well as to internal generosity. There is also variation among welfare 
states concerning the degree to which the means of the welfare state 
have been conducive when it comes to processes of societal inclusion; 
whether the tools have worked in practice. There is however no sim-
ple way of measuring success in this respect, and the norwegian au-
thorities are confronted with more or less the same set of problems as 
other comparable welfare states: a slow pace of inclusion in the labour 
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market, overrepresentation in the social security statistics as well as 
frequently reported instances of ethnic discrimination. 
on the ideological side, the state has needed to mix two discourses 
along with increasing immigration, one pluralist integrationist strand 
and one unifying national strand. This mixed mission has not been 
treated very explicitly in norway, or the two strands have scarcely been 
addressed in combination. The discomfort associated with addressing 
the diffuse nation sphere is probably the reason why politicians and 
academics concentrated for a long time on newcomers’ rights and on 
equal treatment. nationhood issues have been virtually absent in pub-
lic documents on integration.
today the state is under crossfire, and immigration issues figure 
prominently in public discussions on snillism or welfare erosion re-
spectively. 40 years of mileage in the experiment of integration policies 
have left both the state and (parts of) the research community with 
more questions marks than answers as to successful strategies. The 
weaknesses and contradictions of the multicultural approach, and not 
least the unsatisfactory results in terms of equal performance of im-
migrants in society, despite the well-intended welfare state, may have 
brought nationhood into light: the subtle, yet probably still forceful 
“thickness” of norwegian self conception. if perceptions prevail to the 
effect that it is difficult to become norwegian by learning, the welfare 
avenue may become reinforced through the back door: if the norwe-
gian society falls short in including newcomers, at least their material 
standards need to be safeguarded.
Yet the limits to a “nationalist” approach to immigration are even 
more striking in today’s norway than what was the case during the 
1970s. even though the nation state is still a vital entity, it also needs 
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to preserve its economic and societal capabilities to take care of its 
steadily more diverse population in conducive ways; the necessity to 
be open and internationalised is becoming even more pertinent. This 
has been strikingly demonstrated also from the position of the welfare 
state since the beginning of the new millenium. after 25 years with a 
focus on immigrants as “burdens on welfare”, the tidal change, in terms 
of demography and labour demand, have made immigrants emerge as 
the potential saviours of current and future welfare production. 
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chapter 7 
in the Borderland of the Welfare state:
danish integration policy – the early 
Years 1967–1983
heidi Vad Jønsson
introduction
danish integration policy is a hot topic on the political agenda both 
nationally and to some extent also internationally. The election cam-
paign in 2001 gave denmark an international reputation for being a 
somewhat alien hostile country and the muhammad-drawings and the 
following ‘cartoon-crisis’ added fuel to the flames. on the other hand, 
denmark is also known for its universal welfare state – a society with 
high equality between classes and genders, where social mobility and 
advance is relatively easy, with a well functioning democracy etc. im-
migrants have been pointed out as both a future problem for the welfare 
state and as a solution to future problems regarding scarcity of labour 
in certain areas of the labour market.1 This chapter does not look at 
the future, but  at the past and the development of danish integration 
policy. how did the welfare state react to the encounter with the first 
1 see for example Velfærdskommissionen (2006) fremtidens Velfærd  Vores Valg co-
penhagen, finansministeriet
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labour-immigrants (guest-workers)? What was / were the problem(s) 
and what solutions were proposed? These questions are analysed and 
discussed in this chapter, which focuses on the development of danish 
integration policy through the eyes of the welfare state.
since integration and immigration research, as well as welfare-state 
research, are rapidly expanding research-fields, obtaining an overview 
over these research-fields would require more than a chapter in itself. 
two overviews in regard to welfare-state research are however deliv-
ered by søren Kolstrup2 and Klaus petersen3 respectively, who both 
give an introduction to and an overview of welfare-state research in 
denmark in the period before and after the second World War. in 
a recent publication on the history of the danish welfare state, Jørn 
henrik petersen and Klaus petersen presents an updated overview of 
the state of the art research within this field.4 When it comes to inte-
gration and immigration research, flemming mikkelsen’s publication 
from 20085 examines and presents national as well as international 
research within this field. furthermore, two publications comprising 
Immigrant Research in Denmark6 volumes i and ii from 19837 and 
Integration-research in Denmark from 1980 to 20028 present ongoing 
2 Kolstrup, søren(1994) ’forskning i velfærdsstatens rødder forskningsstrategier, resul-
tater, huller’. historisk tidsskrift, volume 16(3). 
3 petersen, Klaus (1997)’fra ekspansion til krise – Udforskning af velfærdsstatens ud-
vikling efter 1945’. historisk tidsskrift, volume 16 (6,2). 
4 see petersen, Jørn henrik, Klaus petersen & niels finn christiansen (eds.) (2010) 
dansk Velfærdshistorie. frem mod socialhjælpsstaten, odense, syddansk Universitets-
forlag. 
5 mikkelsen, flemming (2008) indvandring og integration, akademisk forlag
6 all danish publications are translated into english by the author. for full bibliographic 
references, see the footnotes. 
7 statens samfundsvidenskabelige forskningsråd (1983) indvandrerforskning i danmark. 
Volume i and ii, copenhagen, sfi. 
8 ministeriet for flygtninge, indvandrere og integration (2002) integrationsforskning i 
danmark 1980–2002. copenhagen. 
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research and stress where further research is needed. in general, inte-
gration and immigration research has been carried out by social and 
political scientists as well as economists. historians have also given 
this field quite some attention during the last decade. in denmark a 
number of phd dissertations have been written on the political dis-
courses on immigrants.9 Bent Jensen has delivered a thorough analysis 
of the news chapter debate on immigrants in his publication: The ‘for-
eigners’ in Danish newspaper debates: from the 1870s to the 1990s10 and 
in regard to unemployment, immigrants take up quite a few pages in 
his recent publication Features of the newspaper debate on unemployed. 
11 furthermore, Bent Østergaard has published two somewhat popular 
scientific histories on immigrants in denmark.12
an important point, when taking a look at the great amount of re-
search publications, is that the welfare state seems to have been left 
out or only taken in marginally, especially in the historical analyses. 
Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to include the welfare state as an 
important actor and analyse how the system reacted in the 1960s when 
the guest-workers were imported and in the 1970s when (some of) the 
guest-workers became permanent immigrants.
9 see for example Jørgensen, lars (2006) hvad sagde vi … om ”de andre”? den 
udlændingepolitiske debat i folketinget 1961–1999. rUc and lærke K. holm (2006) 
folketinget og Udlændingepolitikken –diskurser om naturaliserede, indvandrere og 
flygtninge 1973–2002. amid.  
10 Jensen, Bent (2000) de fremmede i dansk avisdebat: fra 1870’erne til 1990’erne. spek-
trum. 
11 Jensen, Bent (2008) træk af avisdebatten om de arbejdsløse. fra 1950’erne til 1990’erne, 
odense, syddansk Universitetsforlag. 
12 see Østergaard, Bent (1983) indvandrernes danmarkshistorie, Gad, and Bent Øster-
gaard (2007) indvandrerne i danmarks historie kultur- og religionsmøder, syddansk 
Universitetsforlag. 
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Theories on integration – integration theories
The concept: ‘integration’ has at least three meanings in the danish 
language. first it defines the process of integrating foreigners into the 
danish society; secondly, it is the means to reach the goal of integra-
tion, and thirdly it is the goal in itself.13 This means that integration 
policy and discussions related to this policy field are often quite dif-
fuse. it is not unusual to observe a mix of immigration policy (mean-
ing entrance-policy) and integration policy (addressed to the foreign-
ers, who are actually in the country on a more or less permanent basis), 
partly because these two policy fields were interwoven in the debates 
of the 1980s and 1990s, and partly because the number of foreigners, 
who sought asylum in denmark, rose rapidly from 1984. Thus, the 
amount of foreigners was in itself of importance for the framing of 
danish integration policy. in this article, the concept: ‘integration’ is an 
analytical terminology referring to the policies addressed to or aimed 
at foreigners in general and the foreigners labelled ‘guest-workers’ or 
‘foreign-workers’ in particular. 
today’s integration policy is however not merely a question of who 
the political initiatives are aimed at. rather, as peter seeberg points 
out, danish integration policy can be defined as a dynamic between 
creating equality and equal opportunities on the one hand, and respect 
for and acceptance of cultural, ethnic and religious differences on the 
other. in regard to the ‘multicultural’ aspect, this is only valid and ac-
cepted by the majority as long as the cultural aspects do not stand in 
contrast to the “legal foundation of society”.14 The effects of this un-
13 seeberg, peter (2006)’indvandrere, integration og velfærdsstatens fremtid?’, in petersen, 
Jørn henrik og petersen, Klaus (eds) 13 løsninger for den danske velfærdsstat, 
syddansk Universitetsforlag, 101.
14 seeberg, peter (2006), 102–3
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derstanding and definition of integration (policy) is that the state and 
society in general are attempting to provide the frames for equal op-
portunities for social mobilisation and social advance. in return, the 
immigrants are expected to participate actively in society, and espe-
cially on the labour-market. as implied in the above listed question, 
this article will primarily focus on the welfare state and the policies 
addressed at immigrants in times of ‘economic boom and recession’. 
an important perspective to take into consideration in the analysis 
is then, whether the initiatives and policies directed towards immi-
grants were in principle different from the general development in the 
welfare state? and furthermore how integration policy was defined in 
the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s; was the aim to create equal oppor-
tunities and what were the problems and solutions when discussing 
guest-worker policy? 
This approach means that to some extent the question of how to 
define integration policy is a question for the empirical data. an ana-
lytical distinction often used in integration research is assimilation – 
integration – multiculturalism.15 This differentiation is usable to some 
extent and especially for contemporary and comparative analyses. on 
the other hand, integration seems to be defined through what it is not: 
if you do not have an assimilation-policy or a multicultural policy to-
wards immigrants, then the label is integration. and thus we are back 
where we started with a rather vague definition of the concept. in this 
chapter integration policy is therefore defined as listed above: (welfare) 
policies addressed at foreigners. 
15 Jørgensen, lars (2006). 
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This definition does, however, also give a rather diffuse picture of 
what integration-policy is. even though the aim is to recognise the 
early steps in the creation of the policy, it is necessary to know what to 
be looking for. in this respect, charlotte hamburgers article: ‘assimila-
tion as a fundamental trait in danish immigrant-policy’16 gives a pre-
liminary overview of the central concepts from a social scientist’s point 
of view. in regard to the concept of assimilation, hamburger states that 
in a meeting between two cultures, assimilation means complete as-
sumption of the ‘majority-culture’ and abandonment of immigrants’ 
own culture; immigrants are assimilated and are expected to abandon 
their cultural heritage and take over the culture of their ‘new country’. 
The model for this type of policy is listed in the following figure, where 
a equals the majority-culture and B equals immigrants’ culture. c is 
the societal structure of culture a. The affect of assimilation is that im-
migrants completely take over the majority-culture, a, and the societal 
structure c.
Figure 1 Assimilation policy
a + c + B    a + c   –B
in regard to integration policy, the model is somewhat different as the 
aim of integration in ha1mburger’s definition is to create a ‘multi-
cultural society’. in this (pluralistic) integration, immigrants and the 
16 The following passage is based on: hamburger, charlotte (1990) ‘assimilation som et 
grundtræk i dansk indvandrerpolitik’, politica volume  22(3). 
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majority-population alike are expected to adapt their different cultures 
to each other and create a new, common societal framework.
Figure 2: Integration policy
a + c + B    a + c + B
When working on policies it is important to keep in mind that these 
figures are not used in order to identify the effects, but rather to ana-
lyse the aim and principles of the policies and place these within the 
modelled framework. 
even though these figures and definitions of assimilation and inte-
gration are usable analytically, it is necessary to use them with quite 
some caution in the period before the mid 1980s. to use a contem-
porary definition of integration on the past and at a time where the 
concept did not have the same meaning17 is quite problematic, as the 
result could very easily be an anachronistic analysis. Therefore these 
definitions of assimilation and pluralistic integration are used to iden-
tify the principles of the early policy build-up combined with a herme-
neutic approach, letting the definitions of the past define the policies. 
an important point in this regard is whether the policies are addressed 
at the individual level (which hamburger places within the assimila-
tory model) or at a collective, ethnic group-level placing the initia-
17 The concept of integration was used in combination with countries’ integration in the 
eU, Un etc. and not as a national policy addressed at immigrants. source: dansk sprog-
nævn. 
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tives within the ‘integration model’ –and furthermore, if new societal 
structures can be observed in this connection as an effect of the policy.
a few comments on the methodology and empirical data
even though this chapter uses a broad definition of ‘integration poli-
cy’ in the early phase, it is however as mentioned above, necessary to 
know what to look for and where to look. in this connection, the focus 
is on system integration meaning that the legislations and institutional 
recommendations are the primary empirical data. System integration 
includes the welfare state’s formal framework (for example legisla-
tions on discrimination, voting rights etc.) and in this perspective, 
the normative principles concerning immigrants’ inclusion or exclu-
sion in society are at the centre of attention. Social integration studies 
concentrate on immigrants’ ‘lived’ citizenship, integration in society, 
implementation of the system integration etc. and primarily focus on 
whether immigrants are in fact included as proscribed by the system 
through legislations. as stressed above, this chapter is primarily a sys-
tem integration study and for this reason, the focus is on identifying 
what the system saw as problems, the solutions suggested and the nor-
mative principles behind this. 
two important tools are used in the empirical analysis including the 
concepts of margizen, denizen and citizen. The first concept, margizen, 
includes people who are excluded from social benefits and / or have 
temporary residence permits. Denizen refers to people with full or al-
most full social rights, but no or limited political rights and permanent 
residence permits. Citizen refers to people with full political and social 
rights (state citizens), who are at the normative level fully included 
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and / or integrated in society.18 This definition of groups of people in 
society is used in this chapter to analyse the ideas and normative devel-
opment from guest-worker policy to immigrant-policy in the earliest 
period (from 1967 to the mid 1970s). 
secondly, the concepts of inclusion or exclusion, with regard to so-
cial rights, are used in order to identify the ideas and goals of the poli-
cies. Whether the aim of the policy was to include immigrants in soci-
ety, on what premises and to what extent are but a few of the questions 
connected to these two terms. The welfare state history has to a great 
extent been a history of ‘social inclusion’19 between top and bottom, 
between classes, between genders etc. in this chapter the connection 
between social inclusion / exclusion and ethnicity is at the centre of at-
tention. 
The data for this chapter primarily consists of commission and work 
group reports as well as legislative data. furthermore, the political de-
bates, and to some extent also the public debate, are taken into consid-
eration in the analysis of the system’s reaction.
The following passages present the building-blocks, counting firstly 
the legislative heritage from the pre- and inter-war-period, and sec-
ondly a few comments on social inclusion in the welfare state.
The building blocks: the legislative legacy
The danish borders had been crossed by labour-immigrants before the 
guest-workers from the 1960s. at the beginning of the 20th century 
18 soysal, Yasemin nuhoglu (1994) limits of citizenship. migrants and postnational 
membership in europe. The University of chicago press, 136ff. 
19 This is generally defined as social integration, however in this chapter social integration 
is linked to the process of integrating immigrants and the concept is therefore replaced 
by social inclusion when it comes to the welfare state.
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from 1893 to 1929, polish land-workers came to the danish islands 
lolland and falster to take up seasonal employment in the agricul-
tural production of sugar beet. The employment ‘service’ was carried 
through by German hiring-offices, and a Germen Aufseher (attendant) 
accompanied the girls on their arrival to denmark.20 The poles were 
lodged in barracks which were soon named ‘pole-Barracks’, and the 
quality of the buildings were, as the name implies, quite poor. 
in order to protect these workers from exploitation the danish par-
liament, Rigsdagen, passed an act in 1908 on the use of foreign work-
ers in certain productions including supervision carried out by the 
public authorities.21 The act was pushed forward by a somewhat col-
ourful group consisting of the social democrats, catholic priests and 
agricultural organisations.22 The social democrat, peter sabroe, fought 
the battle in parliament in alliance with catholic priests and the lo-
cal social democratic party in holbæk. The employers’ organisations 
were also in favour of some state regulation as it was crucial to secure 
ongoing recruitment to the sugar-beet fields. This could be endangered 
by the fact that the poor conditions for the polish girls had made it dif-
ficult to hire seasonal workers from poland.23 The result of this alliance 
was the so-called ‘pole-act’, which contained minimum standards in 
regard to the housing conditions; it was for example stressed that the 
employers were obligated to ensure that the poles had dry and healthy 
20 Østergaard, Bent (1983) indvandrernes danmarks….  
21 lov vedrørende anvendelse af udenlandske arbejdere til arbejde i visse Virksomheder 
samt det offentliges tilsyn dermed. lov nr. 229, 21. august, 1908. 
22 Østergaard, Bent (1983), 196. see also larsen, Kennet (2004) den stereotype polske 
arbejder – en undersøgelse af den benyttede stereotypi omhandlende den polske arbe-
jder i den offentlige debat i danmark i forbindelse med ”polakloven” af 1908 og polens 
medlemskab af den europæiske Union,  Unpublished master thesis, department of 
history, University of southern denmark. 
23 nellemann, Georg (1973) ’fremmedarbejderpolitik i danmark 1973 og 1908’ny politik, 
volume 4(12). 
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accommodation24. The supervision was to be carried out by the local 
police and the health inspector. 
This was the first time the work and living conditions for foreign 
workers were regulated by the state. it happened at a time when pub-
lic supervision and regulation of citizens’ living-conditions developed 
and expanded rapidly. The so-called child-act of 1905 contained 
a public supervision as did the ‘factory-act’ from 1873 which was 
changed several times in the years after. The fact that the state initi-
ated regulation and superintended different aspects of peoples’ lives 
such as work, child-care etc. was not surprising at this time. however, 
the sorting out of immigrant workers as a group in need of particu-
lar governmental and administrative regulation is to some extent a 
new development. even though this aspect is to be seen as part of the 
general development in the ‘birth’ of the welfare state (these were the 
childhood-years), it is still of great significance that the state admin-
istration, the government and the political actors in general saw it as 
their duty to ensure freedom and basic work- and living-conditions in 
accordance with the standard of the time.
The recession in the late 1920s resulted in the introduction of work 
permits from 1926.25 all foreigners who wanted to take up work in 
denmark were from then on obligated to have a work permit. The 
reason was of course to protect the domestic labour-market through 
limiting and controlling the number of foreign-workers in denmark. 
in the post-war years the number of foreign-workers to some extent 
followed the ups and downs of the economic trends. in 1954 a nor-
24 lov vedrørende anvendelse af udenlandske arbejdere til arbejde i visse Virksomheder 
samt det offentliges tilsyn dermed. lov nr. 229, 21. august, 1908. § 10, 1. 
25 lov om midlertidig Ændring af og tillæg til lov af 15. maj 1875 om tilsyn med frem-
mede og rejsende m.m., lov nr. 80, 31. marts 1926.
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dic agreement on establishing a ‘common nordic labour-market’ was 
carried out and all nordic citizens were allowed to take up work in 
scandinavia on equal terms. The effect of this introduction was among 
others that i.e. swedes did not need a work permit in order to take up 
employment in denmark and vice versa. nordic citizens were from 
then on put on the same footing and scandinavian citizens were no 
longer regarded as guest-workers by the system. 
inclusion and exclusion for better or worse. The welfare state 
and nation building
The welfare state has played a significant role in the nation-building 
process and to a great extent this has reflected on danish nationalism 
being significantly orientated towards the welfare state.26 The social 
democratic principle programme ‘danmark for folket’ [denmark for 
the people] from 1934 is an example of the people-party ideology – an 
ideology stressing that the nation and the social benefits were for the 
entire people and not bound to certain classes. The influence of the so-
cial democratic party is discussed in the danish welfare state research, 
where it is occasionally emphasised that the social democrats did not 
build the welfare state on their own. it was in the late 19th and early 
20th century built up through a coalition between the liberals and the 
conservatives by an alliance with the farmers. The social democrats 
did however come to play an increasingly important role in the inter-
war period, where K.K. steincke’s social reform from 1933 represents 
a new era in the welfare-state history by the introduction of a ‘principle 
26 christiansen, niels finn & Klaus petersen, Klaus (2001) ’The dynamics of social soli-
darity. The danish Welfare state 1900 – 2000’, scandinavian Journal of history, Volume 
26 (3). 
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of rights’, which in regard to most social benefits released the existing 
system of ‘administrative estimations’, loss of political rights etc.27 fur-
thermore, with the principle programme ‘fremtidens danmark’ [The 
future denmark / The denmark of tomorrow] from 1946 the social 
democratic party became a key-actor in the build-up of the danish 
welfare state –especially in the post-war years.28
This aim of including the entire people and not only securing social 
rights for the working class is an important part of the history of the 
danish social democracy and of the danish welfare state. to provide a 
high degree of social security for all people through a universal princi-
ple is one of the most important features of the welfare state. ‘do your 
duty – claim your right’ is a social democratic ‘slogan’ which to a great 
extent tells what the basic principle of the danish welfare state is all 
about –participate in the labour market for a high degree of social and 
economic security. This principle demands for a high degree of social 
cohesion where those on the labour market are willing to provide for 
those, who are temporarily or permanently outside (for example the 
elderly). The danish welfare state is based on the principles of univer-
salism and solidarity between classes and generations.29 it is charac-
terised by a fine meshed net of social and economic security, and ‘the 
27 for further information on steincke’s social reform, see christensen, Jacob (1998) K.K. 
steincke. christian ejlers
28 christiansen, niels finn & petersen, Klaus (2004) ‘Velfærd med vilje – men hvis?’ in 
ploug, niels/ henriksen, ingrid/Kærgård, niels (eds) den danske velfærdsstats historie. 
sfi. 
29 for a series of articles on the normative principles of the danish welfare state, see 
petersen, Jørn henrik, petersen, Klaus & petersen, lis holm (2007) 13 værdier bag den 
danske velfærdsstat. syddansk Universitetsforlag. 
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distinctiveness of the danish welfare society30 is that we together bear 
the responsibility for each other and especially for the weakest groups 
and those who have special problems’.31 The keywords of the danish 
welfare state are equality, social cohesion, solidarity, universalism and 
social security. These principles are key items in the danish welfare 
state and in the current and historical development of the danish na-
tion. What is interesting here is how the welfare state –based on these 
principles which had been developed during the 20th century and 
were expanding in the 1960s – reacted, when new groups of people 
came to denmark to substitute danish workers at a time of scarcity of 
labour, and later on took permanent residence in denmark. But before 
examining this aspect, let us first take a brief look at the lopsidedness 
of social inclusion.
‘if you are not with – you are against us?’ –dealing with the 
outsiders
many descriptions of the universal welfare state model are positive 
histories of social inclusion – how the standard of living became in-
creasingly better for the poorest people and people at the bottom of 
society; how the welfare state enabled social advancement, social se-
curity for all of us etc. it is however important to ask the question: 
are there no negative effects of social inclusion? some people are not 
easily included into society; they stand out –break the social norms of 
30 in denmark there are often no strict distinctions between the terms ‘state’ and ‘soci-
ety’ and the concepts are often used synonymously. a larger research project on the 
contextual conceptual history of the welfare state is currently being carried out at the 
centre for Welfare state research, University of southern denmark by professor Klaus 
petersen and professor Jørn henrik petersen.
31 Velfærdskommissionen,(2006), 15.  
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society. The balance between providing social security and ensuring 
cohesion in society on the one hand, and avoiding the creation of a 
paternalistic state on the other, is the welfare state’s Janus-face. When 
working on immigrants and the welfare state’s reaction, it is important 
to take into consideration how the state has dealt with ‘the others’ in 
the years before the 1960s. in this connection, the assimilation of chil-
dren from Greenland is an example of a social project gone wrong. The 
children were placed in danish families for approximately one year 
and were then sent back to Greenland. The idea was that the ‘danifica-
tion’ of these children would create a spillover effect and the danish 
norms, values and ideas would change the population in Greenland 
and make them more danish.32 These attempts at changing the Green-
landic population’s moral were carried out in the 1950s33 and the expe-
riences from this social project might have some influence on the way 
the welfare state institutions reacted and created policies addressed at 
immigrants a decade later.  even if the empirical data does not provide 
any direct references to this project, it is however still important to be 
aware of the historical legacy counting both the legislative heritage and 
the experiences from earlier times when dealing with foreigners and 
groups of ‘others’.
Guest-worker policy: avoiding exploitation 1967–1973
during the 1960s, denmark initiated a labour-import from european 
countries (for example Great Britain) and countries in the periphery of 
(the former Yugoslavia) and outside europe (turkey). The people who 
32 for an analysis of the effects of this social project, see Bryld, trine (1998) i den bedste 
mening. København. 
33 The period of normalisation and standardisation in danish welfare-state history. 
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came to denmark were male industrial workers with no education, 
entering the country in order to meet the labour shortage at a time of 
very low unemployment rate in denmark.34 
The elkær-hansen commission
as an effect of the labour-import, the number of guest-workers from 
non-nordic and non-european countries rose. This was especially the 
case in 1969–1970 as table 1 illustrates. 
 
34 Jønsson, heidi Vad & petersen, Klaus (2010) ’danmark, den nationale velfærdsstat 
møder verden’, in Brochmann, Grete & hagelund, anniken (eds) Velferdens grenser, 
Universitetsforlaget.   
Table 1: Number of foreigners with work permit in Denmark by January 
1st 1959–1970 .
source: elkær-hansen, niels (1971)  Betænkning om udenlandske arbejderes forhold i Dan-
mark: afgivet af det af arbejdsministeriet den 17 . juni 1969 nedsatte udvalg, København, 18.
243
in the Borderland of the Welfare state
looking at the nationalities of the foreign-workers, the Germans 
accounted for 22% of the total number, whereas Britons made up 11%. 
The number of Yugoslavians and turks increased from 8% to 16% dur-
ing 1969 – a number which was rapidly increasing. in total the es-
timated number of guest-workers in denmark in october 1970 was 
approximately 35.000, equal to almost 2% of the total number of wage 
earners in denmark.35 
on the basis of the increase in the number of immigrant-workers 
in the late 1960s and the expectance of a future increase, the so-called 
elkær-hansen commission was appointed in 1969. The remit of the 
commission was formulated by the minister of employment in June 
1969 as follows;
‘Quite recently the number of foreign workers in denmark has in-
creased. They take employment in jobs which cannot be filled by dan-
ish workers and thus their presence is expedient. The entrance of for-
eign workers has, however, lead to certain problems. many have taken 
residence and jobs here unaware of the existing rules; foreign workers 
have in many cases been exploited at the danish labour-market and 
the housing market. [...] for this reason the Government has decided 
to appoint a committee which is to consider foreign workers’ condi-
tions in denmark.’36  
The commission was firstly to consider how to control the access to 
denmark for guest-workers and in this connection include the swed-
ish model as a possible solution. secondly, the commission was to 
shed light upon the social problems related to guest-workers, meaning 
how their social conditions were in denmark, and furthermore give 
35 elkær-hansen, niels (1971), 20.
36 elkær-hansen, niels (1971), 5. 
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recommendations as to improving these conditions. in turn, this two-
fold remit concerned both the question of how to control the guest-
workers’ entrance to the country and how to ensure acceptable living-
conditions for those who were already here. Thus it was implied that 
the welfare state was obligated to take care of the guest-workers and to 
ensure that they were not exploited by the employers. 
The members of the commission were appointed by the government 
with prefect niels elkær-hansen as head of the commission. The dan-
ish lo appointed two members; among others the head of the lo, 
Thomas nielsen, who was replaced by secretary inga olsen in de-
cember 1969. The danish employers’ association had two members: 
director arne lund and head of office Bent Jensen. The members 
from the ministry of employment were per Kerstein and erik Wing-
søe (head of office), the ministry of housing had one member, Jo-
hannes Brigsted, the ministry of Justice two members, niels larsen 
and ole stevns, who was chief superintendent, the social ministry 
had one member, fanny hartmann and the ministry of foreign affairs 
had one member, erik Krig-meyer.37 The members of the commission 
were representatives from both labour and employer organisations as 
well as the relevant ministries; a traditional composition incorporating 
interest-organisations from both sides and Government officials.
When looking at the composition of the commission it is notewor-
thy that the representatives from the labour-market organisations were 
somewhat prominent people (for example arne lund who was direc-
tor of the danish employers organisations da). This implies that the 
guest-worker question was linked to the labour-market and that it was 
37 elkær-hansen, niels (1971).
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of great importance for the organisations. The unions represented by 
the lo were quite sceptical towards the import of labour, whereas the 
employers had argued heavily for it during the boom of the 1960s. 
When it was decided to import labour from other countries it became 
important for the unions and the lo to organise the guest-workers 
and to ensure good and equal working-conditions for them. The For-
eign Worker Magazine38 which was published from 1971 to 1977 is an 
example of how the trade-unions attempted to organise the guest-
workers and expressed solidarity with all working-class people.39 
The conclusions from the commission illustrate a significant trait in 
regard to guest-workers. This was not only a question of supplying the 
labour market with labour and regulating this through work permits 
– it was also a question of how to ensure acceptable living conditions 
for those foreigners, who had already come to denmark. The conclu-
sions with regard to foreigners’ social-, health-, living-conditions etc. 
were that they had the same rights, to a great extent, as danish state 
citizens. it was, however, difficult for immigrants (guest-workers) to 
obtain suitable housing; partly because denmark did not have a large-
scale social housing ‘programme’ at this time, and partly because of 
the general housing shortage at this period of time.40 The commission’s 
suggestion was to earmark municipal apartments for immigrants – a 
suggestion which was carried through in 1970.41 This is an example of 
how the commission regarded immigrants as having special problems 
or difficulties even though they had the same social rights, to a great 
38 fremmedarbejderbladet.
39 Jønsson, heidi Vad & petersen, Klaus (2010). 
40 Jensen, Bent (2000) de fremmede i dansk avisdebat: fra 1870’erne til 1990’erne, spek-
trum, 420. 
41 elkær-hansen (1971), 29ff. 
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extent, as ‘native danes’. another example of this focus on immigrants’ 
social problems is the question of nutrition and health. The commis-
sion pointed out that immigrants, especially from turkey, suffered 
from malnutrition.42 The solution suggested was to have the danish 
national council for domestic science make information-material on 
grocery-shopping, easy cooking etc. This recommendation was also 
followed.43 These and other recommendations indicated that even 
though the ‘guest-workers’ enjoyed almost the same social rights as 
the rest of the population, there were certain problems and difficul-
ties for this group. These difficulties were to be solved by the danish 
welfare state through the existing system and institutions. in 1971 a 
new position was put up in the ministry of social affairs: a so-called 
foreign-worker consultant service. This was also one of the recom-
mendations made by the commission.  Karen andersen was appointed 
to the position and she played a significant role with regard to foreign-
ers and the welfare state in the following years. she was among other 
things part of the ‘alien act committee’ which created the foundation 
for the new alien act from 1983.44 from the early 1970s, the social 
ministry played the role as coordinating institution with regard to the 
guest-workers. This was evident when the social ministry appointed 
a workgroup in april 1973, which was to evaluate the initiatives car-
ried through on the basis of the recommendations given by the elkær-
hansen committee.
as in 1908 this perspective included the housing conditions and 
medical and health conditions, but the field had also expanded as edu-
42 elkær-hansen (1971), 33. 
43 Betænkning om udenlandske arbejderes sociale og samfundsmæssige tilpasning her i 
landet. Betænkning nr. 761, 1975. 
44 see the following passage on the new alien act in the 1980s.
247
in the Borderland of the Welfare state
cational initiatives regarding language teaching and leisure-time ac-
tivities for the foreign workers were also included in the commission 
report.45 These aspects were to some extent also part of the 1908-leg-
islation, however the danish welfare state had expanded especially in 
the after-war-years, and this expansion reflected upon the establish-
ment of danish ‘integration policy’ in the early phase. 
The initiatives suggested in the late 1960s and early 1970s were to 
some extent a product of the general development of the danish wel-
fare state: to provide equal rights, equal opportunities etc. for the entire 
population. The heritage from the early 20th century was however also 
of indirect significance; the ‘building blocks’ chosen in 1908 and 1926 
constituted an institutional framework which was further developed 
in the post-war years.
immigrant policy: partial inclusion and societal adjustment 
1973–1983
The guest-worker import came to an end with the first oil-crisis in 
1973. already in 1970 a so-called ‘small immigrant stop’ had been es-
tablished as the employment minister had initiated an administrative 
stop for the issuance of new work permits.46 When the oil-crisis and 
the following recession hit denmark during 1973, the employment 
minister issued a total stop for the issuance of new work permits – the 
‘immigrant stop’ had come to stay. This however did not effectively 
hinder immigration to denmark as family reunifications contributed 
45 elkær-hansen, niels (1971), 20.
46 Jønsson, heidi Vad & petersen, Klaus (2010). 
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to continuous immigration.47 from the 1980s a large scale refugee-
immigration caused an implicit defeasance of the immigration-stop. 
during the 1970s the guest-workers were to a great extent af-
fected by the recession; they were hit by unemployment as was the 
majority-population. The unemployment rate was however higher for 
immigrants than for the rest of the population and unemployment 
among immigrants became a part of the public and political debate 
in the 1970s.48 a public debate on the guest-workers’ social situation 
occurred in the danish newspapers where liberal and conservative 
newspapers stressed the need for integration due to the deficit in the 
balance of payment. The logic behind this connection was that the 
foreign-workers were in denmark in order to make money which was 
sent back to the family in the home-country. in order to prevent this 
‘flight of capital’ it was necessary to ‘integrate’ the foreign workers and 
their families.49 another point in the debate was however, that many 
single male foreign-workers had returned (repatriated), however this 
repatriation was equalised by the family-reunifications as the same 
number of women and children had entered denmark. The point was 
that immigrant women from non-western countries had a lower rate 
of employment than the ‘danish women’; immigrant-women were not 
contributing and participating on the labour-market to the same ex-
tent as ‘majority-women’50. What happened in this period was that the 
focus shifted; in the pre-oil-crisis period, immigrants’ social problems 
47 it was still possible to get a residence permit.
48 see the debate in parliament: folketingstidende 1979–80, 2. samling (folketingets 
forhandlinger), sp. 14.
49 Jensen, Bent (2008) hvad skrev aviserne om de arbejdsløse? : debatten fra 1840’erne til 
1990’erne, rockwool fondens forskningsenhed, Gyldendal. 
50 The terms majority minority were not used in general in the 1970s. in this article the 
concepts are being used as analytical concepts to describe the persons.
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were the primary ‘radios of action’, but from the mid and late 1970s 
immigrants were increasingly regarded as social problems per se. The 
group of newcomers originating from non-Western countries was in-
creasingly targeted as a ‘social group’ for the welfare state to handle. 
The question was, however, how to deal with this new social problem? 
Were immigrants to be treated as danes in the social system, meaning 
that immigrants were to use the existing social offices and initiatives, 
or was it necessary to create new types of institutions to ‘take care of 
the new citizens’? This question of how to ensure equality between 
immigrants and the majority population was debated extensively 
throughout the late 1970s and especially during the 1980s51, when a 
new situation occurred in connection to the massive increase in the 
number of refugees seeking asylum in denmark.
in 1975 the above mentioned workgroup appointed by the social 
ministry in 1973 published its report. The title was Committee Report 
on foreign workers’ social and societal adjustment in this country52, sug-
gesting that the question was now more framed as an adjustment-
question than concerning foreigners’ living-conditions as was the 
case with the elkær-hansen report. The workgroup was to consider 
whether guest-workers’ general conditions had improved on the basis 
of the suggestions made by the elkær-hansen committee and further-
more provide suggestions for ‘[…] the possibility of improving guest-
workers’ social and societal adjustment […]’53 
51 for a detailed description of the debate on immigrants in danish newspapers, see Bent 
Jensen (2008). The political debate in parliament has furthermore been analysed in a 
ph.d-dissertation by lars Jørgensen (2006) and lærke K. holm (2006).
52 Betænkning om udenlandske arbejderes sociale og samfundsmæssige tilpasning her i 
landet. Betænkning nr. 761, 1975.  
53 Betænkning om udenlandske arbejderes sociale og samfundsmæssige tilpasning her i 
landet, 1975, 2. 
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in general, the workgroup recommended to expand foreign-work-
ers’ social and political rights. This tendency is quite clear with regard 
to the peoples’ pension on the one hand and voting rights on the other. 
The right to full peoples’ pension was regulated by 1) state citizenship 
or 2) the number of years in denmark.54 during the 1970s, social trea-
ties between denmark and turkey, Yugoslavia etc. were introduced, 
ensuring equal rights for immigrants and danish citizens.55 The change 
suggested by the workgroup with regard to this perspective, was to ex-
pand guest-workers’ rights to social pensions. The argument was that 
since the guest-workers had contributed to the financing of social pen-
sions, they should also have the right to receive these even if they chose 
to leave denmark.56 This aspect reflects an important point with regard 
to immigrants and the danish welfare state. The system was built upon 
the principles of universalism and solidarity between classes and gen-
erations, however when it came to immigrants and guest-workers this 
principle was implicitly challenged. Was the existing system fair, equal 
and universal when it came to immigrants? and how could the welfare 
state ensure equal rights for all people at a time when the definition of 
the people was changing. hence what was challenged, when denmark 
and the danish welfare state met the world, were implicitly the core 
principles of solidarity, universalism etc. on the one hand, immigrants 
and guest-workers did not have a ‘birth right’ to the welfare state – on 
54 in order to receive a full pension, the demand was 40 years of living in denmark be-
tween the age of 15 and 67; a demand, which none of the foreign-workers could live up 
to. see Betænkning om udenlandske arbejderes sociale og samfundsmæssige tilpasning 
her i landet, 1975, 8.
55 see Jønsson, heidi Vad & petersen, Klaus (2010). 
56 Betænkning om udenlandske arbejderes sociale og samfundsmæssige tilpasning her i 
landet, 1975, 9. 
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the other, it went against the principle of equality and inclusion to ex-
clude this group from full social benefits. 
The question of voting rights was also dealt with by the work-group 
and the recommendation was to give foreigners voting rights for mu-
nicipal elections after three years of stay in denmark. also in this per-
spective, the argument of participation and tax-payment was used, and 
the workgroup pointed out that since foreigners had worked and paid 
taxes in denmark, they should also have the right to vote in municipal 
elections and through this participate in the decisions made on ‘public 
spending’57. This question of political rights was debated through the 
1970s and early 1980s. in 1981 the work-group’s recommendation was 
followed after a heavy debate in parliament.58 
This question of voting-rights not only points at the puzzle regard-
ing inclusion / exclusion; it also indicated a shift in regard to the target-
group. during the late 1960s and early 1970s it was assumed that the 
so-called ‘guest-workers’ or ‘foreign-workers’ would at some point re-
turn to the country they had left – hence the semantic. however, when 
the work-group submitted its report, it had become clear that not all 
guest-workers were in denmark on a temporary basis; the guest-work-
ers gradually ‘transformed’ into immigrants, who were in denmark 
on a permanent basis. This shift from guest-workers to immigrants 
is reflected in the report with regard to the voting right question, as 
well as with housing and living-conditions and language. for exam-
ple, the workgroup recommended preferential treatment for a shorter 
period of time with regard to the housing-question in order to ensure 
57 Betænkning om udenlandske arbejderes sociale og samfundsmæssige tilpasning her i 
landet, 1975, 27.
58 Jønsson, heidi Vad & petersen, Klaus (2010), 35ff. 
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acceptable accommodation for foreigners and their families. This ‘spe-
cial treatment’ should, however, only be temporary because an implied 
aim was to equalize immigrants with danish citizens.59 This idea of 
preferential treatment in order to obtain ‘equalisation’ was one of the 
important discussions of this time and suggests that the welfare state 
officials attempted put foreigners on the same footing as the danish 
population, without changing the system and the societal structure. 
The new alien act, increasing number of refugees and the 
polarisation of the debate in the 1980s
The guest-worker question was left unresolved in the 1970s and when 
the new alien act was passed and implemented in 198360 an increasing 
number of refugees sought asylum in denmark from 1984. a conse-
quence of this was that the number of immigrants in denmark became 
a hot political issue.61 The debate became harsh and new concepts such 
as ‘society-scroungers / moochers’ were used by some newspapers to 
describe immigrants and refugees who in turn were considered indi-
rectly subversive.62 at the same time, the welfare state was met with op-
position and welfare-state critical parties such as the right wing Frem-
skridtspartiet was established under a so-called ‘minimal state agenda’. 
59 Betænkning om udenlandske arbejderes sociale og samfundsmæssige tilpasning her i 
landet, 1975, 15. 
60 for a thorough analysis of the danish alien acts, see Vedsted-hansen, Jens (1997) op-
holdsret og forsørgelsesret. forsørgelsesbetingelser i udlændingeretten og socialretlige 
regler om forsørgelsesadgang for udenlandske statsborgere. Jurist- og Økonomiforbun-
dets forlag. see also morten Uhrskov Jensen (2008) et delt folk. dansk udlændingepoli-
tik 1983–2008. lysias where a thorough analysis of the 1983–act is carried through. 
Uhrskov’s interpretations should however be used with caution as they are quite politi-
cally coloured. 
61 coleman, david & Wadensjö, eskil (1999) indvandringen til danmark: internationale 
og nationale perspektiver, spektrum. 
62 Bent Jensen (2000) and lars Jørgensen (2006).
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This party has later on been known for its anti-immigration position; 
a position which became quite characteristic for this party during the 
1980s.
one of the big problems for the social democratic party in the 
1980s was the lack of consensus between the municipals and the par-
liamentary representatives. many social democratic mayors stressed 
the need for standardisation and a national policy with regard to inte-
gration. The loudest critic was mayor per madsen (sd) from albert-
slund who argued for a stricter policy addressed towards immigrants. 
This question was not consensual in parliament either, as the liberals 
and conservatives argued for letting the municipalities find solutions 
on their own with reference to the municipal autonomy. The left wing 
argued for a national policy and in the middle were the social demo-
crats, who were sharply divided.63 
initiatives from welfare-state officials 
during the 1980s a rather large number of municipal reports were 
made on integration efforts and how to deal with this aspect in the 
future –in the mid 1980s for example albertslund municipality carried 
through a large-scale analysis on integration.64 By this time the number 
of refugees had, as mentioned above, increased rapidly and were now 
turned over to the municipal social administration in great numbers. 
This transfer was especially extensive in 1986. The reason for this was 
that the danish refugee council was in charge of refugees who had 
been granted asylum for the first1½ years of their stay in denmark. 
63 lærke K. holm (2006). 
64 see for example temponeras, takis (1986) indvandrere og offentlig service : et 
eksempel. Komiteen for sundhedsoplysning, and especially ejrnæs, morten & skytte, 
marianne (1986) indvandrerprojektet. resume, albertslund Kommune. 
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This institution was established in 1956 when hungarian refugees ap-
plied for asylum in denmark, and the ‘nGo’ (which was extensively 
state-financed) played a significant role with regard to refugees until 
the integration act was passed in parliament in 1998.  
in 1983, the conservative government presented an immigrant-
political statement65, which placed the integration of immigrants at the 
municipal level. The statement was an expression of principles and in 
this regard, it was stated that integration should be carried through 
with respect for and acceptance of immigrants’ cultural points of de-
parture. on the other hand, it was necessary for immigrants to give 
up some cultural traits and live after danish norms, values and stand-
ards. This meant that with regard to the principles of the welfare state 
concerning duties and rights, immigrants had to adjust to the danish 
standard. however, the municipalities and the administration would 
also have to accept some parts of  the immigrants’ culture – as long 
as this did not clash with the norms and values of the welfare state.66 
This interpretation of the balance between immigrants’ cultural back-
grounds and the welfare state to some extent fit the definition of inte-
gration argued by peter seeberg.67 on the other hand, charlotte ham-
burger places this statement within the assimilation-model, because 
of the individually-oriented approach and due to the lack of creating a 
new common societal structure. 68  This is an example of how different 
the conclusions can be, according to the different definitions of inte-
gration. charlotte hamburger’s point in regard to the 1983- statement 
and the integration-attempts and –policies carried through during the 
65 redegørelse r12.
66 redegørelse r12.
67 seeberg, peter (2006).
68 hamburger, charlotte (1990),  310 ff.
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1980s is that they focused to a great extent on how to avoid the cluster-
ing of immigrants in certain areas. for this reason, hamburger argues 
that what was labelled ‘integration-policy’ was basically assimilation. 
Whether the danish policy towards immigrants was assimilatory or 
integration-based depends to a great extent on the definition of these 
concepts. in the beginning of this chapter, integration-policy was de-
fined quite vaguely as initiatives and policies addressed at immigrants. 
The commission report and the workgroup-report from the 1970s im-
plies that these policies were concentrated to a great extent on ensur-
ing acceptable living-conditions according to the danish standard, and 
later on to also expand immigrants’ social and political rights. in the 
1983-statement r12 equalisation in general between immigrants and 
danes was one of the primary aims as was avoiding that immigrants 
developed into a ‘minority-group or an opposition-group in relation to 
danish society’. it was important for the danish welfare state to ensure 
inclusion of this group of new-comers – an aim which was reflected 
both at the political69 and at the institutional level70. 
The 1980s was a time of heavy debate and municipal solutions. The 
question of integration was not only a question of social and political 
initiatives and rights, but was also increasingly linked to the labour-
market and the duty-side of the welfare state. Women became an is-
sue and Jytte andersen made this very clear when she stated that ‘The 
male immigrants must understand that we cannot accept the fact that 
a large part of the immigrant-group, the women, are in fact prevented 
from the opportunity of moving among danes as equal citizens’.71 dur-
69 exemplified by the statement r12. 
70 in this context, the institutional level is represented partly by the elkær-hansen com-
mission and mainly by the workgroup appointed by the social ministry.
71 folketingstidende, 1980/81, folketingets forhandlinger sp. 2580. 
256
heidi Vad JØnsson
ing the 1980s, the labour-market became an increasingly important 
tool in the integration-toolbox and it still has a large space there today. 
furthermore Jytte andersen’s statement shows how integration policy 
became an increasingly intersectional question, where the welfare state 
system and the political decision makers would need to regard this 
question of equality in terms of both ethnicity, culture and gender. 
summing up and preliminary conclusions
This article has discussed a number of perspectives concerning the 
reaction of the welfare state to the emergence of immigrants and for-
eigners. firstly, it has been stressed that there are some longer chrono-
logical lines which create the foundation for the emerging integration 
policy in the 1960s and early 1970s.The attempts to ensure adequate 
housing for the polish land workers in the late 19th and early 20th cen-
tury to some extent placed the responsibility for foreigners’ social situ-
ations within the frames of the state. The introduction of work-permits 
in 1926 established a praxis with regard to the entrance-policy and this 
was, combined with the pole-act from 1908, the legislative foundation 
for the elkær-hansen-commission. in the following timetable a brief 
and very simplified overview over the period is delivered. 
it has also been suggested that the integration policy in the form 
of guest-worker-policy followed to a great extent the general develop-
ment in the expansion of the welfare state. on the other hand, by the 
late 1960s the living conditions of the guest-workers were introduced 
as a problem for the welfare state to handle. secondly a shift in ‘dis-
courses’ can be observed by the mid 1970s where it was acknowledged 
that the guest-workers intended to stay and hence they ‘transformed’ 
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into immigrants both in reality and rhetorically. at the same time im-
migrants were unemployed to a higher extent than danish workers. 
The shift in discourse was marked by a changed view on immigrants, 
who now seemed to be extensively looked upon as a ‘social problem’. 
already in the mid 1970s the lack of participation on the labour mar-
ket by immigrant-women was identified as a significant problem for 
the welfare state and for the integration at the political level. The so-
called ‘work –line’ was an important perspective especially after the 
oil-crisis hit denmark from 1973. This aspect concerning integration 
through participation in the labour-market has shown to be an ongo-
ing part of danish integration policy, meaning that the labour-market 
and its representatives (unions and employers organisations) have 
played a key-role in the establishing of this policy field. The point is 
that the welfare state has reacted in many different ways to the meeting 
with the new citizens – one of the reactions was firstly to protect the 
‘guest-workers’ from exploitation and secondly to ensure their active 
participation on the labour-market – an aspect of integration-policy 
which is closely related to the general (social democratic) ambition of 
having the highest possible employment-rate.
summing up, the period from 1967 to 1983 can be divided into 
three phases starting with a guest-worker policy, which is replaced 
by an immigrant policy from the 1970s. By the 1980s new tendencies 
emerged and new political questions were raised. This period starting 
where this chapter ends is for now labelled cultural and municipal im-
migrant policy. The main features and characteristics of the different 
phases are illustrated in figure 4 on policy development. 
in sum, a preliminary conclusion to the question: how did the wel-
fare state react is that the state firstly attempted to increase the living 
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From 1983: ’cultural & municipal’ immigrant 
policy
Explicit cultural aspect, dissemination policy, 
refugee policy
Elaboration of system integration (counting 
rights and duties)
From 1973: immigrant policy
Social inclusion, political inclusion, social and 
societal adjustment
Development of system integration
From 1967: Guest-worker policy
Protection, avoid exploitation, avoid the cre-
ation of a new underclass
New Alien Act
Incr. number of refugees
Oil Crisis: recession, increased unem-
ployment
Economic boom
Labour import
Figure 4: Policy development, 1967–1983
conditions for the immigrant-workers – an ambition rooted in the be-
ginning of the 20th century, and secondly attempted to integrate un-
employed foreigners on the danish labour market. furthermore, it be-
came increasingly important for the state officials and the institutions 
to ensure immigrants’ social and political rights – initiatives which to 
some extent had a common goal: to include immigrants in the danish 
welfare state, both the political part and the part concerning social and 
political security. These tendencies from the 1970s are however often 
cluttered by the very harsh political debate emerging from the mid 
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1980s. 1983 came to mark a new ‘era in danish integration history’: the 
new alien act introduced a legal claim to family reunification etc. for 
refugees and the same year a governmental statement on immigration 
/ integration policy was presented in parliament. 
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chapter 8 
integration policy convergence and 
Welfare ethnic nepotism 
in the republic of ireland
Bryan fanning
introduction
drawing on an analysis of the netherlands, france and Germany, 
christian Joppke in 2007 emphasised a growing eU convergence of 
integration policy. a new european pro-immigration consensus had 
reversed three decades in which immigration was mostly unwanted.1 
Well into the 1990s the joint stance of european states was ‘to sternly 
reject new labour migration’. during the 1990s, the main category of 
migrants was refugees; refugee migration became explicitly politicised. 
a resurgence of anti-immigrant political populism contributed to a 
‘fortress europe’ harmonisation, whereby member states individually 
introduced harsh policies towards these. But alongside this Joppke ar-
gues that a fundamental shift occurred, whereby labour immigration 
is now presented as a ‘permanent, even desirable feature of european 
societies’, necessary to counter demographic decline and to preserve 
european competitiveness. Joppke’s critique of eU integration policy 
1 Joppke, c. (2007), ‘transformation of immigrant immigration: civic integration and 
antidiscrimination in the netherlands, france, and Germany’, World politics, 59, 
243–73. 
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harmonisation depicts it as rooted in an influential cosmopolitan elite 
consensus as well as in economic imperatives. The europeanisation of 
civic integration policy is seen to occur though cultural standardisa-
tion no less than it does by legal mandate. here culture is defined apo-
litically in the bloodless language of policy-speak (‘the soft force of 
best-practice emulation’) in contrast with european histories of blood 
and soil nationalist identity politics.2
Joppke does not argue that national difference in dealing with im-
migrants and ethnic minorities will disappear in Western europe. But 
it is unlikely to be couched in grand ‘national models’ or philosophies 
of integration. he suggests that national difference will persist in two 
ways: ‘trivially, as sheer contingency and history, which will never be 
the same in any two places’ and in nation-state efforts ‘sometimes to 
obstruct, but more often to accommodate and mould the new in the 
image of the past.3   here, the declining influence of nation-building 
processes of modernisation, as influentially depicted by ernest Gell-
ner, is suggested.4 nation-building identity politics are portrayed as 
residual in the face of top-down eU-wide harmonisation.
Joppke’s account of harmonisation is predominantly institutional. 
it instances the 2000 eU race directive which requires that member 
states pass and implement laws against direct and indirect discrimina-
tion on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin. This protects non-eU 
immigrants as well as member state citizens.  its remit encompasses 
education, employment, social protection, health care and access to 
vital goods and services such as housing and private insurance. a sec-
2 Joppke, transformation of immigration, 247.
3 ibid, 272. also see Joppke, c (2005), selecting by origin: ethnic migration in the lib-
eral state, cambridge ma: harvard University  press. 
4 Gellner,  e. (1994) encounters with nationalism, oxford: Blackwell.  
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ond instance of harmonisation is the 2003 directive that extended the 
free-movement rights of eU citizens to non-eU residents. The third 
and most explicit indication of an eU integration project is the 2003 
council of the european Union agreed non-binding Common Basic 
Principles For Immigrant Integration in the European Union .
in Joppke’s analysis two different elements characterise the ‘two way 
process’ emphasised in the Common Basic Principles (cBps). civic in-
tegration renders the individual responsible for his/her own integra-
tion. an   accompanying emphasis on ‘antidiscrimination’ (‘the liber-
alism of equal rights’) at best retrospectively ameliorates inequalities 
resulting from the former:
The emergent gestalt of contemporary european integration is a peculiar 
coexistence of civic integration and antidiscrimination policies. They are 
complementary in that they address different phases of the migration pro-
cess – its initial (civic integration) or late phases (antidiscrimination). how-
ever, both policies also exhibit countervailing, event contradictory dynam-
ics. The logic of civic integration is to treat migrants as individuals, who are 
depicted as responsible for their own integration; civic integration is an ex-
tension into the migration domain of the austere neoliberalism that frames 
economic globalisation. The opposite logic of antidiscrimination is to depict 
migrants and their offspring as members of groups that are victimised by 
the majority society. There is thus reintroduced at the tail end of integration 
the ameliorative group logic that has been discarded at its beginning by the 
harsh individualisation of civic integration’.5
Joppke concern is with the top-down diffusion of policy norms, in-
fluenced heavily by the dutch rejection of multiculturalism and neo-
liberal eU responses to globalisation, the latter exemplified by lisbon 
5 Joppke, transformation of immigration, 247–8.
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agenda goals of making the eU  “the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world.”6  his analysis suggests a dis-
tinction between political and apolitical integration. The former is pre-
occupied with ‘traditional’ culture, poses integration questions from 
the vantage point of host country national identity and historically 
derived (essentialist) conceptions of social membership. The latter, 
exemplified by eU policy norms and directives, potentially works to 
depoliticise integration. insofar as institutions are the structural mani-
festations of culture, institutional shifts suggest underlying cultural 
ones. The rules of belonging are as ever predicated on answers to the 
question ‘integration into what?
The complementary analysis presented here addresses an implied 
cultural convergence seen to accompany institutional harmonisation. 
in summary this suggests three things: (1) that integration seems to 
have become depoliticised at the level of the nation-state because of 
internal social change that fosters generic approaches to integration. 
This perspective is one of functional convergence that emphasises 
shifting social norms as distinct from a conflict theory of social order; 
(2) for all that an eU harmonisation of integration norms can be iden-
tified, integration in any given member state setting will inevitably be 
politicised because this necessitates the extension of welfare solidari-
ties to non-citizens; (3) that integration has also become politicised 
by a trans-national liberal value culture rejection of multiculturalism. 
here policy harmonisation is to some extent driven by an ethnocentric 
liberalism (exemplified by ‘clash of civilization’ rhetoric) that depicts 
integration as coercive acculturation. at a nation-state level ethnocen-
6  ibid, 272.
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tric liberalism defines as out-groups citizens and migrants ontologi-
cally at odds with the prevailing modernity.
The republic of ireland, a kulturnation that recently opened itself to 
mass immigration, is examined here as a case study of the intersections 
between such apolitical and politicised integration. as (until recently) 
an enthusiastic participant in the eU, ireland has been open to the 
kinds of institutional harmonisation emphasised by Joppke. The major 
irish integration policy document to date, Migration Nation (2008), 
states that the Common Basic Principles have been and will be a major 
influence on irish integration policy developments.7 a further key do-
main of harmonisation revealed in the irish case is that of social inclu-
sion policy (described by Joppke as ‘the dominant integration rhetoric 
of the eU). But ireland’s mass immigration-without-politics cannot be 
understood without considering the modernisation of belonging that 
changed the ground rules of being irish. The convergence emphasised 
by Joppke concerns the means of harmonisation. This article examines 
this in terms of a convergence of ends, by which we mean the kind of 
society into which integration might (or not) occur as a political pro-
ject. here, modernisation theory as applied to the ‘traditional’ kultur-
nation by Gellner and theories of reflexive modernity applied by Beck, 
Giddens and Urry to ‘post-traditional’ projects of social reproduction 
posit shifting integration ends. 
7 office of the minister of integration (2008), migration nation: statement in integration 
strategy and diversity management, dublin: stationary office, 30.
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integration into What? 
normatively, integration refers to the process by which immigrants be-
come accepted into a society, both as individuals and as groups.8 how-
ever it comes to be defined, the implicit assumption is that conformity 
represents “successful” integration.9 But conformity into what?  socio-
logical, political science and social policy vantage points posit three 
sets of overlapping rules of belonging. The first is preoccupied with 
social reproduction and the relationships between changing social 
structure and individual agency. here, the integration of immigrants 
and the social inclusion of existing citizens must hit a moving target. 
The second posits integration in contractual terms, whereby migrants 
must negotiate expectations about citizenship rights and behaviour in 
the public sphere. ideologically, the Common Basic Principles presume 
the replacement of essential nationalism and multiculturalism by lib-
eralism as a public sphere value culture. an influential sociological lit-
erature emphasises the primacy of capabilities for social and economic 
self-integration, theorised in terms of reflexive modernity and neo-lib-
eral individualism. here, integration becomes defined sociologically 
in terms of autonomous individual capacity to flourish and individual 
responsibility to do so. reflexivity, so understood is something to be 
engineered as a political project just as were the older mass identities 
of cultural nationalism. The older nation-building projects of social 
modernisation and social reproduction are presumed to be residual. 
8 penninx, r. (2003) integration: The role of communities, institutions, and the state, 
available at: http://www.migrationinformation.org. 
9 entzinger, h. and Biezeveld, r. (2003) Benchmarking in immigrant integration, report 
written for the european commission, european research centre on migration and 
ethnic relations (rotterdam: ercomer, 8.
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The traditional and reflexive modernisation perspectives on which 
this article draws are theories of convergence. They present norms as 
functional and posit that similar changes occur in different nation-
states for similar reasons. The presumption is that integration harmo-
nisation becomes necessary because it is functional. it is responding 
to similar bottom-up changes in the nature of social solidarity even 
if it appears intellectually and politically driven by an elite consensus. 
european champions of functional cosmopolitan reflexivity, such as 
Ulrich Beck, advocate a post-national understanding of citizenship, 
whereby rights within the nation-state do not depend on naturalisa-
tion.10 These also emphasise how cosmopolitan ideals have translated 
into norms of international reciprocity through the formation of trans-
national political and legal structures.11 an example of cosmopolitan 
reciprocity is the agreement between member states dating back to 
1971 which grants reciprocal welfare entitlements to citizens of these 
living in other eU countries. as a result of such reciprocal arrange-
ments, new anti-immigrant welfare stratifications, politically driven in 
member states by ethnic nepotism, have come to predominantly affect 
non-eU migrants. 
10 see robert r and smith, W. (2003) ‘Jurgen habermas’s Theory of cosmopolitanism’, 
constellations, 10.4, 469–487, Ulrich Beck (2000), ‘The cosmopolitan perspective: 
sociology of the second age of modernity’ British Journal of sociology, 51(1), 79–105. 
11 fine r and Boon V. (2007) ‘cosmopolitanism: Between past and future, european 
Journal of social Theory, 10(1): 5–16, 6.
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The changing rules of Belonging
Reflexive versus ethno-national modernity
insofar as the entities charged with integrating immigrants are nation-
states, essentialist ideologies of belonging that precipitated their his-
torical development have inevitably featured in political responses to 
immigration. as influentially articulated by herder and fichte in the 
early nineteenth century, these included the belief that people can only 
realise themselves fully as members of an identifiable culture defined 
in terms of language, tradition and historical roots. herder empha-
sised the multiplicity and incommensurability of the values of different 
cultures; different societies could have equally valid ideals but, in real-
ity, they were incompatible.12 fichte influentially maintained that lin-
guistic homogeneity defined nationality; a Gaelic revival was integral 
to irish nation-building.13. herder emphasised the incommensurabil-
ity of different national cultures. nationalism developed as an ideology 
of cultural separatism.  
a key feature of eU integration norms – not emphasised by Joppke 
but central to the analysis presented here – is their presumed capacity 
to de-politicise integration by side-stepping thorny local histories of 
essentialist national identity. The new politics of immigration and in-
tegration charted by Joppke, with its emphasis on convergent legal and 
policy norms, are depicted as apolitical at the level of the nation-state. 
for example, as presented in the eU Handbook on Integration for Policy 
Makers and Practitioners (2007), the emphasis is on pragmatically re-
12 Berlin, i. (1998) The proper study of mankind, london: pimlico, 369–370, 393.  
13 on the influence of herder and fichte’s ideas on irish cultural nationalism see cruise 
o’Brien, c. (1988), passion and cunning: essays on nationalism, terrorism ad revolu-
tion, new York: simon and schuster, 192–195. 
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defining thorny questions of integration ends or goals into one about 
integration means or methods:
What does integration mean? The question might be expected to trigger 
familiar debates about assimilation and multiculturalism, but participants 
at the technical seminars preparing the handbook hardly used these terms. 
as policy makers and practitioners working with immigrant integration on 
a daily basis, they took a rather more practical approach, focusing on out-
comes in terms of social and economic mobility, education, health, housing, 
social services, and societal participation.14
The Handbook emphasised the acquisition by migrants of com-
petencies that would enable them to integrate. language acquisition 
aside, what is required is the same kind of social capital required of the 
overall population. for example the Handbook called on ‘each indi-
vidual to engage in a process of lifelong learning’ through ‘continuous 
training and education’. it emphasised individualised empowerment 
through reflexive skills of ‘learning to learn.’15  integration, as such, is 
equated with normative social policy understandings of individualised 
social inclusion.  
The meaning of social inclusion has shifted since the unravelling of 
post-WW2 growth and security welfare settlements.16 These promoted 
a growth and security social contract. Theories of reflexivity emerged 
to explain the deterioration of security. These presented the arche-
typical successful candidate for integration as a risk-taker who takes 
responsibility for his/her own welfare through autonomous reflexive 
14 directorate-General for Justice, freedom and security, handbook on integration for 
policy makers and practitioners (eU publications office, 2007), 8.
15 ibid, 8. 
16 hughes G and lewis G (eds.) (1998) Unsettling Welfare: the reconstruction of social 
policy, london: routledge. 
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re-adaptation.17  Beck, Giddens, Urry and lash have variously empha-
sised an obligatory individual capacity for reflexive adaptation.18 mat-
thew adams summarises the claims that reflexivity is emancipatory in 
the following terms:
reflexive self-awareness provides the individual with the opportunity to 
construct self-identity without the shackles of tradition and culture, which 
previously created relatively rigid boundaries to the options for one’s self-
understanding.19
as alternatively described by lisa adkins, the self-reflexive subject 
is ‘the ideal and privileged subject of neo-liberalism’.20 Thinking of citi-
zens rather than migrants, paul sweetman summarises the experience 
of reflexivity as one of regulation, self-surveillance and nervous self-
scrutiny.21  in all this, citizens are candidates for integration; they must 
continually negotiate the changing rules of belonging. But migrants 
who cannot muster the required reflexivity might be rejected out of 
hand. The example Joppke gives is that of the netherlands, where re-
quirements that immigrants demonstrate ‘autonomy’ through labour 
market participation and learning the dutch language have become 
increasingly coercive.22 in effect, responsibility for integration becomes 
17 sevenhuijsen, s. (2000) ‘caring in the third way: the relation between obligation, 
responsibility and care in Third Way discourse’, critical social policy 62, 5–37 (25).
18 see Beck, U. (1992) risk society: towards a new modernity, london: sage, and various 
contributions to Beck, U., Giddens, a., lash, s. (1994) reflexive modernization, cam-
bridge: polity press.  
19 adams, m. (2003) ‘The reflexive self and culture: a critique’, British Journal of sociology, 
54, 2, 221–238 (222).
20 adkins, l. (2002) ‘revisions: Gender and sexuality in late modernity’, Buckingham: 
open University press, 123.
21 sweetman, p. (2003) ‘twenty-first century die-ease? habitual reflexivity and reflexive 
habitus’, sociological review, 51 (4): 528–49.
22 Under the 1998 newcomer integration law (Wet inburgering nieuwkomers,) Joppke, 
transformation of immigrant integration, 250. 
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individualised. in Joppke’s critique, what ensues is a neo-liberalism of 
‘power and disciplining’. here:
…the contemporary state, hollowed out by economic globalisation, is coerc-
ing individuals, as well as the ‘communities’ that they constitute, to release 
their self-producing and self-regulating capacities as an alternative to the re-
distribution and public welfare that fiscally diminished states can no longer 
deliver. civic integration is the equivalent on the part of immigrants to the 
workfare policies that the general population is subjected to in the context 
of shrinking welfare states: both use illiberal means to make people self-
sufficient and autonomous.23
The reflexive modernisation perspective is an extension of mod-
ernisation theory stripped of the role ascribed to tradition in Gellner’s 
account of nation-building.24 modern nations needed a shared sense 
of authentic culture. What they had little use for, according to Gellner, 
were the ‘often baroque structures’ and the plethora of ‘nuances and 
ambiguities and overlaps’ that served the functional needs of pre-mod-
ern society. national cultures became streamlined and homogenised 
and ontologically altered. Gellner’s prerequisites for nationalism as a 
basis of social cohesion include mass literacy and school-inculcated 
culture.25 such inculcation may have promoted essentialist beliefs 
about national culture, but what arguably occurred, according to Gell-
ner (writing about irish modernisation), was the phenomenon of Ge-
sellschaft using the idiom of Gemeinschaft.26 The ‘new primary ethnic 
colours, few in number and sharply outlined against each other, be-
23 ibid, 268. 
24 Gellner, e. (1987), culture, identity and politics, cambridge: cambridge University 
press, 15–16. 
25 ibid. 
26 Gellner, e. (1983) nations and nationalism, oxford: Blackwell, 57.
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came deeply internalised.27 in Gellner’s account ‘’tradition’ as invoked 
by nation-builders was invented.  modernity produced shifts in domi-
nant cultural identities and nation-state rules of belonging through the 
modernisation of culture and through ontological displacement; out-
groups whose beliefs, cultural practices and norms presented them as 
out of step with dominant current ones were remaindered.28   
Whatever the rules of belonging are understood to be will have a 
huge bearing on the politics of integration. national identities were 
functions of modernity and the nature of the ties that bind shifted over 
time. nation-states became the vehicles for universalist conceptions 
of rights and belonging, for the expression of cosmopolitan ideas and 
liberal politics. Theories of reflexive modernisation presume a shift 
away from an explicit ethnic politics of national identity; identity is 
(again) seen to have become de-traditionalised. essentialist national-
ism became relegated to fringe political movements in the post WW2 
era, although anti-immigration national front parties have persisted. 
Within the political mainstreams of many eU member states racism 
and religious sectarianism became stigmatised. essentialist national-
isms have been discarded in favour of looser and in some cases ‘post-
nationalist’ depictions of   identity. a key project of the eU has been 
to facilitate this. 
Ethnic Nepotism and Ethnocentric Liberalism
however, claims that national identities and ethnocentrism have a 
minimal bearing on integration need to be treated with caution. again, 
Joppke has charted the decline of ethno-racial exclusive immigration 
27 Gellner, e. (1987), culture, identity and politics, 16. 
28 ibid, 15–16. 
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policies in his by Origin: Ethnic Migration in the Liberal State.29 in his 
analysis he notes some instances of preference for co-ethnics, israel’s 
law of return being an example. on the other hand, he suggests that 
German preference for co-ethnic immigrants has declined, this being 
exemplified by reform of ius sanguine citizenship laws. The inference 
is that solidarity is no longer defined by a homogenous ethno-national 
mass culture.30 The irish case bears this out. a proactive immigration 
policy targeted the irish diaspora until 2000 when it was believed that 
the pool of potential returning expatriates was becoming exhausted. 
in 2004, when co-ethnics constituted a small proportion of overall im-
migration, the irish government allowed immediate access to migrants 
from the eU accession states.31 But simultaneously in the irish case 
legislation was introduced to remove welfare entitlements from mi-
grants. immigration became depoliticised, but not integration which 
required extending welfare solidarities to non-citizens. 
david Goodhart, echoing what has come to be known as ethnic 
nepotism theory, has influentially argued that there is an inevitable 
conflict or trade-off between social solidarity and diversity.32 in the 
United Kingdom, the influence of Goodhart’s arguments can be seen 
29 Joppke, c. (2005) selecting by origin: ethnic migration in the liberal state, cambridge 
ma: harvard University press. 
30 Klusmeyer, d. (2001) ‘a ‘Guiding culture’ for immigrants? integration and diversity in 
Germany’, Journal of ethnic and migration studies Vol. 27 (3): 519–532.  
31 The Jobs ireland campaign ran from the late 1990s. it visited newfoundland, Boston, 
sidney, liverpool, munich and Berlin. But by early 2000 it was believed that the pool 
of potential returning expatriates in Britain and america was becoming exhausted. 
hayward  K and howard, K. (2007), ‘cherry-picking the diaspora’ in fanning B. (ed.) 
immigration and social change in the republic of ireland, manchester: manchester 
University press, 47–62. 
32 for example see Goodhart, d. (february 2004) ‘too diverse?’, prospect, and Goodhart, 
d. (June 2004) ‘discomfort of strangers’, prospect. on Goodhart and ethnic nepo-
tism theory see malik K. (2007) strange fruit: Why Both sides are Wrong in the race 
debate, oxford: one World, 263–4 and  fanning, B. (2009), new Guests of the irish 
nation, dublin: irish academic press, 181–187. 
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in The Path to Citizenship green paper (2008).33  Using, as Goodhart 
put it, ‘a rhetoric that would have been unthinkable 10 years ago’ The 
Path to Citizenship proposed that newcomers incur additional taxes to 
‘pay their way’. 34 This was, as the UK minister of integration put it, to 
‘win an emotional argument about immigration’.35 Goodhart depicts 
welfare nepotism as political pragmatism:
The justification for giving priority to the interests of fellow citizens boils 
down to the pragmatic claim about the value of the nation-state. Without 
fellow-citizen favouritism, the nation-state ceases to have much meaning. 
and most of the things liberals desire – democracy, redistribution, welfare 
states, human rights – only work when one can assume the shared norms 
and solidarities of national communities.36 
diversity, according to ethnic nepotism theory, undermines the 
moral consensus on which a large welfare state rests.37 as presented 
by its leading advocate frank salter, ethnic nepotism is more a politi-
cal theory of human interests than a socio-biological theory of human 
behaviour.38 it proposes calculus for ascertaining ethnic genetic inter-
est (in copies of one’s own genes) in different relational situations that 
salter uses to argue how ethnic groups ought to act in specific circum-
33 Border and immigration agency (2008) The path to citizenship: next steps in reform-
ing the immigration system, london: home office. 
34 Goodhart, d. (february 24 2008) ‘The baby-boomers finally see sense on immigration’, 
The observer. 
35 liam, Byrne (20 february 2008) UK minister of integration, press release. 
36 Goodhart, Baby boomers see sense.
37 salter, f.K. (2004) ‘introduction’ in f.K. salter (ed.) Welfare, ethnicity and altruism: 
new findings and evolutionary Theory, london: frank cass, 5. 
38 salter describes his work as ‘political ethology’ meaning the study of political phenom-
ena from a biological perspective. salter presents ethnic nepotism as a neo-darwinism 
socio-biological theory of inclusive fitness: it presumes that individual genetic interest 
is carried by close kin, and ethnic interests by one’s ethnic group. salter, f.K. (2002) 
‘estimating ethnic genetic interests: is it adaptive to resist replacement migration? 
population and environment, 24, 2, 111–140, 112–3.
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stances. here ethnic kinship is presented as relative to the population 
chosen for comparison.39 ethnic nepotism theory developed from the-
ories of inclusive fitness that portrayed individuals as ‘programmed’ by 
natural selection to extend preferential treatment of others in propor-
tion to their degree of common descent.40  it presumes that inclusive 
fitness can be applied to altruism towards non-relatives with whom 
genetic affinity can be recognised (‘extra-familial nepotism’). here eth-
nicity is ultimately defined in terms of common descent; ethnic and 
racial sentiments are understood as extensions of kinship sentiments; 
ethnocentrism and racism are thus extended forms of nepotism.41 
Kenan malik summarises the political appeal of ethnic nepotism in 
the following terms:
The echoes that reverberate between Goodhart’s and salter’s arguments are 
not because Goodhart has accepted salter’s unsavoury claims about the 
dangers of miscegenation or the need for an ethnically homogenous society. 
rather they reveal the ways in which contemporary anxieties about diversi-
ty can be reformulated into different political idioms. in part, this is because 
diversity has today become so ambiguous, indeed incoherent, in its mean-
ing that both sides of the debate can simultaneously be for it and against it. 
critics of diversity view ethnocentrism, and hence the tendency to diversify, 
as universal and often as adaptive. proponents of diversity wish to limit the 
corrosive character of diversity in the name of cultural authenticity.42 
ethnic nepotism theory presumes a kind of anti-integration harmo-
nisation, one described by Joppke in 1999 as a comparative normative 
39 ibid, 123–124. 
40 Vananen, t. (1999) ‘domestic ethnic conflict and ethnic nepotism: a comparative 
analysis, Journal of peace research, 36, 1, 55–73 (73). 
41 salter, f.K estimating ethnic Genetic interests, 112–3. 
42 malik, strange fruit, 263. 
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shift characterised by new gradations of rights or welfare stratifica-
tions between citizens and immigrant non-citizen groups.43 Whilst eU 
member states are required to extend reciprocal welfare rights to one 
another, they are not required to extend integration-as-social inclu-
sion to non-eU migrants. The new welfare ethnic nepotisms cannot 
be reduced to a revival of essentialist nationalisms. The political au-
dience being addressed are cosmopolitan values and social democrat 
advocates of universal welfare entitlements. Goodhart argues that the 
legitimacy of such entitlements depends on these being restricted to 
fellow citizens. implicit and explicit welfare ethnic nepotism can be 
identified in a number of member states. it is alluded to as a barrier to 
integration in the sixth cBp. 
The second cBp implies that integration occurs into an eU-wide 
value culture. specifically it states that: ‘integration implies respect 
for the basic values of the european union. everybody resident in the 
eU must adapt and adhere closely to the basic values of the european 
Union as well as to member state laws’. it elaborates that provisions 
and values enshrined in european treaties serve as a baseline and a 
compass. examples listed include a mixture of cosmopolitan (respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms, non-discrimination and 
citizenship-based solidarity. The countervailing emphasis on respon-
sibility requires immigrants to assimilate (reject old culture where it 
conflicts with the basic values) and expects member states to ensure 
that immigrants are not permitted to remain outside the wider value 
culture or national values:
43 Joppke, c. (1999) ‘how immigration is changing citizenship: a comparative view’, eth-
nic and racial studies, 22, 4, 629–652. 
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Views and opinions not compatible with such basis values might hinder the 
successful integration of immigrants into their new host society and ad-
versely influence the society as a whole. consequently successful integration 
policies and practices preventing isolation of certain groups are ways to en-
hance the fulfilment of respect for common european and national values.44
 
Joppke emphasises the eU-wide influence of dutch civic integra-
tion policy that emerged as a reaction against the ‘obvious failure’ of 
multiculturalism’; the Common Basic Principles were an initiative of 
the dutch eU presidency. That multiculturalism should be rejected 
is taken as a given. The intersection of post-9-11/‘clash of civilisation’ 
responses to islam and antipathy to multiculturalism within liberal 
democracies highlight the extent to which the public sphere is under-
stood as a cultural sphere in its own right, one idealised in terms of 
secular values, individual personal autonomy and history of progress. 
here the cBps can be seen to endorse an ethnocentric liberal politici-
sation of integration. anti-multiculturalism is also implicit in the re-
quirement for integration into national culture outlined by the eight 
cBps. This guarantees the practice of diverse cultures and religions 
with the caveat that if necessary ‘legal coercive measures’ can be ap-
plied where necessary to ensure that basic values prevail.45  
from the late 1980s richard rorty outlined an intellectual rationale 
for ethnocentric liberalism (or ‘anti-anti-ethnocentrism’ as he termed 
it).46 here liberalism is presented as a public sphere value culture that 
44 Quoted from full text of the second cdp.
45 The eight cdp states that’ member states also have a responsibility to ensure that cul-
tural and religious practices do not prevent individual migrants from exercising other 
fundamental rights or from participating in the host society.
46 fanning B., and mooney t. (2009) ‘pragmatism and intolerance: nietzsche and rorty’, 
philosophy and social criticism, (at press), 35. 
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behaves like an ethnos. 47  drawing on american pragmatist philoso-
phy, rorty depicted knowledge itself as ethnocentric; our only useful 
notions of ‘true’ and ‘real’ and ‘good’ are those extrapolated from our 
normative practices and our beliefs.48 The choice then for liberals (or 
anyone else) is whether to privilege to one’s own community or to pre-
tend an impossible tolerance for every other group. But his pragmatist 
critique of cultural relativism did not merely turn on the notion of a 
liberal ethnos. it extended also to national identity (ethnos as more 
generally understood). pragmatic loyalty to both were emphasised in 
a 1994 attack on the role of the ‘unpatriotic academy’ in promoting 
divisive multiculturalism.49 in the european context ethnocentric lib-
eralism tends to be directed at the muslim communities taken to offer 
proof that multiculturalism does not work largely because they are on-
tologically at-odds with the West. The dutch rejection of multicultur-
alism, exemplified by paul scheffer, pym fortune and Theo Van Gogh, 
was expressly ethnocentric in defence of liberalism as a value culture.50 
or to put it in different terms, dutch anti-multiculturalism revealed a 
selective or a la carte cosmopolitanism, committed to many, but not all 
47 rorty r. (1991) objectivism, relativism and truth, new York: cambridge, 2. 
48 particularly on John dewey. see allen, B. (2002) ‘What was epistemology?’ in robert B. 
Brandom (ed.) rorty and his critics, london: Blackwell, 224; rorty, r. (1979) philoso-
phy and the mirror of nature (princeton, princeton University press, 337.
49 as put by rorty, it ‘refuses to rejoice in the country it inhabits. it repudiates the idea of 
a national identity, and the emotion of national pride. This repudiation is the difference 
between traditional american pluralism and the new movement called multicultural-
ism. pluralism is the attempt to make america what the philosopher John rawls calls 
‘a social union of unions’, a community of communities, a nation with far more room 
for difference than most. multiculturalism is turning into the attempt to keep these 
communities at odds with one another. rorty, r. (13 february 2004) ‘The Unpatriotic 
academy’ new York times, reprinted in philosophy and social hope, 252–4. 
50 as put by scheffer (in terms also expressed by fortune and Van Gogh), recalling his 
generation as world pioneers of a new age of sexual and religious liberation, who shared 
the same ideas, the same values, the same references: ‘The muslims are spoilsports, 
unwelcome crashers at the party.’ see Buruma, murder in amsterdam, 127.  
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anti-discriminatory liberal values. european ethnocentric liberalism 
is by no means restricted to anti-muslim politics. insofar as it empha-
sises cleavages in terms of ontology and habitus, those excluded from 
solidarity include remaindered indigenous minorities living ‘at odds’ 
with modernity. examples here include the roma and also, in the irish 
case, the exclusion of the travelling community who are the largest 
indigenous ethnic minority from the remit of integration policy.
Integration as Social Inclusion
The social policy integration project exemplified by the cBps extends 
the techniques of nation-building modernisation to the promotion of 
a new modernisation of belonging, one defined by globalisation and 
one targeted at host member state populations as well as migrants. The 
first cBp defines integration in terms of rights and responsibilities as 
a two way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and 
residents of member states. a number of cBps emphasise integration 
goals that apply also to the citizen population of member states.  
The eU social inclusion agenda encompasses normative under-
standings of the structural causes of poverty and deprivation, of the 
role of social policy in promoting social cohesion and, crucially, efforts 
to measure social inclusion.51 The dominant paradigm emphasises so-
cial cohesion. it defines social exclusion in terms of poverty, related 
phenomena such as unemployment, the spatial concentration of mul-
tiple disadvantages and discrimination. The focus is on processes of 
exclusion and processes of inclusion, on relational understandings of 
51 entzinger, h. and Biezeveld, r. (2003) Benchmarking in immigrant integration, report 
written for the european commission, european research centre on migration and 
ethnic relations (ercomer), erasmus University rotterdam, 8. 
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social capital on access to the resources needed to achieve security but 
also to the attainment of societal norms.52 eU funded research on so-
cial inclusion has come to emphasise relational understandings of so-
cial capital.53 a normative focus on social cohesion, defined in terms of 
‘shared values, feelings of common identity, trust, a sense of belonging 
to the same community, can also be identified.54 prevalent definitions 
of social inclusion, social capital and social cohesion posit communal 
interdependence, shared loyalties and solidarity as the basis of integra-
tion.55 such normative communal, even communitarian integration 
values are clearly at odds with expectations of reflexive individualism 
as the basis of inclusion.
however, an emphasis on reflexivity can be identified in social in-
clusion definitions that depict individual autonomy as a core aspect 
of quality of life and human development. here, capabilities equate 
to ‘the idea that individuals actively and consciously direct their lives 
according to their preferences’.56 The cBps place considerable empha-
sis on social policy understandings of integration (integration-as-so-
cial inclusion). These can be seen to apply to citizens more so than 
to migrants where stratifications of rights and entitlements result in 
exclusion from social exclusion.  The sixth cBp states that’ ‘access for 
52 cremer-schäfer, h et al (2001), social exclusion as a multidimensional process: subcul-
tural and formally assisted strategies of coping With and avoiding social exclusion, 
Brussels: european commission. targeted socio-economic research (tser) soe1-
ct98-2048. 
53 ‘There are various theoretical approaches... But they all have in common that they 
regard social capital as a property of a social entity and not of an individual. it is a 
relational concept, it presupposes a social relation and exists only so far as it is shared by 
several individuals’ Berger-schmitt, r. and noll, n.h. (2000) ‘conceptual framework 
and structure of a european system of social indicators’, eureporting Working paper 
no. 9, manheim: zuma, 8.
54 ibid, 13. 
55 ibid, 34–35. 
56 ibid, 9.
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immigrants to institutions, as well as to public and private goods and 
services, on an equal basis to national citizens and in a non-discrim-
inatory way is an indispensable foundation for better integration’. it 
summarises the integration case against welfare nepotism:
conversely, uncertainty and unequal treatment breed disrespect for the 
rules and can marginalise immigrants and their families, socially and eco-
nomically. The adverse implications of such marginalisation continue to be 
seen across generations. restrictions on the rights and privileges of non-
nationals should be transparent and be made only after consideration of the 
integration consequences, particularly on the descendents of immigrants.57
rights to welfare are emphasised as a means to an end (integration-
as-social inclusion) rather than as an end in themselves (as an entitle-
ment of citizenship). 
  What an eU integration-as-social inclusion project might involve 
is most clearly spelt out by the empirical indictors devised on behalf 
of the european commission. These established an eU-wide baseline 
‘common language’ for conceptualising and measuring social inclu-
sion.58 The purpose was to define core eU social values and place a 
normative pressure on member states to pursue social inclusion poli-
cies, to ‘define social indicators conceptually, to apply them empiri-
cally, and to use them in politics.’ 59 a key mechanism here has been the 
requirement that member states devise national action plans on so-
cial inclusion (napincl) The eleventh (and final) cBp proposed these 
as the basis of the eU integration-as-social inclusion project:
57 Quote from full text of the sixth cdp. 
58 noll, h.h. (2002) ‘towards a european system of social indicators: Theoretical frame-
work and system architecture’, social indicators research, 58 (1–3): 47–87. 
59 Vandenbroucke, f. (2002) ‘foreword’ in atkinson, t., cantillon B, marlier e and nolan 
B, social indicators: The eU and social inclusion, oxford: oxford University press, vii. 
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although it is a process rather than an outcome, integration can be meas-
ured and policies evaluated. sets of integration indicators, goals, evaluation 
mechanisms and benchmarking can assist measuring and comparing pro-
gress, monitor trends and developments. The purpose of such evaluation is 
to learn from experience, a way to avoid possible failures of the past.
ireland has been an early adopter of social inclusions plans and tar-
gets. in 1997 it became the first eU member state to adopt a national 
poverty reduction target.60 in 2001 it agreed both a follow-up revised 
national anti-poverty strategy and its first national action plan on 
social inclusion.61  
integration and irish social policy
Social Inclusion and Integration Policy Harmonisation
The republic of ireland joined the european economic community in 
1973. Until recently it has been regarded as an enthusiastic member of 
the eU. it remained a net beneficiary of eU funding until well into its 
‘celtic tiger’ boom period. a referendum in 2008 rejected the treaty 
of lisbon. it became just one of three countries, along with sweden 
and the United Kingdom that allowed free movement of labour from 
eU-accession states in 2004. a country with a problematic history of 
handling cultural difference overtly pursued large-scale immigration 
as a neo-liberal response to globalisation. The first major irish immi-
60 The national anti-poverty strategy 1997 was developed following the 1995 Un social 
summit in copenhagen. atkinson et al, social indicators, 53. 
61 Government of ireland (2001) ireland: national action plan against poverty and social 
exclusion (napsincl) 2001–2003, dublin: stationary office. 
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gration policy statement, Integration: A Two Way Process (2000) antici-
pated key elements of the common Basic principles.
as defined in the report ‘integration means the ability to participate 
to the extent that a person needs and wishes in all the major com-
ponents of society, without having to relinquish his or her own cul-
tural identity’.62 Integration: A Two Way Process emphasised the need to 
promote the integration of refugees and immigrants into irish society 
though measures to promote employment and ones aimed at address-
ing the specific barriers of discrimination, non-recognition of qualifi-
cations and lack of fluency in english:
employment is a key factor in terms of facilitating integration. it provides a 
regular income and economic independence, security, status and opportu-
nities for interaction with people from the host community and for social 
integration. employment brings many benefits including an improved in-
come and lifestyle, an increased sense of belonging to the community, better 
interaction with people outside their own communities and allows refugees 
to contribute to society.63.
This case for integration, defined in terms of capacity to partici-
pate fully in society drew on the one for addressing social exclusion 
contained in the National Anti-Poverty Strategy (1997) and restated in 
the revised National Anti-Poverty Strategy (2002).  Both documents 
asserted that the social exclusion of marginal groups in irish society 
must be contested in the interests of the greater good; ‘no society can 
view without deep concern the prospect of a significant minority of 
people becoming more removed from the incomes and lifestyles of the 
62 department of Justice, equality and law reform (2000) integration: a two Way pro-
cess, dublin: stationary office, 9.
63  Integration: A Two Way Process, 29. 
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majority’.64  This social cohesion case for social inclusion policy was 
first extended to migrants in the lead up to the revised naps (2002). 
That document quoted the 2000 social partnership agreement, The 
Programme for Prosperity and Fairness which described racism as an 
‘emerging cause of poverty in ireland’.65
collectively, these have articulated a broad definition of social ex-
clusion that encompassed concerns about ‘poverty, deprivation, low 
educational qualifications, labour market disadvantage, joblessness, 
poor health, poor housing or homelessness, illiteracy and innumeracy, 
precariousness and incapacity to participate in society’.66 
such definitions were stated and restated in the 1996 and 2000 social 
partnership agreements, Partnership 2000 and Programme for Prosper-
ity and Fairness. The former defined social exclusion in terms of ‘cu-
mulative marginalisation: from production (employment), from con-
sumption (income poverty), from social networks (community, family 
and neighbours), from decision-making and from an adequate quality 
of life’.67 This definition acknowledged that people who experienced 
material deprivation by comparison to community norms were un-
derstood to be excluded from participation in societal activities. at the 
same time this definition recognised that exclusion from community, 
family and neighbourhood networks was not merely a consequence 
64 Government of ireland (1997) national anti-poverty strategy, dublin: stationary office, 
3–4.
65 Government of ireland (2000) programme for prosperity and fairness, dublin: station-
ary office, review of the national anti-poverty strategy (2002), 4. 
66 atkinson, t, cantillon B., marlier e., and nolan B (2002) social indicators: The eU and 
social inclusion, oxford: oxford University press, 3.
67 Government of ireland (1996) partnership 2000 agreement, dublin: stationary office, 
Government of ireland (2000) programme for prosperity and fairness, dublin: station-
ary office.   
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of income poverty. NAPS (1997) explained the need to tackle social 
exclusion in the following terms:
no society can view without deep concern the prospect of a significant mi-
nority of people becoming more removed from the incomes and lifestyles 
of the majority. it is the tackling of the structural factors that underpin this 
exclusion which requires the strategic approach set out in this document.68
‘migrants and members of ethnic minority groups’ were identified 
as a distinct target group within the Revised NAPS: Building and In-
clusive Society (2002). This set an objective of ensuring that these are 
not more likely to experience poverty than majority group members.69 
it signalled (in theory) an integration remit for irish social inclusion 
policy. however, the expectation voiced by various government minis-
ters was that the integration of new immigrants would occur through 
the economy. 
ireland’s response to eU enlargement in 2004 was to allow immedi-
ate labour market access to migrants from the accession states whilst 
simultaneously introducing explicit welfare ethnic nepotism. The 
Social Welfare (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (2004) removed rights 
from new immigrants to Unemployment assistance, old age (non-
contributory) and Blind pension, Widow(er)’s and orphan’s (non-
contributory) pensions, one parent family payment, carer’s allow-
ance, disability allowance, supplementary Welfare allowance (other 
than one-off exceptional  and urgent needs payments) and children’s 
allowances. The group most seriously affected by these new welfare 
stratifications were non-eU migrants. in february 2006 the govern-
68 Government of ireland (1997) sharing in progress: The national anti-poverty strategy, 
dublin: official publications, 4.
69 Government of ireland (2002)  Building and inclusive society: review of the national 
anti-poverty strategy, dublin: official publications, 17. 
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ment acknowledged that eU law (eec 1408 of 1971) imposed recipro-
cal obligations on eU state to recognise the entitlements of citizens 
from other eU countries resident in their own countries.  This meant 
that the removal of entitlements set out under the 2004 act could never 
have applied to immigrants arriving from the new eU member states. 
Throughout 2004 and 2005 it was generally presumed by government 
departments and nGos that the 2004 act applied to all immigrants. 
What emerged however was a habitual residence condition for entitle-
ment to such benefits; this required two years of reckonable residency 
for non-eU migrants as a basis of eligibility.
it is noteworthy that no specific political advocacy of welfare eth-
nic nepotism preceded the 2004 act. however, a citizenship politics of 
ethnic nepotism did emerge in 2004 through the government’s cam-
paign in support of a referendum on citizenship. The outcome of the 
referendum was to remove the birth-right to irish citizenship from 
the irish-born children of immigrants. citizenship had been consti-
tutionally defined in Ius Soli terms in a context of high emigration. 
The change towards an Ius Sanguine basis of establishing rights to citi-
zenship was a direct response to immigration. Within the politics of 
the referendum, the prevailing discourse distinction was one between 
‘nationals’ and ‘non-nationals.’ The latter were portrayed as having a 
right to citizenship due to a loophole in the constitution. That over 80 
per cent of voters in the referendum voted in favour of ‘commonsense 
citizenship’ (the government slogan) points to the salience of theories 
of ethnic nepotism in the irish case. 
Just one month before the act was passed the irish government 
hosted a conference entitled Reconciling Mobility and Social Inclusion 
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as part of its eU presidency.70  The report from the conference, whilst 
couched in the rhetoric of social inclusion, placed little emphasis on 
welfare rights and entitlements.71 The equation emphasised by the 
conference was one between the promotion of mobility for economic 
reasons and the need to ‘specifically promote the social inclusion of 
these workers and where appropriate, that of their families’.72 Yet the 
Reconciling Mobility and Social Inclusion conference defined social in-
clusion and integration predominantly in terms of the economic inte-
gration of workers.73 furthermore, the presumption that immigrants 
were workers with no dependents living in ireland was repeatedly stat-
ed.74 Yet, the social policy case for integration-as-social inclusion was 
acknowledged in the foreword to the conference proceedings:
mobile workers, and especially those who migrate from other regions and 
countries, are particularly vulnerable to social exclusion. mobility can in-
volve leaving behind the support of family, friends, local community and 
one’s own culture, and experiencing much difficulty in finding comparable 
support in the host country. This demands that, in solidarity, we work to 
provide them with the support they need to achieve social inclusion and 
integration. it is clearly also in our interests to do so. The social exclusion 
of migrants can result in their working well below their potential as well 
as high rates of unemployment. This has negative consequences both eco-
nomically and in relation to social cohesion. two key goals of the lisbon 
70 office for social inclusion (2004) reconciling mobility and social inclusion: The role of 
employment and social policy, dublin: stationary office. 
71 fanning, f. (2007) ‘integration and social policy’, in fanning B. (ed.) immigration and 
social change in the republic of ireland manchester: manchester University press, 252. 
72 Quoted from the back cover, italic emphasis added. office for social inclusion, recon-
ciling mobility and social inclusion.
73 reconciling mobility and social inclusion, 8.
74 ibid, 27.
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agenda, greater economic competitiveness and social cohesion, are well 
served, therefore, by reconciling mobility and social exclusion’.75
This partial endorsement of integration-as-social inclusion coin-
cided with the welfare ethnic nepotism of the 2004 Social Welfare act. 
in this context it was unsurprising that migrants and ethnic minori-
ties received just a one-paragraph mention in the 2005 report on the 
implementation of the National Action Plan against Poverty and Social 
Exclusion 2003–2005. This noted to the ‘need to provide migrants with 
access to social protection and other services’.76 for specifics it point-
ed to another policy document, Planning for Diversity: The National 
Action Plan Against Racism . This in turn noted the need to include 
immigrants within ‘national plans and programmes that target pov-
erty and social exclusion.’ again nothing specific was envisaged.  The 
National Action Plan against Racism contained some emphasis on the 
need to address institutional barriers but placed none on structural 
barriers encountered by migrants not entitled to (some) welfare goods 
and services.77 integration was envisaged as occurring through ‘macro 
economic and social policy planning’ through ‘employment rights, re-
sponsibilities and workplace policy.’78 
during the peak years of immigration before and after eU enlarge-
ment in 2004, there was little or no political debate on either cultural 
integration or on the role of social policy in furthering integration. 
policy development gathered pace in 2007 with the establishment of a 
75 ibid, 6.
76 office for social inclusion (2005) national action plan against poverty and social 
exclusion: implementation and Update report, dublin: stationary office, 4.  
77 department of Justice, equality and law reform (2005) planning for diversity: The 
national action plan against racism 2005–2008, dublin: stationary office, 31.
78 planning for diversity, 31.
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cabinet post with responsibility for integration. The first comprehen-
sive report on integration policy was published the following year. Mi-
gration Nation: Statement on Integration Strategy and Diversity Man-
agement sets out the following “key principles” which were claimed to 
inform irish state policy on integration:
–  a partnership approach between the Government and nongovernmental 
organisations, as well as civil society bodies to deepen and enhance the 
opportunities for integration
–  a strong link between integration policy and wider state social inclusion 
measures, strategies and initiatives
–  a clear public policy focus that avoids the creation of parallel societies, 
communities and urban ghettoes, i.e. a mainstream approach to service 
delivery to migrants
–  a commitment to effective local delivery mechanisms that align services 
to migrants with those for indigenous communities79 
overall the principles could be seen to endorse integration-as-social 
inclusion. But none of the related key actions set out in Migration Na-
tion did so. These emphasised immigration controls ‘to facilitate access 
to ireland for skilled migrants with a contribution to make’, ‘citizenship 
and long-term residency to be contingent on proficiency of skills in 
the spoken language of the country and enhanced anti-discriminatory 
measures. Migration Nation stated that ‘‘integration policy will be a 
two-way street involving rights and duties for those migrants who re-
side, work and in particular those who aspire to be irish citizens.’80 all 
of these were very much in keeping with the harmonisation identified 
by Joppke and the thrust of the cBps. 
79 migration nation, 9.
80 migration nation, 9–10.
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a number of measures identified in Migration Nation fell to the 
wayside by the end of 2008. These included funding for migrants in 
schools (undermining linguistic integration goals) and plans for a 
commission on integration. The stated reason was the need to make 
cuts in public expenditure in response to the global financial crisis. But 
state-funded bodies with anti-discriminatory remits were subjected 
to hugely disproportionate cuts or were shut down altogether.81 The 
combat poverty agency, which had long driven the development of 
social inclusion policy in ireland, was abolished.82 arguably, irish gov-
ernance had purged its advocates of integration-as-social inclusion. 
significantly Migration Nation (unlike the earlier Integration: A Two 
Way Process) did not cite or paraphrase social inclusion documents. 
it made no specific commitments to integration-as-social inclusion. 
 
Developmental Modernity and Cultural Convergence
Migration Nation engaged directly with the question of institutional 
harmonisation and social convergence. it argued from a nation-state 
perspective that there would be limits to the former; only so much 
could be drawn on from the experiences of other countries:
in applying such international models, the most important consideration to 
be taken into account is that integration takes place in the very specific con-
text of individual cultures and traditions, legal systems, immigration histo-
ries, administration practices, religious profiles and shared value-systems. 
81 particularly the equality authority which was stripped of more than half its funding 
(several times the level of cuts required of other public bodies). 
82 Bodies shut down included Know racism and the national consultative committee 
on racism and interculturalism (responsible for anti-racism policy) and the combat 
poverty agency which since the 1970s played a key role in the development of social 
inclusion policy. its functions were transferred to the civil service The office for social 
inclusion.
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This is not to say that lessons cannot be learnt but such lessons must be 
strictly filtered to allow for such differences.83  
irish distinctiveness is most evident in the education system. con-
stitutional religious subsidiarity has effectively resulted in a multicul-
tural school system that allows state-funded schools with a muslim 
ethos to exist alongside catholic and protestant schools.84 Migration 
Nation noted that the ‘issue of muslim radicalisation’ did not have the 
same profile as elsewhere.85  Migration Nation emphasised the ‘soft’ but 
‘binding’ harmonising role of the eU:
The point has already been made that globalisation, among other interna-
tional phenomena, binds us together with other states and standardises ex-
periences generated by the movement of people. as an eU member state, 
this binding is a powerful determinant of integration issues and the role 
of the eU is particularly relevant. in general, the eU, in understanding the 
contextual nature of integration, has to date adopted a relatively soft ap-
proach to the co-ordination of international policy and concentrates on the 
articulation and development of best practices as opposed to harmonisa-
tion. Thus, eU leadership initiatives focus on the exchange of information 
and principles of integration common to member states.86
in keeping with the cBps, Migration Nation de-emphasised na-
tional identity politics. however, its very title implied a cultural fo-
83 migration nation, 29. 
84 on issues such as wearing the hijab and dress code for girls the general trend has been 
towards flexibility. Groups such as the Joint management Body for secondary schools 
and the management association of catholic secondary schools advise schools not to 
make an issue of school uniform rules where these conflict with a child’s religion.. flynn 
K. (2006) ‘Understanding islam in ireland’, islam and christian-muslim relations, Vol. 
17, no. 2, 223–238 (231). 
85 migration nation, 33. 
86 migration nation, 29. 
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cus of integration. it specified two historical reference points. The first 
claimed that ireland’s history of diaspora implied an intrinsic solidar-
ity towards immigrants. The minister of integration’s foreword evoked 
memories of past irish emigration (‘a sense of failure evoked by our 
own inability to provide for our own people and the courage it took to 
start a new life far from home’), and claimed a role for the diaspora in 
formulating irish identity (‘in purely historical terms it is not an exag-
geration to state that the irish identity is as much as a product of those 
who left our shores as those who stayed at home’). a degree of intrinsic 
solidarity with migrants was claimed (‘This ministerial statement of 
policy is predicated on the idea that ireland has a unique moral, intel-
lectual and practical capability to adapt to the experiences of inward 
migration’)87.
The symbolic inclusion of irish emigrants within the irish nation is 
relatively recent.88  sentimental rhetoric belied several generations of 
post-famine exclusionary pressures that, as deeply internalised within 
families and communities, ruthlessly consigned those without pros-
pects to emigration or lesser status.89 ireland’s response to its diaspora 
was one of considerable ambivalence. an ongoing sense of malthusian 
fatalism depicted emigration as a manifestation of overpopulation, 
whereby any increase in population was not to be condoned because 
it would mean a decline in living standards for the rest.90 Through 
the 1998 Good friday agreement the irish abroad became officially 
recognised by the irish state as part of the irish nation. The return 
87 migration nation, 7. 
88 notably  by president mary robinson in her inaugural speech in 1990. 
89 crotty r. (1986) ireland in crisis: a study in capitalist colonial Underdevelopment,  
dingle: Brandon, 70. 
90 lee, J.J. (1989) ireland: politics and society, 1912–1985, cambridge: cambridge Univer-
sity press, 647. 
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of emigrants was promoted by the state during the late 1990s boom. 
irishness was now portrayed as ‘a global family, linked by blood and 
ancestry’.91 The Jobs ireland campaign set up by the state encouraged 
co-ethnics abroad to ‘think with their blood’ in fulfilling their patriotic 
duty to return. however, invitations to this family reunion were selec-
tive; the focus was on attracting the skilled irish abroad.92  Migration 
Nation offered a similar conditional welcome to immigrants. 
The most prominent advocate of ethnic nepotism in the irish case 
has been david mcWilliams, an influential economist and journal-
ist. in a 2007 bestseller book (and accompanying television series) 
mcWilliams argued that large-scale immigration was accepted be-
cause economic growth ensured that there were no distributional con-
flicts between natives and newcomers. 93 he posited (and advocated) 
an emerging politicisation of immigration as one between nativists 
(whom he termed hibernians) and cosmopolitans.94 mcWilliams 
advocated a selective cosmopolitanism meshed with an essentialist 
conception of irishness, closer to fringe nationalist groups than any 
of the mainstream political parties. he proposed a ‘new hibernia’ 
nation-building project modelled to some extent on zionism and Jew-
ish history. This would privilege the co-ethnics of the diaspora whilst 
rejecting other migrants.95 he advocated pulling out of the eU because 
91 see ni laoire, c. (2008) ‘complicating host-newcomer dualisms: irish return migrants 
as home-comers or newcomers? translocations: migration and social change, Vol 4. 
no. 1,  35–50 (39). 
92 howard and hayward, cherry-picking the diaspora, 57–8. 
93 mcWilliams, d. (2007) The Generation Game, dublin: Gill and mcmillan, 60. 
94 The term hibernians ‘refers to those irish people who regard themselves as irish first, 
expressed by the catholic religion, irish culture, history and language.’ mcWilliams, 
david (2005) The pope’s children, dublin: Gill and macmillan, 216. 
95 mcWilliams, Generation Game, 243. 
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of treaty requirements to accept eU migrants.96 it is noteworthy that 
anti-immigration did not feature in any of the no campaigns prior to 
the 2007 referendum that rejected the treaty of nice and that the fun-
damentalist anti-immigration ethnic nepotism mcWilliams advocated 
found no support in the political mainstream. This indifference sug-
gests the limits of ethnic nepotism theory in the irish case. large-scale 
immigration was justified by ‘a national interest discourse’ after the 
numbers of available co-ethnic migrants went into decline.97 This ‘na-
tional interest’ was distinct from ethnic interest as defined by salter 
and mcWilliams insofar some co-ethnics were less desired than some 
migrants. arguably, mcWilliam’s ideas met with indifference because 
these were deliberately framed as a recovery of a kind essentialist na-
tionalism that had long been displaced from the irish rules of belong-
ing. 
The second historical contingency emphasised in Migration Na-
tion was the emergence of developmental nation-building (aka devel-
opmentalism) which won out over an earlier ‘irish ireland’ cultural 
phase. The preoccupations of the latter were the cultural reproduction 
of the irish language and of catholicism (hibernicism as described by 
mcWilliams).98 from the 1950s a new developmental nation-building 
de-emphasised the cultural reproduction of irish national identity in 
favour of economic growth, social liberalism and the individualisation 
of irish life. The origins of a developmental nation-building project 
96 mcWilliams’ conception of hibernicism resembles that of The hibernian a xenophobic 
fringe nationalist periodical that presents immigration as a threat to the survival of the 
irish nation.  see ‘save our national Birthright’, The hibernian, July 2006 www.hiberni-
anmedia.com. 
97 Boucher, G. (2007) ’ireland’s lack of a coherent integration policy’ translocations: 
migration and social change, Vol. 3, no. 1 www.translocations.ie. 
98 o tuathaigh, G (1991) ‘The irish-ireland idea: rationale and relevance’ in (ed.) long-
ley e culture in ireland: division or diversity, Belfast: institute of irish studies. 
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trace back to the publication of the influential Economic Develop-
ment in 1957. Under sean lemass, and influenced heavily by the 1965 
oecd/irish government report Investment in Education, develop-
mental social reproduction goals came to the fore.99 Investment in Edu-
cation amounted to a paradigm shift, whereby a combined mercantile 
and human capital paradigm broke with an earlier dominant theocen-
tric one. developmental secular liberalism clashed with catholic con-
servatism as well as the primacy of cultural liberalism. Within educa-
tion policy, religious expertise, epitomised by papal encyclicals and 
episcopal pronouncements, was displaced from the 1960s onwards by 
the World Bank, oecd and eU reports and policies.100 human capital 
itself became understood as a key requirement for economic growth.  
developmental modernity (precipitated by the expansion of edu-
cation and urbanisation) was accompanied by ontological shifts in 
rules of belonging (social liberalism, secularism and individualism). 
in the standard celtic tiger era accounts, exemplified by tom Garvin’s 
Preventing the Future: Why was Ireland so poor for so long?, develop-
mentalists had triumphed over a history of economic failure, emigra-
tion and cultural stagnation.101 or as earlier depicted by Joseph lee, 
developmental liberalism was a visceral psychological and emotional 
response to post-colonial underdevelopment102 developmentalism de-
traditionalised irishness but it did not de-ethnicise it.103 The state con-
tinued to constitutionally reflect the catholic culture of the dominant 
99  Government of ireland (1965) investment in education, stationary office/oecd. 
100 o’sullivan, d (2005) cultural politics and irish education since the 1950’s: policies, 
paradigms and power, dublin: institute of public administration, 105–115. 
101 Garvin, t. (2004) preventing the future: Why was ireland so poor for so long?, 
dublin: Gill and macmillan, 170–198. 
102 lee, ireland: culture and society, 647. 
103 frost, c. (2006) ‘is post-nationalism or liberal-culturalism behind the transformation 
of irish nationalism?’, irish political studies, 21, 3,  277–295 (280–81). 
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ethnic group. at the same time it defined the national interest in pri-
marily economic terms as the pursuit of growth. insofar as optimum 
economic development was in the national interest, so too was large-
scale immigration. as justified in Migration Nation:
The important point for all irish citizens to understand is that immigration 
is happening in ireland because of enormous recent societal and econom-
ic improvement, beginning in the 1990s, but is built on an opening to the 
world created by the late sean lemass as taoiseach in the 1960s.104
irish modernity had arguably become a generic one where the rules 
of belonging had become de-traditionalised, human capital-centred, 
determined by educational attainments and by the labour market. in 
2005 the national economic and social council (nesc) influentially 
proposed the extension of developmentalism to all aspects of social 
policy.105 The Developmental Welfare State (dWs) echoed the notions 
of reflexive modernity and of an individualised risk society developed 
by Giddens and Beck. in policy terms the parallels here were with the 
Third Way reconfiguration of social policy proposed by Giddens in the 
United Kingdom. as applied by Beck to the British case it identified an 
institutionalised individualism in opposition to neo-liberal market in-
dividualism. Beck argued that most rights and entitlements associated 
with the British welfare state were designed for individuals engaged 
in paid-employment: ‘in many cases they presuppose employment. 
employment in turn implied education and both of these presuppose 
mobility. By all these requirements people are invited to constitute 
themselves as individuals: to plan, understand, design themselves as 
104 migration nation, 8. 
105 The national economic and social council is the policy arm of social partnership. 
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individuals.’106 according to Gidden’s The Third Way, the developmen-
tal role of the state was to support individual reflexivity in managing 
risks and hazards across the human lifecycle.107  
as outlined in DWS: ‘a fundamental standpoint from which to 
judge the adequacy and effectiveness of overall social protection is 
to access the risks and hazards which the individual person in irish 
society faces and the supports available to them at different stages of 
the lifecycle’ 108DWS exemplified an ontological modernisation of be-
longing that had come to discount low-skilled irish citizens lacking 
in flexibility and reflexivity. it emphasised that these would have to 
compete with immigrants in possession of both.109 Whilst some mi-
grants are exempted from social inclusion partly because of ethnic 
nepotism, some citizens experience a delimited ethnic altruism. ar-
guably, many of those most likely to experience developmental lib-
eralism as ethnocentric are residual citizen groups. in particular, the 
travelling community dislocated from rural society from the 1960s 
experienced increasing ontological social distance from the sedentary 
population, ongoing increases in political hostility over time and ex-
clusion from anti-discriminatory norms.110 arguably their experience 
as a population out of sync with reflexive modernity more closely re-
sembles that of dutch muslims than the predominantly well educated 
and employed irish muslim population, which has not been the focus 
106 Beck, U. (20 march 1998) ‘The cosmopolitan manifesto’, new statesman.
107 Giddens, a. The Third Way, 99–118. 
108 national economic and social council (2005) The developmental Welfare state, dub-
lin: stationary office, xxiv. 
109 ibid, 57. 
110 Bhreatnach, a. (2007) Becoming conspicuous: irish travellers, society and the state 
1922–70, dublin: University college dublin. 
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of state-sanctioned ethnocentrism.111 But from an ethnocentric liberal 
perspective, this observation can be seen to vindicate cdp and irish 
policy preferences for immigrants capable of self-integration.  
conclusion
arguably, what is being harmonised through the eU is no single in-
tegration paradigm, but a number of social, institutional and political 
ones. from a convergence perspective, harmonisation of integration 
exemplifies a new chapter in the parallel modernisation of belonging 
within member states. The harmonisation of integration has emerged 
in a context of multiculturalism written largely where the politics of 
incommensurability – the europe of continual wars and, in ireland, 
sectarian conflict predicated on the religious and political divisions of 
the reformation –has been tamed but by no means eliminated. in this 
context member states extend cosmopolitan reciprocal welfare altru-
ism towards one another and welfare ethnic nepotism towards out-
siders. as presented in the Common Basic Principles, harmonisation 
preserves the linguistic claims to incommensurable national identities 
characteristic of essentialist nationalism. ireland is something of a ex-
ception here insofar as the nationalist Gaelic revival was only a partial 
success. english flourished after independence for utilitarian reasons, 
a harbinger of the developmental nation-building project that began 
to displace cultural nationalism from the irish rules of belonging from 
111 in socio-economic and educational terms the extreme marginalisation of irish travel-
lers resembles that of dutch muslims. hayes, m. (2006) irish travellers: representa-
tions and realities, dublin: liffey press; spiecker s. and steutel J. (2001) ‘multicul-
turalism, pillarization and liberal civic education in the netherlands’, international 
Journal of educational research, Vol. 35, no. 3, 293–304 (296–7). 
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the mid-twentieth century. eU integration norms posit a ‘generic’ 
modernisation of belonging. insofar as the irish case validates Joppke’s 
harmonisation thesis, it does so because of an underlying cultural con-
vergence characterised in the irish case as developmental modernity. 
irish integration policy debates have come to be defined by a na-
tional interest developmental liberalism open to mass immigration 
with minimal commitment to integration. Whilst irish social policy 
is considerably influenced by eU social inclusion debates, irish am-
bivalence to integration-as-social inclusion exemplifies the civic inte-
gration harmonisation, with its accompanying welfare stratifications 
identified by Joppke. as put by Boucher, irish integration policy ulti-
mately defines the national interest in neo-liberal terms and privatises 
responsibility for integration to individual migrants.112 While Joppke 
is dismissive of the ‘rhetoric’ of social inclusion, integration-as-social 
inclusion is posited here as the functionally viable alternative to neo-
liberal civic integration. it is viable insofar as it is predicted upon trans-
ferable commonsense understandings of and institutionalised knowl-
edge about the dangers of social exclusion to social cohesion. The 
eU has successfully promoted welfare reciprocities between member 
states. it overruled irish legislation introduced in 2004 to curtail the 
welfare entitlements of migrants from member states. But the political 
problems of extending welfare solidarities beyond citizens of member 
states and co-ethnics tend to be de-emphasised in what is described 
here as apolitical integration, and in eU documents as soft harmonisa-
tion. Yet, the eU policy game of repetitively commending social inclu-
sion norms to member states can be seen as a cosmopolitan challenge 
112 Boucher, ireland’s lack of a coherent integration policy, 6. 
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to welfare ethnic nepotism. in the irish case an embryonic and very 
much beleaguered integration-as-social model has a national interest 
case to make against integration defined in neo-liberal terms. in this 
context integration-as-social inclusion offers a case for solidarity be-
tween migrants and citizens of the nation-state that may only be politi-
cally realised partially and retrospectively.
301
contributors
Daniel Béland is canada research chair in public policy and professor at the 
Johnson-shoyama Graduate school of public policy (University of saskatchewan 
campus). With andré lecours, he co-authored “Nationalism and Social Policy: The 
Politics of Territorial Solidarity” (oxford University press, 2008). 
Grete Brochmann is professor of sociology at the University of oslo. she has pub-
lished several books and articles on international migration; sending and receiv-
ing country perspectives, eU policies, welfare state dilemmas as well as historical 
studies on immigration. she has also been involved in a number of international 
research projects and evaluations. she has been lecturing internationally for many 
years, and has served as a visiting scholar in Bruxelles (louvain la neuve), at the 
University of Berkeley, california, and at Boston college, Boston. 
Romana Careja is post-doctoral research and teaching fellow at the institute for 
sociology, at the University of cologne. her main research areas are tranformation 
reforms in eastern european countries and east-West migration. recent publi-
cations include “The Politics of Public Spending in Post-Communist Countries” in 
east european politics and societies (with patrick emmenegger) (2009),  “Policy 
Coherence and Economic Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe . The Great Trans-
formation” (2010) and “Paths to policy coherence in creating market economies in 
Central and Eastern Europe” in international political science review (2011).
Patrick Emmenegger is associate professor at the centre for Welfare state 
research of the University of southern denmark. he obtained his phd 
from the University of Bern in 2008. he has published some twenty articles 
and chapters in edited books, among others in the european Journal of 
political research, comparative political studies, scandinavian political 
studies, and the Journal of european social policy.
Bryan Fanning is professor at the school of applied social science, University 
college dublin. he obtained his phd from the University of london. his previous 
books include The Quest for Modern Ireland  (2008), New Guests of the Irish Nation 
(2009), Immigration and Social Cohesion in the Republic of Ireland (2011) and, as 
co-author, Lessons for the Big Society: Planning, regeneration and the politics of the 
community participation (2011).
302
Heidi Vad Jønsson is cand.mag in history and currently phd student at the insti-
tute of history and civilization & centre for Welfare state research, University of 
southern denmark. The title of her phd thesis is: In the borderland of the welfare 
state – Danish integration policy, 1967 to 2010. 
Ireneusz Paweł Karolewski is associate professor of political science at the Willy 
Brandt centre for German and european studies, University of Wrocław and ad-
junct professor at the chair of political Theory, University of potsdam. his recent 
publications include The Nation and Nationalism in Europe (edinburgh University 
press, 2011, co-authored with andrzej marcin suszycki), Citizenship and collective 
Identity in Europe (london: routledge, 2009), Multiplicity of Nationalism in Eu-
rope (lanham: lexington Books, 2009, co-edited with andrzej marcin suszycki). 
Pauli Kettunen, d. soc.sc., is professor of political history at the University of 
helsinki, finland. he is director of the nordic centre of excellence nordWel and 
honorary professor in welfare state research at the University of southern den-
mark in odense. his recent publications include Beyond Welfare State Models 
– Transnational Historical Perspectives on Social Policy (edward elgar, 2011, co-
edited with Klaus petersen).
André Lecours is professor in the school of political studies at the University of 
ottawa. With daniel Béland, he co-authored “Nationalism and Social Policy: The 
Politics of Territorial Solidarity” (oxford University press, 2008).
Andrzej Marcin Suszycki is a lecturer in political theory at the University of pots-
dam (Germany), and a lecturer in political theory and international relations at 
the University of passau (Germany). his recent publications include The Nation 
and Nationalism in Europe (edinburgh University press, 2011, co-authored with 
ireneusz paweł Karolewski), Multiplicity of Nationalism in Europe (lanham: lex-
ington Books, 2009, co-edited with ireneusz paweł Karolewski), and Nationalism 
and European Integration (new York: continuum, 2007, co-edited with ireneusz 
paweł Karolewski).

W
elfare citizenship and w
elfare nationalism
suszycki 
(ed.)
N
ordW
el
Despite a considerable proliferation of research on citizenship, the
term welfare citizenship has remained unclear in conceptual and
theoretical terms. Scholars have also rarely scrutinised the relationship
between nationalism and the system of welfare provisions.
This volume offers contributions from scholars in the field of welfare
state studies, comparative politics, political theory as well as history
focusing on welfare citizenship and welfare nationalism.
This volume deals first with conceptual and theoretical aspects as
well as the ethical assessment of the terms welfare citizenship and
welfare nationalism. Second, it examines the nature of welfare
citizenship and welfare nationalism in a comparative perspective in
the context of multi-ethnical or multilingual statehood, and against
the background of increasing immigration flows. Third, it includes
in-depth single country case studies on Norway, Denmark and Ireland.
ISBN 978-952-10-6980-2
ISSN 1799-4691
Welfare citizenship
and welfare nationalism
edited by andrzej marcin suszycki
NordWel Studies in Historical Welfare State Research 2
*9789521069802*
ISBN 978-952-10-6980-2 (PAPERBACK)
9521 4 (PDF)
